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jeudi, 24 avril 2014

300. Naissance d’une nation

300. Naissance d’une nation

par Thomas Ferrier

Ex: http://thomasferrier.hautetfort.com

 

300 La naissance d'un empire  FRenchLa suite attendue du film « 300 » de Zach Snyder, intitulée « l’Avènement d’un Empire » (Rise of an Empire), est récemment sortie sur nos écrans. A la musique, Tyler Bates a cédé la place à Junkie XL, qui nous propose une bande originale brillante, finissant en apothéose en mêlant  son dernier morceau à une mélodie de Black Sabbath.

Comme dans le premier film, c’est un récit qui nous est proposé, jusqu’à l’extrême fin. La reine spartiate Gorgo raconte ainsi la vie de Thémistocle, le héros athénien du film, jusqu’à ce que ses troupes interviennent d’une manière décisive à Salamine. Les nombreuses invraisemblances et les libertés prises avec l’histoire sont ainsi justifiées. Il faut les admettre pour profiter pleinement du message optimiste du film.

L’ouverture avec un Xerxès décapitant Léonidas mort correspond au récit traditionnel. Quant à la « naissance » du dieu-roi, concept contraire à la tradition zoroastrienne, grande oubliée du film, la jeunesse de Xerxès, assistant impuissant au parcours d’une flèche de Thémistocle perforant l’armure de Darius, son père, est narrée, ainsi que la manipulation dont il est la victime par Artémise, jouée par Eva Green, mégère inapprivoisée avide de sang vengeur.

A l’incendie de Sardes par les Athéniens, qui sera le véritable déclencheur de la guerre avec les Perses, le scénariste a préféré « accuser » Thémistocle, personnage tragique, à la fois responsable des malheurs de son peuple et vainqueur ultime de ses ennemis.

A la grandeur sobre et un peu égoïste de Léonidas dans le premier film, Thémistocle est un idéaliste, rêvant d’une Grèce rassemblée et même d’une nation grecque. Le voici émule avant l’heure d’Isocrate. Son discours sur la nécessaire unité de la Grèce au-delà des querelles de cités rappelle celui des véritables européistes, partisans d’une Europe-Nation. Gorgo est davantage souverainiste, estimant que Sparte a « assez donné », mais elle saura faire son devoir et venir en renfort. C’est ainsi que Spartiates et Athéniens unis écrasent la marine perse, tandis qu’Artémise meure dans les bras de son ennemi.

Et même le traître du premier film, le bossu Ephialtès, sert à sa manière la Grèce en invitant Xerxès à attaquer Thémistocle, alors qu’il sait que ce dernier a prévu un piège dans lequel les Perses vont s’engouffrer. Les Spartiates, à l’instar des Rohirrim menés par Gandalf dans « Les deux tours », arrivent à la rescousse, avec à leur tête une nouvelle Valkyrie, une Gorgo marchant l’épée dressée. Même si la Sparte historique traitait ses femmes avec une quasi égalité, on ne verrait pourtant jamais une femme au combat.

Si le message du premier film était celui opposant 300 Européens au monde entier, la dimension cosmopolite de l’armée perse a été adoucie. A l’exception d’un émissaire perse, vu dans le premier film, les généraux et soldats perses pourraient passer pour des Iraniens. En revanche, le message du second est offensif. Après la résistance, la reconquête. Certes, au bord de l’abîme, tout comme l’Europe ne s’unira qu’à proximité du tombeau, selon Nietzsche. La reconquête et l’unité. Tous les Grecs combattent désormais ensemble. Historiquement, c’est bien sûr faux. Thessaliens et Grecs d’Asie mineure étaient dans l’armée perse, et Thèbes jouait double jeu. La mort héroïque de Léonidas, habilement exploitée par Thémistocle, sert de mythe mobilisateur. La Grèce a eu ses martyrs. L'Europe n'a pas encore eu les siens.

Le message politique de Thémistocle, appliqué à la Grèce mais qui pourrait tout aussi bien l’être à l’Europe, est fort. La ruine d’Athènes, incendiée par Xerxès, est également un moment décisif du film. Bien que nous sachions que Salamine fut une victoire grecque, la dimension tragique de leur combat apparaît nettement. Monté sur un cheval de guerre qui saute de bâteau en bâteau comme s’il était Pégase, Thémistocle pourfend les ennemis de son épée, jusqu’à combattre et vaincre Artémise, tandis que Xerxès s’éloigne, sentant l’ombre de la défaite.

Le film est un hymne à l’unité de l’Europe, ce qui est bien surprenant pour une production américaine, au cœur même de l’assemblée d’Athènes. En pleine crise, la Grèce se retrouve à nouveau comme préfiguration de l’Europe de demain, qui reste à bâtir. Une Grèce qui lutte pour la démocratie autour d’Athènes, aidée d’une Sparte qui pourtant n’y croit guère. L’alliance d’Athènes et de Sparte, c’est l’alliance de l’Union Européenne et de la Russie face à un empire qui menace ses libertés, un empire qui a reçu l’aide de renégats (Artémise, Ephialtès) qui agissent contre leur propre peuple.

Thomas FERRIER (LBTF/PSUNE)

Aristote, « Politique ». Livre III – chap. IV

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« De même que chaque matelot est l’un des membres d’une communauté, ainsi en est-il disons-nous, du citoyen. Ces matelots ont beau différer par leur capacité (l’un est rameur, un autre pilote, un autre la vigie, un autre reçoit quelque autre dénomination du même genre), il est clair que la définition la plus exacte de la perfection de chacun n’est propre qu’à lui, mais qu’il y en aura également une qui sera commune et qui s’adaptera à tous : en effet, la sécurité de la navigation est leur tâche à tous, car c’est à cela qu’aspire chacun des matelots. Il en va donc de même des citoyens : ils ont beau être dissemblables entre eux, leur tâche, c’est le salut de la communauté. »

Aristote, « Politique ». Livre III – chap. IV.

mercredi, 23 avril 2014

Hercule, un Jésus européen ?

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Hercule, un Jésus européen?

par Thomas Ferrier

Ex: http://thomasferrier.hautetfort.com

« Hercules, the legend begins » est enfin sorti sur les écrans français après avoir connu un terrible échec commercial, il y a deux mois, aux Etats-Unis. On pouvait donc craindre le pire, malgré une bande annonce des plus alléchantes. Après avoir vu ce film, que j’ai pour ma part beaucoup apprécié, je m’interroge sur le pourquoi de cette descente en flammes et de ce qui a déplu à la critique.

Bien sûr, dans cette Grèce du XIIIème siècle avant notre ère, il y a de nombreux anachronismes comme des combats de gladiateurs ou encore la conquête de l’Egypte. Si de beaux efforts graphiques ont été faits, on se trouve dans une Grèce de légende, à mi-chemin entre la Grèce mycénienne et la Grèce classique. Et de même, la légende du héros, avec les douze travaux, est absente ou malmenée, alors que de nouveaux éléments s’ajoutent, comme une rivalité entre Héraclès et son frère Iphiclès. Tout cela a pu surprendre un public habitué à ces classiques.

Et pourtant de nombreuses idées audacieuses se sont glissées dans ce film et le rendent passionnant. Ainsi, la vie d’Hercule s’apparente par certains aspects à celle de Jésus. De nombreux films américains, à l’instar de Man of Steel, la comparaison implicite est patente. Dans « Hercules », elle est voulue mais détournée. Alcmène s’unit à Zeus sans que le dieu apparaisse, se manifestant par une tempête accompagnée d’éclairs. Cela ne vous rappelle rien ? De même, Hercule est fouetté et attaché par les deux bras dans une scène rappelant la crucifixion. Mais il en sort vainqueur, brisant ses liens, et écrasant grâce à deux énormes blocs de pierre attachés par des chaînes à ses bras tous ses ennemis. Enfin, il devient concrètement roi à la fin de son aventure, ne se revendiquant pas simplement « roi de son peuple » mais roi véritable.

Bien sûr, ce « Jésus » aux muscles imposants mais sobres, à la pigmentation claire et aux cheveux blonds, n’a pas la même morale. Fils du maître de l’univers, dont il finit par accepter la paternité, Zeus en personne, il tue ses ennemis, jusqu’à son propre père adoptif, combat avec une férocité qui en ferait l’émule d’Arès, et semble quasi insensible à la douleur. Une scène le présente même recevant sur son épée la foudre de Zeus qu’il utilise ensuite comme une sorte de fouet électrique pour terrasser les combattants qui lui font face.

Par ailleurs, la « diversité » est réduite à sa plus petite expression, limitée à des mercenaires égyptiens, crédibles dans leur rôle. Les Grecs en revanche sont tous bien européens, avec des traits parfois nordiques. Il n’est pas question comme dans « Les Immortels » ou « Alexandre » de voir des afro-américains en armure ou jouant les Roxanes. En revanche, on retrouve davantage l’esprit de Troie, l’impiété en moins. En effet, cette fois les athées ont le mauvais rôle à l’instar du roi de Tirynthe Amphitryon. Hercule lui-même, qui ne croit pas dans l’existence des dieux pendant une bonne partie du film, finit par se revendiquer explicitement de la filiation de Zeus et la prouver. En outre, Hercules rappelle par certains côtés le premier Conan, puisque le héros est trahi et fait prisonnier, puis s’illustre dans des combats dans l’arène d’une grande intensité, bondissant tel un fauve pour fracasser le crâne d’un ennemi, mais il reste toujours chevaleresque, protégeant les femmes et les enfants.

A certains moments, le film semble même s’inspirer des traits guerriers qu’un Breker donnait à ses statues. Kellan Lutz n’est sans doute pas un acteur d’une expression théâtrale saisissante mais il est parfaitement dans son rôle. Si les douze travaux se résument à étrangler le lion de Némée, à vaincre de puissants ennemis mais qui demeurent humains, et à reconquérir sa cité, son caractère semi-divin, même si le personnage refuse tout hybris, est non seulement respecté mais amplifié. En ce sens, Hercule apparaît comme un Jésus païen et nordique, mais aussi un Jésus guerrier et vengeur, donc très loin bien sûr du Jésus chrétien. Fils de Dieu, sa morale est celle des Européens, une morale héroïque.

Toutefois, bien sûr, certains aspects modernes apparaissent, comme la relation romantique entre Hercule et Hébé, déesse de la jeunesse qu’il épousera après sa mort dans le mythe grec, et le triomphe de l’amour sur le mariage politique. C’est bien sûr anachronique. Mais « la légende d’Hercule » ne se veut pas un film historique.

Enfin, la morale est sauve puisque dans le film, Héra autorise Zeus à la tromper, alors que dans le mythe classique elle met le héros à l’épreuve par jalousie, afin de faire naître un sauveur. Zeus ne peut donc être « adultère ». Cela donne du sens au nom du héros, expliqué comme « le don d’Héra », alors qu’il signifie précisément « la gloire d’Héra », expression énigmatique quand on connaît la haine de la déesse envers le héros. Pour s’exprimer, Héra pratique l’enthousiasme sur une de ses prêtresses, habitant son corps pour transmettre ses messages. C’est conforme à la tradition religieuse grecque.

Les défauts du film sont mineurs par rapport à ses qualités, graphiques comme scénaristiques, mais ce qui a dû nécessairement déranger c’est qu’il est trop païen, trop européen, trop héroïque, qu’il singe le christianisme pour mieux s’y opposer. Le fils de Dieu est marié et a un enfant (à la fin du film). Le fils de Dieu n’accepte pas d’être emmené à la mort mais triomphe de ses bourreaux. Le fils de Dieu devient « roi des Grecs ». Enfin le fils de Dieu apparaît comme tel aux yeux de tous et n’est pas rejeté par son propre peuple. Ce film ne pouvait donc que déranger une société américaine qui va voir des films où Thor lance la foudre, où Léonidas et ses « 300 » combattent jusqu’à la mort avec une ironie mordante, mais qui reste très chrétienne, très puritaine et hypocrite.

Thomas FERRIER (LBTF/PSUNE)

vendredi, 11 avril 2014

Jacqueline de Romilly: La grandeur de l'homme au siècle de Périclès

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Jacqueline de Romilly, La grandeur de l'homme au siècle de Périclès, Editions de Fallois, 2010.

Ex: http://cerclenonconforme.hautetfort.com

Helléniste française de renom international, membre de l’Académie Française, Jacqueline de Romilly est décédée en 2010. Quelques mois avant sa mort, elle écrivit (ou plutôt dicta) cet essai qui répondait à son triste constat quant à la réalité de notre époque : le niveau culturel baisse inexorablement et les textes antiques ne sont plus lus. Or, pour l’auteure, il est impératif de se ressourcer auprès de ces grands textes afin d’y trouver les réponses sur nous-mêmes et de préparer notre futur car « nous vivons une époque d’inquiétude, de tourments, de crise économique, et –par suite- de crise morale ». Cette louable préoccupation, qu’on retrouvait également chez Dominique Venner, explique pourquoi je me suis intéressé à cet ouvrage dont je vais tenter d’extraire plus bas les aspects qui m’ont le plus marqué.

1. Que signifie, pour les auteurs grecs de l’époque de Périclès (Vème siècle avant JC), cette idée, exprimée pour la première fois sans doute, de grandeur de l’homme ? 

romilly.jpgJacqueline de Romilly se base ici sur Sophocle et surtout Thucydide où elle décèle les éléments d’une sagesse politique tendant à des vérités valables pour le présent mais aussi l’avenir.

La grandeur de l’homme s’entend comme l’agrégat de plusieurs éléments: en plus de l’intelligence et de l’ingéniosité propres aux hellènes, c’est ce sentiment que la nature humaine dans ce qu’elle a de plus « humain » (égoïsme, paresse, passions –au mauvais sens du terme- diverses) se doit d’être dominée. « La grandeur de l’homme, nous dit effectivement J. de Romilly, c’est de s’élever contre sa nature ».

Dans sa Guerre du Péloponnèse, Thucydide faisait justement remarquer que nombre des acteurs politiques de l’époque étaient souvent mus par de bas mais très humains motifs personnels au lieu de rechercher avant tout le bien commun. Il soulignait par ailleurs que Périclès, à la différence de ceux-là, était honnête et incorruptible. Il disait la vérité au peuple et cherchait à le guider pour le bien de la cité. Voilà ce qu’est un dirigeant valable : un homme rempli de qualités morales qui fera rejaillir celles-ci chez le peuple qui a besoin de tels meneurs. Seul, le peuple ne peut en effet ni dominer sa nature ni tendre vers le supérieur car il lui manque des responsables exemplaires, disposant de hautes vertus, et donc, capables de le conduire vers davantage de grandeur. En effet, le peuple est trop marqué par sa nature profonde, sa légèreté et son manque de réflexion (il est ainsi capable de s’enthousiasmer facilement pour le premier démagogue venu), pour évoluer sans guides. Toute réussite politique est donc le fruit de la recherche du bien commun couplé à une morale forte. Elle implique la rencontre d’esprits éclairés et d’une base réceptive.

D’ailleurs, les points principaux de l’idéal politique de Périclès se retrouvent chez Thucydide (dans son oraison funèbre des morts, Livre II) : le respect des gens et de la loi, l’absence de trop de coercition, la participation à la vie publique (tout en ayant une vie privée), la célébration des fêtes, le respect des morts et de leur gloire passée, le courage et le dévouement à la cité. Cet ensemble de rites et de vertus cimentent la communauté dans la recherche du bien pour le plus grand nombre. Les citoyens sont donc fiers, responsables et peuvent mener un mode de vie éclairé par la liberté, ce qui les mène sur les chemins de la grandeur.

On pourrait par ailleurs ajouter à ce tableau idéal les idées que l’auteure n’évoque que trop rapidement : la morale qui perle à cette époque à propos de la solidarité, de l’indulgence et du pardon ou encore ce qu’on retrouve dans Socrate et Platon qui, d’un point de vue religieux, placent le but de l’homme dans son « assimilation à Dieu »…

2. En quoi la figure du héros tragique nous aide à mieux cerner ce qu’est la grandeur de l’homme ?

Se basant également sur les tragédies de la même époque se rapportant aux héros grecs, la grande helléniste nous montre un autre aspect de cette grandeur de l’homme à travers l’étude de leur sort.  Dans les tragédies d’Eschyle ou d’Euripide, les héros et leurs proches sont tous frappés de désastres et souffrent allégrement. Bien sûr, des personnages aussi différents qu’Œdipe ou Médée sont très souvent emportés par leurs passions, la première tue ses enfants pour se venger de Jason et le second (chez Euripide) tue toute sa famille. Pourtant, et ce point est fondamental, ils ne sont que des victimes de la volonté divine. Les dieux, par châtiment ou hostilité, inspirent démesure, folie ou actes insensés aux hommes et aux héros qui subissent cet « égarement » qu’ils craignent au plus haut point tant il est une menace pour leur dignité et leur grandeur. C’est un fait, l’homme (ou le héros qui est une sorte de demi-dieu) est fragile, voire minuscule face aux dieux.

Pourtant, même abattu ou humilié, le héros ne perd pas de sa grandeur. Le malheur le rend encore plus grand à nos yeux car il n’est pas synonyme d’abandon. Il prouve que le héros de la tragédie est prêt à tout pour atteindre son but : il accepte les épreuves et le sacrifice ultime : la mort.

Le spectacle répété des tragédies amenait ainsi le public à accéder à un monde de grandeur où se déroulait ce que Jacqueline de Romilly appelle « la contagion des héroïsmes ». La grandeur des héros pénétrait les habitudes de pensée des Grecs et influait sur leurs esprits et leurs idéaux. Savoir se sacrifier alors qu’on sait n’être que fragilité face aux dieux magnifie d’autant plus, chez l’homme, sa grandeur. D’ailleurs, l’exemple d’Ulysse qui fait face au courroux de Poséidon et à mille autres dangers le montre bien.

Les grecs n’étaient pas des optimistes béats et avaient bien conscience que l’homme mène une vie difficile où les épreuves et les pièges sont légions, avant tout à cause de sa fragilité et de sa nature intrinsèque. Pourtant, ils avaient fait le choix de dominer cela et de se vouer à un idéal supérieur, durable et beau, atteignable seulement par un travail constant sur soi impliquant efforts et triomphe de la volonté. Ils nous montraient un chemin, un élan intérieur, que nous devrions chacun essayer de suivre avec ardeur car tendre vers cette grandeur est un désir que nous nous devons de poursuivre en tant qu’Européens conscients de notre héritage et désireux de construire notre avenir. Car notre premier travail, il est à faire sur nous-mêmes. Et nous sommes notre premier ennemi.

Rüdiger

Note du C.N.C.: Toute reproduction éventuelle de ce contenu doit mentionner la source.

vendredi, 14 mars 2014

Spartan Women

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Spartan Women

Sarah B. Pomeroy
Spartan Women 
Oxford University Press, 2002

Ancient Sparta is known not only for its great warriors, but also for its unusual treatment of women. Further north in democratic Athens, modest women were rarely educated and mostly kept sequestered indoors. But in the militarist state of Sparta, the government insisted that both boys and girls be given an education from childhood. Boys were trained to be future warriors, and women to be the mother of warriors — a task that required a variety of skills.

Sarah B. Pomeroy, a professor at New York’s Hunter College and the Graduate Center at the City University, delves into the unique education and lifestyles of women in Sparta in Spartan Women. Although its primary focus is women, the reader will learn much in the book about the men in this city-state in the south-eastern Peloponnese, as well as about the lives of both men and women in classical Athens.

Women’s Education in Sparta

Compared to other Greek women, Spartans had vastly more free time to do what they wanted. One reason for this was because Sparta was highly dependent on the labor of slaves (called helots), and Spartan citizens were not allowed to engage in most forms of manual labor. This meant that even the women were free from much domestic drudgery. The men of Sparta were full-time warriors, and consequently, Spartan women were usually more cultured than the men. For example, girls were trained in singing, dancing, and playing instruments, and singing competitions often were held between individuals and rival choruses.

Pomeroy says that there is much reason to believe that literacy was common among women in Sparta. There are numerous references to women writing letters to their sons at war (usually these consisted of urging their sons to be brave warriors). And Spartan women also were encouraged in public speaking. In ProtagorasPlato even refers to the women of Sparta and Crete, who take pride in their educations and are skilled in philosophical debate. Common themes for women’s speeches included praising the brave and reviling cowards and bachelors. Another testimony to Spartan women’s education: The Neoplatonist philosopher Iamblichus said there were 17 or 18 women among Pythagoras’ 235 disciples; about one-third of the women were Spartans, while less than 1 percent were Spartan men.

Women could own land in Sparta, and by Aristotle’s time, they owned two-fifths of the land in Laconia. Another privilege of Spartan women, according to Pomeroy: “of all Greek women, Spartans alone drank wine not only at festivals, but also as part of their daily fare.” Although they could not vote, they participated in political campaigns and were said to have much influence over their husbands (according to Aristotle).

Spartan Women and Sports

Edgar Degas, “Young Spartans Exercising”

Spartan Women also details women’s role in sports, another area where they were able to receive training and to excel. Their training was similar to that of boys, but less intense. Women participated in trials of strength, racing competitions, wrestling, discus throwing, and hurling the javelin. Some athletic competitions were held in honor of female deities.

The encouragement of athleticism in women appears to be based on women’s role as mothers. According to Xenophon, Lycurgus (who created Sparta’s constitution) thought that having two physically healthy parents would be more likely to produce healthy offspring.

Young men and women often exercised in the nude, and there was even a “Festival of Nude Youths.” Confirmed bachelors, according to Plutarch, were banned from attending. For the others, it was a chance to view potential marriage partners.

Marriage in Sparta

Gustave Moreau’s depiction of Helen of Troy (Helen of Spara)

Spartan women were usually married at 18—later than other Greek women—and the marriages were unusual for Greece at the time. Unlike in Athens, where a 15-year-old girl might marry a man twice her age, Spartan couples were usually close to the same age. The men lived with other men in military groups until age 30, so there was no “nuclear family” until later in life. Husbands and wives were not encouraged to spend a lot of time together, the idea being that absence created stronger passions between the pair, and that the child resulting from a passionate union would be stronger.

The marriages in Sparta were “mostly monogamous.” Although couples were married, it wasn’t uncommon for a woman to have another man’s child than her husband’s, if the man could persuade the husband to allow it. As the population declined, men began fathering children with the helots (the children would be partial citizens); but the consequence was that their legitimate wives began having fewer children. There appears to have been no penalty for adulterous women, like in other parts of Greece where they could be punishable with death.

The Importance of Motherhood

Spartan Women spends many pages describing the role of motherhood in Sparta, since being a mother (particularly the mother of a brave warrior) was the highest honor for women. The only women who were permitted gravestones were priestesses and those who died in childbirth. Women spent much of their time actually involved with their children, since slaves did many of the domestic chores and families were provided with rations of food by the state. Women did work, but it was more as managers than as servants. Before the decline of Sparta, greed was considered a vice, so women’s pursuits were more centered on the arts and their children rather than accumulating material things. In fact, Spartan women were forbidden to wear gold or use cosmetics.

Because they were so involved with their children’s upbringing, women felt very responsible for their children’s successes (and failures) in life. Many of these attitudes can be found in Plutarch’s Sayings of Spartan Women, where he recounts women disowning and even killing cowardly sons.

One of Pomeroy’s most interesting discoveries involves the practice of infanticide. It’s a well-documented fact that deformed or weak babies would be thrown into a chasm on Mount Taygetos, a form of eugenics that ensured a strong military for the state, and that only worthy candidates would be awarded the land and education that was the right of every Spartan citizen. Pomeroy presents a valid case that female babies were not put to the same scrutiny as the males (except for obvious physical deformities). Not all male babies were capable of being warriors, but even the weakest female baby could grow into a mother of warriors.

Women and Religion in Sparta

Unlike most societies in ancient Greece, the private family religious cult was virtually unknown in Sparta. There are several main reasons for this: The first is because there was such an emphasis on community, so primary loyalty was to the state not the family. The militaristic nature of Sparta meant that transcendent values and actions were more important than biological ties (as evidenced by the willingness to kill family members). And finally, since married couples lived apart until the man was 30, and since children went away from home to be educated at a young age, the “family” as we think of it today was never very solidified.

Religion was important to women in Sparta, however. The popular cults for women included those of Dionysus, Eileithyia (a fertility goddess), Artemis, Hera, Helen of Troy, Demeter, Apollo, Athena, and Aphrodite. Spartan Women goes into details about each of these cults, and also discusses the role of women priestesses at various periods in the city-state’s history.

*  *  *

Spartan Women is scholarly and well-researched, yet written in an easy-to-understand style for a general audience. My only complaint is that much of the information is repeated at many places throughout the book — however, it is evidence of thorough research and ensures that you can read any chapter and receive all of the relevant information. I’d highly recommend it to anyone interested in the history of either Sparta or Athens, women’s roles in traditional societies, and women’s roles in pagan religions.

mardi, 07 mai 2013

Quel rôle les dieux grecs ont-ils joué dans la guerre de Troie ?

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Quel rôle les dieux grecs ont-ils joué dans la guerre de Troie ?

Pierre Sineux

Ex: http://linformationnationaliste.hautetfort.com/

Au chant III de l'Iliade, Priam s'adresse à Hélène : "Tu n'es, pour moi, cause de rien, les dieux seuls sont cause de tout : ce sont eux qui ont déchaîné cette guerre" (III, 164-165). Les vieux Troyens, au demeurant, quand ils voient Hélène marcher sur les remparts, sont prêts à excuser tout à la fois Troyens et Achéens "si pour telle femme, ils souffrent si longs maux. Elle a terriblement l'air, quand on l'a devant soi, des déesses immortelles" (III, 156158). Hélène n'y serait pour rien ou plutôt, quand bien même y serait-elle pour quelque chose, ce serait la faute de cette part "divine" qui est en elle, cette beauté qui, précisément, la met du côté des dieux et matérialise une destinée de nature divine. Voyons les faits. Dans l'Iliade, il faut se rendre au chant XXIV pour trouver une allusion à l'événement qui déclencha la guerre de Troie alors que les dieux délibèrent au sujet du cadavre d'Hector, Héra, Poséidon et Athéna conservent leur rancune à l'égard de Troie et de Priam : "ils pensent à l'affront qu'en son aveuglement Pâris à ces déesses autrefois infligea : lors, dans sa bergerie elles étaient venues, mais il leur préféra celle qui lui fit don d'un objet de douloureux désir" (XXIV, 28-30). À Héra et à Athéna Pâris-Alexandre préféra Aphrodite qui lui fit don d'Hélène. Mais Pâris n'était en fait que l'instrument d'une querelle qu'aux noces de Thétis et de Pélée, Éris avait suscitée entre les trois déesses pour savoir laquelle des trois était la plus belle.

L'épisode figure dans les Chants Cypriens, une épopée perdue qui racontait les événements antérieurs à ceux qui sont évoqués dans l'Iliade, depuis les noces de Thétis et de Pélée jusqu'à la capture de Chryséis, la fille d'un prêtre d'Apollon, par Agamemnon. La guerre de Troie y apparaît en définitive comme le fruit d'un complot ourdi par Zeus et par Thémis. Zeus cherchait, en effet, à délivrer la terre du poids de tant de mortels ; Gaia, accablée par le nombre des hommes et par leur impiété, s'était plainte auprès de lui qui, d'abord, provoqua la guerre des Sept contre Thèbes puis qui, sur les conseils de Mômos ("Sarcasme"), maria Thétis à un mortel (ce sera Pélée et de l'union naîtra Achille) et engendra lui-même une fille très belle (de son union avec Léda naîtra Hélène). C'est ce qu'Euripide rappellera en faisant d'Hélène un instrument dont les dieux se sont servi pour dresser Grecs et Phrygiens les uns contre les autres "et provoquer des morts afin d'alléger la Terre outragée par les mortels sans nombre qui la couvraient" (Hélène, 1639-1642).

De l'origine de la guerre à l'histoire des batailles, tout, en apparence, dépend d'eux, l'idée même qui fait naître l'action puis le résultat d'une entreprise. D'emblée, à propos de la querelle entre Achille et Agamemnon, le poète le dit : "Qui des dieux les mit donc aux prises en telle querelle et bataille ? Le fils de Létô et de Zeus" (I, 8-9) : Apollon a vu l'un de ses prêtres, Chrysès, méprisé par Agamemnon (à qui il a refusé de rendre sa fille) et il descend des cimes de l'Olympe décocher, neuf jours durant, ses traits à travers l'armée jusqu'à ce qu'Achille appelle les gens à l'assemblée et que Calchas révèle l'origine de son courroux. On le sait, Agamemnon contraint de rendre sa captive, fera enlever Briséis, la "part d'honneur" d'Achille qui s'en va alors implorer sa mère. C'est précisément au moment où Zeus répond à la plainte de Thétis outragée en la personne de son fils qu'il fait parvenir un message à Agamemnon sous la forme d'un songe mensonger qui vient, alors que celui-ci est endormi, se poster au-dessus de son front : "Je suis, sache-le, messager de Zeus... Il t'enjoint d'appeler aux armes tous les Achéens chevelus – vite, en masse. L'heure est venue où tu peux prendre la vaste cité des Troyens. Les Immortels, habitants de l'Olympe, n'ont plus sur ce point d'avis qui divergent. Tous se sont laissé fléchir à la prière d'Héra. Les Troyens désormais sont voués aux chagrins. Zeus le veut" (Iliade, II, 26-33). Et puisqu'Agamemnon croit qu'il va le jour même prendre la cité de Priam, ignorant l'oeuvre que médite Zeus, il relance l'affrontement... Le monde homérique est donc peuplé de divinités en relation pour ainsi dire permanente avec les humains. Le dieu peut être favorable, défavorable, hostile ou bienveillant mais dans tous les cas de figures, il va de soi que son intervention est normale. On peut même aller jusqu'à dire que l'intervention des dieux est au coeur de la psychologie des héros d'Homère (Chantraine, 1952 : 48), ce que deux vers de l'Odyssée résument : "les dieux peuvent rendre fou l'homme le plus sage, tout comme ils savent inspirer la sagesse au moins raisonnable" (XXIII, 11-13).  

Si le dieu inspire la crainte ou la colère, donne l'élan de l'action, cela ne signifie pas que les héros sont dépourvus d'une volonté et d'un caractère qui leur sont propres. Causalité divine et causalité humaine coexistent, se doublent et se combinent comme le montre particulièrement la collaboration, voire la symbiose, qui se manifeste entre Athéna et Ulysse. Et lorsqu'à la fin de l'Iliade, Achille s'entend dire par Thétis que, selon la volonté de Zeus, il faut rendre le corps d'Hector, lui-même se laisse toucher par la pensée de son père que lui rappelle Priam, manque de se fâcher à nouveau, puis accepte... Dans de nombreux cas, au demeurant, ce sont les décisions prises par les héros et leurs actions qui poussent les dieux à intervenir : ainsi, quand Achille se bat avec Memnon, les deux mères divines, Thétis et Éos, entrent en scène. 

Ce rapprochement du divin et de l'humain commande en définitive la place des dieux dans l'épopée où le seuil que constitue l'immortalité tend à être sans cesse franchi. Achille est le fils de Thétis, Énée est le fils d'Aphrodite, Hélène est la fille de Zeus... Ces liens de parenté ne sont qu'un élément qui explique l'intérêt que les dieux manifestent à l'égard des hommes. Leur acharnement dans la lutte vient d'une façon générale de leur attachement pour certains mortels, leurs mérites ou leur piété – ou, inversement de leur aversion – et de la nécessité qu'il y a pour eux à exiger des honneurs de la part des hommes. Prenant parti pour les uns ou pour les autres – Héra, Athéna, Poséidon sont de tout coeur avec les Achéens, Apollon est tout entier du côté des Troyens, Aphrodite n'a d'yeux que pour Énée... – les dieux se retrouvent combattant les uns contre les autres.  

Or, précisément, tout à leur passion pour les affaires des hommes les dieux agissent et réagissent comme des hommes. Zeus a beau y faire, lui, le roi, l'aîné, le père souverain, il doit constamment rappeler à l'ordre sa famille prête à désobéir et à en découdre, ce qui ne manque pas de donner à l'épopée ici et là des allures de comédie. Et chacun de se quereller, de venir se plaindre à lui, de se moquer des uns et des autres. Et lui d'interdire aux dieux de se mêler de la guerre, de menacer de ses coups, de promettre le "Tartare brumeux" à ceux qui désobéissent. Lui-même craint sa femme, Héra, toujours prompte à le tancer : "... même sans cause, elle est toujours là à me chercher querelle en présence des dieux immortels, prétendant que je porte aide aux Troyens dans les combats" (Iliade, I, 518-521). Celle-ci peut le berner, en éveillant son désir puis en l'endormant (Iliade, XIV, 158-350) pour laisser Poséidon donner toute sa mesure dans le secours qu'il apporte aux Achéens. Ces histoires tout humaines dont l'épopée regorge mettent en lumière le caractère anthropomorphique des dieux et les limites de leurs pouvoirs.

On comprend alors que lorsque les dieux descendent de l'Olympe pour intervenir directement dans la mêlée, c'est sous une forme humaine, en prenant, le plus souvent, l'aspect d'un proche de la personne à qui ils veulent apparaître. Ce type d'épiphanie est fréquent : Aphrodite apparaît à Hélène sous les traits d'une ancienne servante mais elle est reconnue : sa gorge splendide, sa belle poitrine, ses yeux fulgurants sont ceux d'une déesse (Iliade, III, 396-398). Athéna vient au secours de Diomède qui la reconnaît et s'installe sur son char, saisissant le fouet et les rênes pour conduire les chevaux contre... le dieu Arès (Iliade, V, 839-842). Souvent, le dieu se cache dans une nuée aux yeux de la foule et ne se laisse voir que par le personnage à qui il veut se manifester : Apollon se fait reconnaître auprès d'Hector (Iliade, XV, 247-266) mais, au milieu des Troyens, il s'enveloppe d'un nuage (307). Parfois, lorsque le dieu apparaît sous les traits d'un proche, il peut laisser les mortels dans l'illusion : Apollon apparaît à Hector sous les traits de son oncle maternel, le vieil Asios, l'encourage à repartir au combat mais reste incognito (Iliade, XVI, 718). Les personnages d'Homère s'attendent à tout moment à rencontrer un dieu sous une forme humaine ; d'où la crainte, dans la bataille, de se trouver face à face avec un dieu : "Serais-tu quelque Immortel descendu des cieux ? Je ne saurais combattre une des divinités célestes" crie Diomède à Glaucos (Iliade, VI, 128). S'il arrive parfois que les dieux interviennent dissimulés, par une métamorphose, dans le corps d'un animal par exemple, la norme est bien une représentation anthropomorphique des dieux.  

On peut donc dire qu'en jouant leur rôle dans la guerre de Troie, les dieux révèlent, par la grâce du poète, leur anthropomorphisme, non seulement plastique mais fondamental : les dieux agissent et se conduisent comme des hommes. Autrement dit, la poésie épique donne une forme organique et visible à la sphère du divin et, en faisant des dieux les protagonistes d'un récit, elle leur attribue les qualités spécifiques aux individus : ils ont un nom, une "personnalité" et un caractère particuliers (Vegetti, 1993 : 388). Et pourtant... Les dieux sont bien différents. D'une certaine façon, ils apparaissent comme des héros dont l'areté (la valeur) aurait été poussée jusqu'à ses extrêmes limites : ils les surpassent par la beauté, la force, l'intelligence. L'éclat surgit dès qu'il est question d'un dieu. Laissons parler Thétis : "Zeus à la grande voix, assis à l'écart, sur le plus haut sommet de l'Olympe aux cimes sans nombre" (Iliade, I, 498-499). À cette image de la majesté divine, il faut ajouter ce trait qui change tout : les dieux sont immortels. Après avoir donné à Pélée des chevaux immortels qui pleurent la mort imminente de leur jeune maître Achille, Zeus se lamente : "Pauvres bêtes ! Pourquoi vous ai-je donc données à Sire Pélée - un mortel ! – vous que ne touche ni l'âge ni la mort ? Est-ce donc pour que vous ayez votre part de douleurs avec les malheurs humains ? Rien n'est plus misérable que l'homme entre tous les êtres qui respirent et marchent sur la terre" (Iliade, XVII, 443-447). Affirmation d'une supériorité qui fait des dieux des maîtres fondamentalement séparés des hommes.  

Nul doute que lorsqu'elle prend forme, l'épopée a pour toile de fond quantité de récits mythiques traditionnels sur les divinités et les puissances naturelles qui habitent et dominent le monde. Mais le plus remarquable est que pour faire le récit des derniers jours de la guerre de Troie, le poète, en sélectionnant, en mettant en œuvre et en réélaborant un immense matériau, a esquissé pour les siècles à venir la figure de ce qu'est un dieu grec.

Editions Klincksieck

vendredi, 15 mars 2013

What's Wrong with Democracy? From Athenian Practice to American Worship

zzAcropole-Athene-Grece.jpg

Reseña

 
Loren J. Samons II:
What's Wrong with Democracy?
From Athenian Practice to
American Worship.*
University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 2004, 307 pp.


por Erwin Robertson

Ex: http://erwinrobertson.blogspot.com/

L. J. Samons II es especialista en Grecia clásica, autor de obras como Empire of the Owl: Athenian Imperial Finance (Stuttgart, 2000) y Athenian Democracy and Imperialism (Boston, 1998). En What's Wrong with Democracy? (“¿Qué hay de malo con la democracia?”) analiza críticamente la práctica política ateniense en los ss. V y IV, con la mirada puesta en la democracia norteamericana de hoy. Uno de esos casos, pues, en que el estudio del pasado se vuelve juicio sobre el presente... y a la inversa.

Los puntos de vista del autor son heterodoxos, por decirlo suavemente: cuestiona la “fe” en la democracia, el “culto” (american worship) rendido a un sistema de gobierno cuyas virtudes se dan por aceptadas sin que medie demostración racional. LJS cree que las (buenas) cualidades que tradicionalmente se asocian con la democracia vienen de la existencia de un cuerpo ciudadano con derechos y deberes, y del gobierno de la ley, cosas que pueden ser separadas de la democracia per se. Cree más: que los valores democráticos propiamente tales (que se puede resumir en el igualitarismo y la noción de que la voluntad popular, expresada a través del voto, es moralmente buena), que han llegado a ser los principios morales y sociales fundamentales de la sociedad norteamericana, ahora amenazan la forma constitucional representativa de su gobierno.

Los Fundadores de la constitución norteamericana (James Madison, por ej.) desconfiaban de la democracia “pura”, tal como se practicó en la Atenas clásica. Sólo en el curso del s. XX los norteamericanos llegaron a identificar a su gobierno como una “democracia” –señala LJS-, a la vez que se imponía la creencia de que era el mejor régimen posible; pero ello fue justo en el momento en que la palabra perdía mucho de su significado originario. Atenas, en un tiempo un modelo, ahora suele estar bajo crítica, no porque fuera demasiado democrática (como pensaban los Fundadores), sino porque no realizó suficientemente los ideales democráticos. Así y todo, porque era (en todo o parte) democrática, Atenas antigua se beneficia del prejuicio moderno favorable a la democracia. ¿Y si los aspectos más problemáticos fuesen justamente los democráticos? Es característico el tratamiento de la muerte de Sócrates, aduce LJS; como un accidente o una anomalía que no autoriza un juicio sobre el régimen político que lo condenó: ¡casi como si Sócrates hubiera cometido suicidio!

Se trata entonces de examinar la historia ateniense, tal como fue, a fin de ver si de ella se puede extraer lecciones para la política y la sociedad modernas. Por lo tanto, un primer capítulo de la obra proporcionará información general sobre el tema; sucesivos capítulos pasarán revista a otros tantos aspectos de la demokratía ateniense. “Democracia y demagogos: Elección, votación y calificaciones para la ciudadanía” es el título del capítulo 2. Al contrario de lo que se estima en las democracias modernas, LJS recuerda que el voto no era un procedimiento definitorio de la democracia (la regla democrática era el sorteo, como advertía Aristóteles) . Sin embargo, cargos importantes, como el de strategós, eran elegidos por votación. Característicos de la democracia ateniense fueron asimismo la ausencia de calificaciones de propiedad para la ciudadanía y el hecho de que los ciudadanos más pobres recibieran, en distinta forma, pagos del tesoro público. No obstante, la noción de ciudadanía en Atenas difería de la de los modernos regímenes democráticos, donde se asocia primeramente con derechos y privilegios, más que con las calificaciones que requiere o los deberes que implica. Además, muchas de las garantías que comporta se consideran “derechos humanos” (comillas de LJS), que no dependen –se dice- o no deberían depender de la forma particular de régimen o de la distinción entre ciudadanos y extranjeros. Por el contrario, en la democracia ateniense la ciudadanía significaba serias obligaciones, incluso ciertos patrones de conducta privada, recuerda el autor.

El capítulo sobre las finanzas públicas (“the People's Purse”) subraya el carácter excepcional de Atenas entre las ciudades griegas: en primer lugar, por su riqueza en mineral de plata y por la flota de guerra que ella permitió. Con el imperio y el tributo de los “aliados”, en el s. V, pudo manejar recursos financieros sin comparación en Grecia antigua. Fue igualmente inusitado que el ateniense común, al que no se pedían requisitos de propiedad para votar en la asamblea, comenzara a decidir entonces sobre materias financieras. LJS señala el empleo abusivo de esos recursos (así lo era a ojos de todos los demás griegos) en pagos a los propios ciudadanos y en un extraordinario programa de obras públicas. Cuando se agotaron las reservas, como durante la Guerra del Peloponeso, o cuando dejaron de existir las rentas imperiales, como en el s. IV, Atenas debió gravar a sus ciudadanos ricos. Es agudísima la observación de que, con todo, a la hora de gastar, los atenienses giraban sobre sus propias reservas; la deuda pública moderna consiste en traspasar la deuda de una generación a otra.

La política exterior del s. V está tratada en dos capítulos. Evidentemente, los temas son la construcción del imperio, las circunstancias que llevaron a la gran guerra inter-helénica que fue la Guerra del Peloponeso, y las de la guerra misma. Un interesante excursus aborda el problema de la causalidad histórica, a propósito de la Guerra del Peloponeso. Para el s. IV (tema del capítulo que sigue), el problema es el de la “Defensa Nacional”, no ya el de una política imperial. De una Atenas agresiva, se pasa a una Atenas a la defensiva que terminará por sucumbir ante Filipo de Macedonia. Con todo, el triunfo de Macedonia no era inevitable, como no había sido inevitable el triunfo de los persas –con fuerzas mucho mayores- siglo y medio antes.

En “Democracia y Religión”, último capítulo, LJS recuerda que la sociedad ateniense era una integral society, sin la separación entre las esferas política, religiosa y económica, propia de las sociedades modernas. En Atenas, lo puramente “político”, en el sentido limitado moderno –lo relativo al gobierno, a las elecciones y a las opiniones al respecto- era sólo una pequeña parte del conjunto social. Sin duda, las actividades militares y religiosas disfrutaban de una participación pública mucho más elevada que la votación en las asambleas. Más que de demokratía o de los ideales de “libertad e igualdad” –comillas de LJS-, los principios unificantes del cuerpo ciudadano ateniense provenían de las creencias comunes acerca de los dioses, de un sentimiento de superioridad nacional y de la conciencia de la importancia de cumplir los deberes hacia los dioses, la familia y la polis.

Ahora bien, la tesis central de LJS es que, mientras que los logros por los que se admira a Atenas –el arte, la tragedia, la filosofía- no tenían que ver con la democracia, fue el carácter democrático del régimen lo que estimuló los aspectos más negativos. Si el pueblo decidía sobre la distribución de fondos públicos a sí mismo, eso tenía que alentar el desarrollo de los demagogos: era fácil para un político asegurar la propia elección o el éxito de las propias iniciativas mediante la proposición de repartir más dinero público a una porción suficientemente amplia de los ciudadanos. Es cierto que Pericles (como muestra Tucídides) fue capaz de “conducir al pueblo más que ser conducido por él”, y de persuadirlo a tomar decisiones impopulares, pero correctas desde el punto de vista del dirigente (que era el de la grandeza imperial de Atenas). Capaz también de enfrentar a ese pueblo, corriendo el riesgo de destitución, multas, ostracismo y hasta de la pena capital; muy a la inversa del “timid modern statesman, afraid even to suggest that 'the American people' might be misguided”. LJS penetra en el mecanismo psicológico del voto y cree poder establecer que el ciudadano medio, en el momento de elegir, no preferirá a los candidatos que se vean muy superiores a él o que le digan lo que no quiere escuchar. Es lo que parece haber ocurrido después de la muerte de Pericles. En el s. IV, Demóstenes se verá en apuros para convencer a los atenienses a destinar los recursos (entonces escasos) a las necesidades de la defensa antes que al subsidio del teatro. El autor repara también en la perversión que, a su juicio, constituye la reverencia por el acto mismo de votar, antes que por el sentido de la decisión –el “proceso” es más importante que el “producto”-, con la conclusión práctica: “any immoral or unwise act –whether it is executing a great philosopher or killing civilians while making undeclared war on Serbia or Iraq- can be defended on the grounds that it reflects the results of the democratic process”.

Tempranamente (s. VI), Atenas mostró ambiciones imperiales; y si suele hacerse una lectura humanista y liberal del Discurso Fúnebre de Pericles, el autor muestra que su tono es “militaristic, collectivist..., nationalistic". La democracia sólo exacerbó esta política. Los atenienses fueron plenamente conscientes de que la guerra y del imperio generaban ingresos que los beneficiaban directamente, lo que estimuló los aspectos más agresivos e imperialistas de la política exterior. Es claro que el pueblo aprobó todas las empresas que implicaban someter, expulsar de su territorio o exterminar a otros griegos. Si la democracia no fue la causa de la Guerra del Peloponeso, lo menos que se puede decir –en opinión de LJS- es que no hizo nada por poner fin a la guerra. Con todo, los atenienses en el s. V por lo menos arriesgaban sus vidas, en el ejército y en la flota. Mas en el s. IV estaban menos dispuestos a sacrificios para fortalecer y proteger el Estado y llegaron a pensar que tenían derecho a recibir pagos, existiera el imperio que proveía de rentas o no, y estuvieran o no cubiertas las necesidades de la seguridad nacional. El dêmos desalentaba a los individuos ricos y capaces de entrar al servicio del Estado; es shocking la frecuencia con que los generales eran juzgados y multados o condenados a muerte. Cuando llegó la hora de enfrentar el creciente poder de Filipo de Macedonia, los atenienses nunca quisieron sacrificar la paga por la asistencia a la asamblea y el subsidio del teatro para sufragar los gastos militares necesarios. Prefirieron escuchar a los oradores que les tranquilizaban con la perspectiva de la paz, antes de decidirse a una política exterior que protegiera a sus aliados –mientras los tuvieron.

Llegados a este punto, puede uno preguntarse que puede inferirse del funcionamiento de la democracia ateniense para la democracia moderna. LJS se detiene en un aspecto. A diferencia de la democracia antigua, que reposaba sobre un conjunto de sólidos valores comunes, independientes de la misma democracia, la moderna (en particular, la norteamericana, para el autor) ha debilitado esos valores, o prescindido de ellos. La democracia ha sido elevada al nivel de creencia religiosa (the American religion). Los nuevos valores moralmente aceptados e indiscutibles son freedom (para cualquier cosa que uno desee), choice (respecto de lo que sea) y diversity (en cualquier plano). Estas palabras resuenan en los corazones de los ciudadanos del modo como antes resonaban “God, family, and country”. Mientras parece perfectamente aceptable en algunos círculos reprender a alguien por sostener opiniones políticamente “incorrectas”, el hecho de hacer ver a otra persona que sus actos son moralmente equivocados y socialmente inaceptables, es en sí mismo considerado grosero, si no inmoral. Pero ninguna sociedad con valores reales (es decir, no los valores vacíos de libertad, elección y diversidad, advierte LJS) puede subsistir bajo reglas que impiden la reafirmación de esos valores mediante la desaprobación pública y privada de los individuos que los violan.

Como conclusión, el autor compara las figuras de Pericles y Sócrates. No enteramente homologables, desde luego: Pericles era principalmente político (“statist”, dice LJS) y ponía el servicio del ciudadano al Estado por sobre otras cualidades; su declarado objetivo era la grandeza de su patria. Sócrates, principalmente “moral”: para él, no era el poder del Estado el fin que debía perseguir el individuo, sino el mejoramiento de la propia alma. Mas tanto el uno como el otro arriesgaron sus propias vidas al servicio de su patria, su piedad religiosa (demostrada en el culto público) estaba conforme a lo que pensaban sus conciudadanos, subordinaron la ganancia personal a sus ideas sobre justicia o servicio público y fueron, cada uno a su modo, líderes dispuestos a correr grandes riegos por decir lo que juzgaban era necesario decir. No fueron totalmente exitosos: “Both might have been surprised to learn that we have taken the Athenian political system, stripped away its historical and social context, and raised it from a simple form of government to the one remaining Form of virtue”.

Las tesis de What's Wrong with Democracy resuenan inusuales y hasta provocativas, no sólo en Estados Unidos. Aquí nos interesan particularmente en lo que tienen que ver con la historia griega antigua. En este sentido, la obra de LJS es un completo y muy documentado resumen sobre la historia política de la época clásica, recogiendo la discusión historiográfica relevante del último tiempo. Algunas observaciones podemos permitirnos a este respecto. Ciertamente, la democracia ateniense no era nada pacifista, ni humanitaria ni especialmente tolerante; pero tampoco lo era Esparta, cuyo régimen político es habitualmente considerado oligárquico (podemos aceptar que los espartanos, por razones que ellos bien sabían, no estaban tan dispuestos a ir a la guerra como los atenienses). Los “crímenes de guerra” –para emplear la terminología moderna- abundaron por lado y lado durante la Guerra del Peloponeso –como en toda guerra, sin duda. La democracia ateniense, no por confiar el gobierno a una muchedumbre no calificada, fue particularmente ineficiente; por el contrario, manejaron sus finanzas bastante bien (aunque seguramente la Guerra del Peloponeso tuvo un costo mayor del previsto por Pericles) y su política exterior no dejó mucho que desear, al menos en el s. V (Tucídides contrasta la eficacia ateniense con la lentitud espartana). La paga por las funciones públicas, vista como una forma de corrupción por algunas de nuestras fuentes –y LJS parece compartir la opinión-, era necesaria, si se quería que el régimen fuera efectivamente democrático (Aristóteles señalaba las condiciones para ello) y, además, imperial (la flota era maniobrada en gran parte por los propios ciudadanos). El autor, por fin, adopta el punto de vista habitual en gran parte de la historiografía de los ss. XIX y XX sobre la decadencia de Atenas en el s. IV, un punto de vista que ya ha sido contrastado (nosotros mismos nos hemos referido al tópico en “La decadencia de la Polis en el siglo IV AC: ¿'mito' o realidad?”, Revista de Humanidades, U. Andrés Bello, Santiago, vol. 13, 2006, pp. 135-149).

Como quiera que juzguemos las opiniones políticas del autor, las cuestiones que plantea no son irrelevantes. Sin duda se puede sacar lecciones prácticas del funcionamiento del sistema político ateniense; de fondo, empero, es la pregunta de si ha existido una sociedad que no se funde en un mínimo de valores estables compartidos –no sólo “procedimentales”. Atenas puede ofrecer respuestas a estas preguntas. Como siempre, el mundo clásico tiene algo que decir a las inquietudes del hombre contemporáneo.
 
 

*Publicado en revista Limes N° 21, Santiago, 2009, pp. 174-178.

jeudi, 08 novembre 2012

Lycurgus & the Spartan State

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Lycurgus & the Spartan State

By Mark Dyal

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

“And Theompopus, when a stranger kept saying, as he showed him kindness, that in his own city he was called a lover of Sparta, remarked: ‘My good sir, it were better for thee to be called a lover of thine own city.’” – Plutarch[1]

Lycurgus-9389581-1-402.jpgJust as Mussolini looked to Ancient Rome for the model of a healthy, organic society, the Ancient Romans looked to Sparta. In the first century (A.D.), as Rome continued its imperial ascent to near-hemispheric domination, the distance between the virtuous Republican nobility and the garish imperial nobility began to alert many to the potential for social degeneration. One of these was Plutarch, a Roman scholar of Greek birth.

Plutarch is best known for his series of parallel lives of the most virtuous Greeks and Romans, written to explain the particular virtues and vices that either elevate or subordinate a people. His “Life of Lycurgus,” then, is less a celebratory tale of the legendary king who transformed Sparta from typical Greek polis into the greatest warrior state in Western history than a description of that state. Its lessons are no less astounding to contemporary Americans than they were for Imperial Romans. And, while many Greek, Roman, and contemporary writers have explored the origins of warrior Sparta, Plutarch’s “Life of Lycurgus” remains the only necessary source on the subject.

Lycurgan Sparta was born of decadence. As the mentor of the young Spartan king Charilaus, his nephew, Lycurgus played a Cato-esque role. He imparted conservative and austere virtues to the young king, seeking to stem the love of money and ostentatious displays among the city’s nobility. When this tactic ran afoul of the Spartan elite, Lycurgus left the city and traveled around Greece and Asia. He discovered the Homeric epics and visited the Oracle at Delphi. There, Apollo’s priests told him that under his guidance a state would become the most powerful in Greece. So, with Apollo’s backing, he returned to Sparta and was given legal command of the city.[2] He immediately established a social system in which decadence would be impossible.

Lycurgus sought above all to end the vanity, weakness, and extravagance of the Spartan people. Politically, he devised a dually senatorial and monarchical governmental system that governed for the good of the state, not just its wealthiest citizens. Before Lycurgus, the kings of two royal families ruled Sparta, a model already designed to limit tyranny. In adding the senate, Lycurgus sought only further political stability,[3] understanding that democracy was only as valuable as its subjects were noble.[4]

So whereas the Athenians made democracy the reason of the state, Lycurgus made nobility the rationality of Spartan life. Individual Spartan lives were subordinated to that one ideal.[5] But what made Lycurgan nobility so extraordinary was, one, that it was attainable only by the bravest, strongest, and most accomplished warriors – and their women; and two, the lengths to which the state went in breeding this type of nobility.

Just as we have seen in Italian Fascist thought,[6] Lycurgus was interested in human instincts. Contextually speaking, however, we do not give the latter as much credit as the former. For Lycurgus was living at a time far removed from modern assumptions about the separation of mind and body. The Greek ideal, then, was possible precisely because the body was understood to be an outward manifestation of the mind. What is remarkable in Lycurgan Sparta, though, is the understanding of the link between instinct and conception; and it is this understanding that made warriors the most noble of nobles. In other words, Spartan training was not designed to create warrior bodies and concepts, but warrior instincts, of which the bodies were mere symptoms. Thus the importance placed on ethics and environment, as we will see below.

Lycurgus took one ideal and made it the aim of the state and its subjects. But while Greek nobility had become associated with hereditary wealth, creating a self-perpetuating system of luxury and quality (to which moderns owe much of the value of the Hellenic legacy, in particular) Lycurgus transvaluated nobility, making it instead something attainable only in violent service (and the preparation thereof) to the state. He felt more profoundly than other Greeks the relationship between nobility and the human form – conceptually and physiologically – and the idea of training these in concert. And, he reformed the Spartan state to become a factory of bodily nobility. It was his social and physiological reforms to this end that were critical to Sparta’s transformation, establishing, as they did, the messes, agōgē (meaning abduction but also leading and training), and eugenics that gave content to Sparta’s warriors.

Lycurgus’ first tasks, like establishing the senate, were designed to change the immediate political and social climate of the city. He redistributed all the land in Sparta so that each citizen family had a small plot of land to cultivate. He also banned coined money, instituting instead the trade in vinegar-soaked iron bars, thus making it virtually impossible to amass wealth.[7] Almost all forms of iniquity vanished from Sparta, Plutarch writes, “for who would steal or receive as a bribe, or rob or plunder that which could neither be concealed, nor possessed with satisfaction, nay, nor even cut to pieces with any profit?”[8] Elsewhere, Plutarch explains that wealth “awakened no envy, and brought no honor” to its Spartan bearer.[9]

Although most artisans left Sparta when there was no longer a way to trade their goods, Lycurgus compounded their misery by banishing any “unnecessary and superfluous” arts.[10] When not on campaign, Spartan men spent their time in festivals, hunting, exercising, and instructing the youth.[11] Within months of the Lycurgan monetary reforms, it was impossible to buy foreign wares, receive foreign freight, hire teachers of rhetoric, or visit soothsayers and prostitutes in Sparta. Although such restrictions were not motivated by the desire to protect or develop Spartan artisan crafts, locally produced housewares soon became sought after throughout the Greek world.[12] After establishing the limits of what would be permitted in Sparta, Lycurgus set his sights on educating toward nobility.

To ensure the unity and gastronomical fitness of Spartan men, Lycurgus created a mess system wherein men and youthful warriors dined together. Scholars have pointed to the messes as a crucial element of the Lycurgan reforms, and one that only made sense by Lycurgus’ understanding of the close relationship between mind and body. As Plutarch explains, the mess ensured more than social cohesion, providing a forum for the maintenance of the warrior himself:

With a view to attack luxury, [Lycurgus] . . . introduced the common messes so that they might eat with one another in companies, of common and specified foods, and not take their meals at home, reclining on costly couches at costly tables, delivering themselves into the hands of servants and cooks to be fattened in the dark, like voracious animals, and ruining not only their characters but also their bodies.[13]

The infamous agōgē operated with similar motivations. Breaking with Greek tradition – Xenophon explains that Lycurgus literally transvalued all Greek child rearing and education practices[14] – no private tutors or education were allowed in Sparta. The Spartan state, instead, educated all boys from age seven, regardless of his family’s status. In the agōgē boys were trained for discipline, courage, and fighting. They learned just enough reading and writing to serve their purpose as warriors, with their education “calculated to make them obey commands well, endure hardships, and conquer in battle.”[15] Likewise, the boys went barefoot and largely unclothed so that they may function better in rough terrain and in inclement weather. Clothes, Xenophon explains, were thought to encourage effeminacy and an inability to handle variations in temperature.[16]

As well as being scantily clad, boys in the agōgē were underfed and encouraged to steal food. This taught them to solve the problem of hunger by their own hands with cunning and boldness[17] and encouraged the development of warlike instincts.[18] To further this development, the boys were forced to live for a period in the mountain wilderness, without weapons, and unseen.[19] If boys were caught stealing, their agōgē superiors beat them. Kennell debates the legend that these beatings had fatal consequences. After all, a Spartan boy/young man was the focus of the entire social rationale, and would not be killed prematurely. Another part of the legend is not debatable, however: the boys were not beaten for having stolen, but for having been mediocre enough at it to be caught.[20]

Returning to the mess, the boys, as common responsibility of all male citizens of Sparta, were constantly surrounded by “fathers, tutors, and governors.”[21] At dinner, the boys were quizzed on virtues and vices, commanded to answer in a simple and honest style now called laconic (after Lacedaemon). Often these questions demanded that they pass judgment on the conduct of the citizenry. Those without response were deemed deficient in the “will to excellence,” as if any lack of response, whether out of respect or ignorance, was product of an insufficiently critical mind.[22]

In Lycurgan Sparta, the warriors governed because war, and the preparation for war, had made them the most virtuous. Lycurgus is credited with codifying the value of a life cleansed of all superfluous trappings. The life so essentialized not only became the perfect hoplite warrior, moving in concert with his cohorts, but also the most virtuous and reliable citizen. This is because Spartan war training was designed primarily to toughen the mind against fear, adversity, and pain, leaving clarity and the confidence of conquering any foe in any situation.[23]

Steven Pressfield’s Polynikes explains this conception of model citizen:

War, not peace, produces virtue. War, not peace, purges vice. War, and preparation for war calls forth all that is noble and honorable in a man. It unites him with his brothers and binds them in selfless love, eradicating in the crucible of necessity all that is base and ignoble.[24]

But what of Spartan men who did not meet these noble and honorable ideals? Xenophon explains that, in Sparta, the cowardly man was, in fact, a man without a city. He was shunned in all areas of public life, including the messes, ball games, gymnasia, and assemblies. This fact of life can be discerned in the “official” Spartan belief that honorable death was more valuable than ignoble life.[25] Xenophon sums the entire Lycurgan social system thus: to ensure “that the brave should have happiness, and the coward misery.”[26] Whereas in Fascist Italy, cowardly men might have been encouraged to “be courageous” in one’s own context, in Sparta, men had only one avenue to courage – war and training for war.

The agōgē has been central to academic and popular visions of Sparta from antiquity to modernity, and justifiably so. The Romans were so enchanted with the agōgē that Roman tourists traveled to Sparta just to visit its sites and temples (Artemis and the Dioscuri each played important roles in the boys’ religious instruction). Indeed, by 100 (A.D.) Rome had re-established the agōgē in Sparta and used it as a finishing school for noble Roman boys. It is only thanks to this period of the agōgē that we know anything about its Classical glory.[27]

And, even though we have been forced to speculate from the few anecdotes provided by Plutarch and Xenophon as to the content of agōgē training, we have a clear delineation of its purpose. As Plutarch explains it, the agōgē was a systematic training regimen in which boys and young men learned warring skills (including the discipline, sense of duty, and leadership already discussed) as well as “the most important and binding principles which conduce to the prosperity and virtue of a city.” These were not merely taught through lecture and regurgitation, but “implanted in the habits and training of [the boys],” through which “they would remain unchanged and secure, having a stronger bond than compulsion”.[28] As Lycurgus is thought to have summarized the agōgē’s rationale: “A city will be well-fortified which is surrounded by brave men and not by bricks.”[29]

Just as the content of the agōgē is speculative, it seems that so to is Lycurgus’ understanding of the links between conceptual and bodily vitality. For up to now, it has only been demonstrated that Lycurgus sought to defeat weakness and vice with strength and nobility. However, Lycurgus’ understanding of the body and mind is best demonstrated by the fate of Spartan women and infants.

As suggested above, sons were not the property of the father in Lycurgan Sparta, but the common property of the state. Unlike other Greek and Roman states, in Sparta the decision to raise a child rested with a council of elders who checked babies for health and stamina. If one was ill born and deformed it was discarded, as life “which nature had not well equipped at the very beginning for health and strength was of no advantage either for itself or the state.”[30]

In many cases, Spartan children were not even the product of random parentage, “but designed to spring from the best there was.” Eugenics. During his time of exile, Lycurgus noticed something peculiar about Greek men. In Athens, Plutarch explains, he saw men arguing over the particular breeding stock of certain dogs and horses. And yet, these same men sired children even though “foolish, infirm, or diseased, as though children of bad stock did not owe their badness to their parents.”[31] Marriages and births were carefully regulated, then, always with an eye to the physical and political wellbeing of the city.

Because of the Lycurgan exaggeration of the Greek educational ideal, Plutarch exclaimed that the education of Spartan children began before birth – an extraordinary concept, considering the 7th Century (B.C.) context. In reality it began prior to conception. Which brings us to Spartan women as mothers. Uniquely in the Classical Greek world, Spartan women exercised alongside men. They ran, wrestled, and threw the discuss and javelin, so that they might struggle successfully and easily with childbirth, and that their offspring would have a “vigorous root in vigorous bodies.”[32]

Lycurgus had a well-conceived eugenic rationale, believing that the human body would grow taller when unburdened by too much nutrition. Things that are well fed, he noticed, tend to grow thick and wide, both of which went against ideals of beauty and divinity. Thus, while leanness marked the human form as most beautiful, it also gave it a kinship with the divine. However, for mothers and their offspring, the benefits were also mundane, as mothers who exercised were thought to have lean children because the lightness of the parent matter made the offspring more susceptible to molding.[33]

After birth, infants were reared without swaddling so that their limbs would develop freely and robustly.[34] Boys in the agōgē wore a simple loin wrap, and men little more. The scores of near-naked men, boys, and unswaddled babies were joined by scores of near-naked women and girls. Perhaps Lycurgus’ most delicious transvaluation of decadent values is his command that in Sparta, the healthy condition of one’s body was to be more esteemed than the costliness of one’s clothes.[35] Nakedness and a strict code of physical beauty – that equated beauty with nobility – seem like potent stimuli to health; to say nothing of the belief that one’s commitment to beauty and nobility was of great benefit to oneself, one’s offspring, and one’s people.

Lycurgus believed that scant dress encouraged in women the habit of living with simplicity. More so, however, he wanted Spartan women to have an ardent desire for a healthy and beautiful body. And because the path to health and beauty led to the gymnasia and sports field, a beautiful female body ensured that the bearer of such possessed “bravery, ambition, and a taste of lofty sentiment.”[36]

Nowhere in the ancient world were women so integrated in the social and political rationale of a people. As a result of the Lycurgan reforms, Spartan girls were educated to similar principles and standards of courage, discipline, and honor, as the boys. They were literate. They performed public rituals to Artemis and Apollo. They were athletic enough to win medals at the Olympic games – even when competing against men. And they were known for their “vitality, grace, and vigor.”[37]

Meanwhile in Athens, girls received no education beyond the domestic duties of a wife and mother. And they lived sequestered lives, with no thought of how their physical degeneration might adversely affect Athens.[38] Thus the scandalous response provoked by Spartan women. For it is the state of women that provoked the idea that Spartan men were mere slaves to women.[39] But it is also the source of the sentiment, expressed so succinctly by Zack Snyder’s Gorgo, that “Only Spartan women give birth to real men.” Incidentally, the line comes from Plutarch and not Frank Miller.[40]

Lycurgus used political philosophy and physiology to fight degeneration. And while Sparta may seem a frightening place to modern men, this is precisely its value. For Sparta stands apart as the singular place that valued the bodily and conceptual nobility of its citizens above all else.

Plutarch described the legacy of Lycurgan Sparta as an example of what is possible when an entire people lives and behaves in the fashion of a single wise man training himself for war.[41] Wisdom, training, and war: three of the Classical traits most damned by modernity – at least as they were understood and practiced by Classical peoples. Above it was suggested that the lessons of Sparta would be read equally as shocking to a Roman as to an American. Yet, this is perhaps not quite true; and the reason is in the nature of Plutarch’s statement about Sparta acting as a single wise man. For, in effect, this was Plutarch’s explanation of the efficacy of the Lycurgan reforms. Just as his portrayal of Lycurgus’ seizure of power focused on Apollo’s blessing and the will of a handful of men, so here Plutarch sees no modern systemic rationale at work; but instead a natural path of choice for truly noble men.

For, according to Plutarch, what Lycurgus did was to establish a divinely sanctioned ethical aristocracy at the expense of a monetary aristocracy. This was an aristocracy into which one must be born, but also for which one must be born. Lycurgus incorporated each living Spartan into the aristocracy, by virtue of being alive. A Spartan boy would know himself worthy of the nobility being demanded of him simply because he had been selected at birth and progressed through the training of the agōgē. One can imagine that the harshness and forcefulness of Spartan life would have been accepted far more readily by one given a hereditary and ethical rationale for inclusion and acceptance than by liberated and atomized modern men.[42]

There is another aspect of Sparta that discomforts modern men even more than the equation of wisdom and war training, however: purity. In the 300 years of strict adherence to the Lycurgan reforms, no Spartan was allowed to live beyond Spartan territory. What’s more, no foreigners without a useful purpose were allowed to stay in Sparta overnight. None of them were allowed to teach vices.

For along with strange people, strange doctrines must come in; and novel doctrines bring novel decisions, from which must arise [disharmony within] the existing political order. Therefore [Lycurgus] thought it more necessary to keep bad manners and customs from invading and filling the city than it was to keep out infectious diseases.[43]

This desire for social purity also works as part of Lycurgus’ system of ethical and physiological transformation. For there is no reason to believe that noble men and women are made less so in an environment that provides only for their nobility. Imagine, instead, that the body becomes what its environment expects and demands of it. Harshness is the only thing productive of bodily vitality. Lycurgus believed that similar bodily harshness was also productive of conceptual nobility. So, instead of teaching such values in a cesspool and hoping that nature would provide a few prime examples each generation, Lycurgus took on nature, providing an environment that afforded Sparta the “good” in every citizen. This meets the definition of utopia, but unlike unnatural, modern, egalitarian utopia, Lycurgus’ Spartan utopia was hyper-natural. As was his ethical aristocracy.

The attainment of a high standard of noble living was a public duty. Youth were often the products of selective breeding, and it was demanded that all people be fit and vital. The greatest and most noble sentiments and characteristics available to man were attainable only through physical exertion and warlike action. Beauty was reserved for the worthy and actively denied the unworthy. In sum, it was demanded that men and women be as noble as was physically and conceptually possible.[44] And, while Fascist Italy did not go as far to promote the “eugenic improvement” of fascists, it too understood the relationship between ethics, behavior, and environment. Oddly enough, postmodern science agrees, even if it would use this knowledge to promote a global bourgeois community devoid of strife. Nonetheless, the next paper in this series will explain how the chemistry of the body is influenced by environment, opening great possibilities for placing the body directly at the center of a war against bourgeois modernity; and further, at the mercy of Nietzsche’s understanding of instincts, the body, and conceptual vitality.

Notes

[1] Plutarch, Lives (Volume One), trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1914), 269.

[2] Plutarch 205–17.

[3] Plutarch 219–21.

[4] Xenophon, Scripta Minora, trans. E.C. Marchant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 169.

[5] Friedrich Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings from the Period of Unfashionable Observations, trans. Richard T. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 293.

[6] Giuseppe Bottai, “Twenty Years of Critica Fascista,” in A Primer of Italian Fascism, ed. Jeffrey T. Schnapp, trans. Schnapp, Sears, and Stampino (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 192.

[7] Plutarch 227–29.

[8] Plutarch 231.

[9] Plutarch 279.

[10] Plutarch 231.

[11] Plutarch 281.

[12] Plutarch 231.

[13] Plutarch 233.

[14] Xenophon 141.

[15] Plutarch 257.

[16] Xenophon 143.

[17] Plutarch 261.

[18] Xenophon 145.

[19] Nigel M. Kennell, The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education and Culture in Ancient Sparta (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 131.

[20] Kennel 179.

[21] Plutarch 259.

[22] Plutarch 263.

[23] Plutarch 267.

[24] Steven Pressfield, Gates of Fire (New York: Doubleday, 1998), 137.

[25] Xenophon 167.

[26] Xenophon 165.

[27] Kennell 117–39.

[28] Plutarch 241.

[29] Plutarch 267.

[30] Plutarch 255.

[31] Plutarch 253.

[32] Plutarch 245–47.

[33] Plutarch 261.

[34] Plutarch 255.

[35] Xenophon 161.

[36] Plutarch 247.

[37] Paul Cartledge, The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece (New York: The Overlook Press, 2003), 36–37.

[38] Cartledge 36.

[39] Xenophon 163.

[40] Plutarch 247.

[41] Plutarch 297.

[42] Nietzsche 363.

[43] Plutarch 289.

[44] Xenophon 169.

 


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jeudi, 25 octobre 2012

Leonidas & the Spartan Ethos

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Leonidas & the Spartan Ethos

By Theodore J. O'Keefe

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

The Persian rider edged his horse cautiously forward. Just ahead the coastal plain dwindled to a narrow passage between the mountains and the sea, scarcely wider than a carriage track. Somewhere within the pass, the Greeks had massed to deny the Persians entry. It was the duty of the horseman to determine the size and disposition of their forces. Xerxes, his lord, the emperor of the Persians, knew that if his troops could force the pass, which the Greeks called Thermopylae, his armies could then stream unchecked into the heart of Greece.

The scout caught his breath as he sighted the Greeks in the western end of the pass. His trepidation gave way to surprise as he looked more closely. There were only about 300 of them, arrayed before a wall which blocked further access to the pass, and they were behaving most oddly. Some, stripped naked, performed exercises, like athletes before a contest. Others combed their long, fair hair. They gave their observer no notice.

Were these the vaunted Spartans? The Persian turned his horse and rode back to the imperial camp.

Xerxes received the scout’s report with undisguised amazement. The behavior of the Greeks seemed impossible to account for. Until now his advance down the northern coast of Greece had resembled a triumphal procession. City after city had submitted with the symbolic offering of earth and water. When at last the Greeks seemed disposed to stand and fight, their most gallant soldiers, the Spartans, were conducting themselves more like madmen than warriors.

The emperor summoned Demaratus, who had been a king of the Spartans until his involvement in political intrigues had forced him to flee to the Persian court. While Xerxes listened from his golden throne, Demaratus spoke of the Spartans:

“Once before, when we began our march against Greece, you heard me speak of these men. I told you then how this enterprise would work out, and you laughed at me. I strive for nothing, my lord, more earnestly than to observe the truth in your presence; so hear me once more. These men have come to fight us for possession of the pass, and for that struggle they are preparing. It is the common practice for the Spartans to pay careful attention to their hair when they are about to risk their lives. But I assure you that if you can defeat these men and the rest of the Spartans who are still at home, there is no other people in the world who will dare to stand firm or lift a hand against you. You have now to deal with the finest kingdom in Greece, and with the bravest men.”

The year was 480 B.C. During the previous three years Xerxes had assembled what promised to be the mightiest military force the world had ever seen, drawn from every corner of his far-flung realms. Modern historians are properly skeptical of the millions of soldiers and sailors meticulously enumerated by the great historian Herodotus, and of his endless catalogs of camel-riding Arabs, trousered Scythians, and frizzy-haired Ethiopians. Nevertheless, Herodotus’ account gives dramatic expression to the feeling of the Greeks that all the numberless, swarthy hordes of Africa and Asia were advancing on them.

Ten years before, the Athenians, who had aroused the wrath of Xerxes’ father and predecessor, Darius, by aiding their Ionian Greek cousins of Asia Minor in an unsuccessful revolt against their Persian overlords, had all but annihilated a Persian punitive expedition at Marathon, a few miles from Athens. It was Xerxes’ purpose to avenge that defeat and to crush the power of the impudent Hellenes, as the Greeks called themselves, once and for all.

There was more to it than that. Xerxes was a Persian, an Aryan, of the noble Achaemenid line, descended ultimately from the same race as the Hellenes. His ancestors had ranged the mountains and steppes of Iran and Central Asia, proud and free.

But as the Persians had increased their power and then wrested the great empire of the Near East from the Babylonians, their kings had fallen prey to the power and the regalia and the idea of empire. Once the Iranian leaders had regarded themselves, and been regarded, as first among Aryan equals. Now his fellow Persians, like all his other subjects, abased themselves at Xerxes’ feet. And like his imperial predecessors, Xerxes intended to make the remainder of the known world do the same.

As the Persian army moved ponderously across the great bridges with which the emperor had joined Europe and Asia at the Dardanelles, the Hellenes hesitated. Xerxes had accompanied the exertions of his engineers with a diplomatic campaign. While his engineers built the Dardanelles bridges and dug a canal across the Acte peninsula in Thrace by which his fleet could circumvent the stormy cape, his diplomats worked to promote defeatism in Greece. Argos and Crete promised to stay neutral, and the priestess of Delphi muttered gloomy oracles of Persian conquest.

The delegates from the Hellenic city-states who gathered at the Corinthian Isthmus in the spring of 480 were at first divided as to their course of action. The Peloponnesians were for guarding only their southern peninsula, while the Athenians and their allies on the neighboring island of Euboea pressed for an expedition to the north of Greece. Eventually the congress of diplomatic representatives agreed to dispatch a joint force of Athenians and Peloponnesians to the Vale of Tempe, in northern Thessaly, which seemed a fit place to bar the Persians’ way from Macedonia into Greece.

At Tempe, to their dismay, the Hellenes found that other passes afforded the invader entry into Hellas from the north. As the Greek contingent retreated to the south, the northern Greeks abandoned their determination to resist and submitted to the Persian emperor.

As Xerxes’ forces began to advance south from Macedonia into Greece, the Greeks were thrown into something of a panic. Following their first contact with the numerically superior Persian fleet, the Greek navy fled down the straits between Euboea and the Greek mainland. Only the loss of a considerable number of the Persian ships in a storm off the Artemisian cape at the northern tip of Euboea emboldened the Hellenic fleet to sail northward to face the enemy once more. In the meantime the Athenians made plans to evacuate their population to the islands of Salamis and Aegina to the southwest.

One force remained in the field to confront the Persians with determined opposition: Leonidas, king of the Spartans, had occupied the crucial pass at Thermopylae.

The gateway from northern to central Greece, Thermopylae stretched more than four miles between the towering wall of Mt. Oeta and the waves of the Malian Gulf. At both its eastern and western extremities, the pass contracted to a narrow, easily defended pathway. For much of the intervening distance, the pass billowed out into a broader expanse. Here there were a number of thermal springs, both salt and sulfur, from which Thermopylae derived its name, which means “hot gates.”

The garrison which held Thermopylae was at first considerably larger than the 300 Spartans whom the Persian scout had glimpsed at the western entrance to the pass. Behind the wall, which the Greeks had hastily rebuilt after occupying the pass, and along the ridge of Mt. Oeta, Leonidas had stationed nearly 7000 troops. About half of them were men from Sparta’s neighbor cities in the Peloponnesus. The rest were Boeotians from Thebes and Thespiae in central Greece, or hailed from nearby Phocis and Locris.

Although their Greek allies were many times more numerous, Leonidas and his Spartan guard formed the backbone of the Hellenic defense force. In recognition of the peril attending their mission, the 300 consisted exclusively of men with living male heirs, so that names and bloodlines would be carried on if they fell. Leonidas and his men were the elite of an elite, and on their example would depend the conduct of the other Greeks at Thermopylae.

What manner of men were the Spartans, that Xerxes hesitated to pit his myriads against their hundreds?

The origins of Sparta are shrouded in the mists of Greek antiquity, but it is certain that Sparta was founded by the Dorians. The last wave of Hellenic migrants from the north, the Dorians swept their Greek predecessors, the Achaeans, westward into Attica and Asia Minor. From the time of the Dorian migrations, the traditional division of the Hellenes into Dorians, Ionians, and Aeolians begins to take shape.

The Dorians were probably more Nordic in type than the other Greek tribes. As the great classicist Werner Jaeger wrote, “The Dorian race gave Pindar [the great poet of Thebes] his ideal of the fair-haired warrior of proud descent.” As Jaeger implies, the Dorians—above all those in Sparta—placed a premium on the preservation and improvement of their native stock.

One branch of the Dorians invaded the district of Laconia in the southeastern Peloponnesus. In the words of the great historian J. B. Bury, “The Dorians took possession of the rich vale of the Eurotas, and keeping their own Dorian stock pure from the admixture of alien blood reduced all the inhabitants to the condition of subjects. . . . The eminent quality which distinguished the Dorians from the other branches of the Greek race was that which we call ‘character’; and it was in Laconia that this quality most fully displayed and developed itself, for here the Dorian seems to have remained more purely Dorian.”

The city of Sparta arose from the amalgamation of several neighboring villages along the Eurotas. The Spartans gradually came to wield political power over the other Dorians in Laconia, the so-called perioeci, who nevertheless retained some degree of self-government and ranked as Laconian, or Lacedaimonian, citizens.

Not so the racially alien helots, the pre-Dorian inhabitants of Laconia, whom the Spartans reduced to serfdom and denied all political rights. The helots bore their servitude grudgingly and threatened constantly to revolt and overthrow their masters. To contain the helots’ revolutionary inclinations, the Spartans organized periodic campaigns, containing something of the spirit of both the fox hunt and the pogrom, in which their young men were given free rein to wreak havoc and eliminate the more truculent and dangerous of their serfs.

During the eighth century, the Dorians conquered the Messenians, who had occupied the remainder of the southern Peloponnesus. A century later, they suppressed a Messenian uprising only after a long and difficult war. From that time on, constrained to manage their own helots and the unruly Messenians as well, the Spartans evolved a unique ethos involving both the preservation of their racial integrity and a comprehensive system of military education and organization.

To a greater extent than any state before or since, the Spartans safeguarded and improved their biological heritage with an uncompromising eugenics program. Marriage outside the Spartan racial community was forbidden, nor was immigration tolerated. There were penalties for celibacy and late marriage, while men who fathered several children could be exempted from standing watch at night, and even from paying taxes.

The Spartans required that the newborn be presented for inspection by officers of the state. Sickly or deformed offspring were left to die.

According to the ancient biographer Plutarch, Lycurgus, the legendary lawgiver of Sparta, made even further provisions for healthy progeny, which continued to be adhered to in classical times. After describing the chaste upbringing of young Spartans of both sexes, Plutarch continues:

After guarding marriage with this modesty and reserve, he [Lycurgus] was equally careful to banish empty and womanish jealousy. For this object, excluding all licentious disorders, he made it, nevertheless, honorable for men to give the use of their wives to those whom they should think fit, so that they might have children by them. . . . Lycurgus allowed a man who was advanced in years and had a young wife to recommend some virtuous and approved young man, that she might have a child by him, who might inherit the good qualities of the father, and be a son to himself. On the other side, an honest man who had love for a married woman upon account of her modesty and the well-favoredness of her children, might, without formality, beg her company of her husband, that he might raise, as it were, from this plot of good ground, worthy and well-allied children for himself. And indeed, Lycurgus was of a persuasion that children were not so much the property of their parents as of the whole commonwealth, and, therefore, would not have his citizens begot by the first-comers, but by the best men that could be found; the laws of other nations seemed to him very absurd and inconsistent, where people would be so solicitous for their dogs and horses as to exert interest and to pay money to procure fine breeding, and yet kept their wives shut up, to be made mothers only by themselves, who might be foolish, infirm, or diseased; as if it were not apparent that children of a bad breed would prove their bad qualities first upon those who kept and were rearing them, and well-born children, in like manner, their good qualities.

As might be gathered, the women of Sparta were regarded, first of all, as the mothers of Spartan children. The young women were educated for childbearing. They engaged in vigorous gymnastic exercises and dances, often while nude, to the scandal of the other Greeks, although the Spartan women were proverbial for their chastity. Doubtless in consequence of heredity as well as a carefully cultivated physical fitness, the women of Sparta were accounted the most beautiful in Hellas.

Despite the emphasis on their role as mothers, Sparta’s women were the freest in Greece. Indeed, they were accused of dominating the Spartan men. When Gorgo, the wife of Leonidas, was so taunted, she summed up the situation of the Spartan women succinctly: “We rule men with good reason, for we are the only women who bring forth men.”

The men of Sparta were raised to be soldiers. They left the management of commercial affairs and the trades to the perioeci and devoted themselves exclusively to the business of government and war. Each Spartan citizen supported himself from a hereditary plot of land, farmed by the helots, which could not be alienated by sale or division.

Between the ages of seven and twenty the Spartans received their soldierly training. They acquired far more than a mechanical mastery of military skills. Their instructors strove to inculcate in their cadets an absolute devotion to Sparta, the ability to endure any hardship, and an unwavering courage on the battlefield.

To keep the young men on their mettle, the Spartan training system played off the exigencies of discipline against the defiant and adventurous spirit of youth. Young Spartans were compelled to steal their food, yet subjected to severe punishment if they were caught, a seeming paradox epitomized in the story of the Spartan boy who let the fox he concealed under his cloak tear at his vitals rather than give himself away. The Spartan school was a cruel but effective one, for it caught its students up in the enthusiasm of constant challenge and danger.

When he reached the age of 20 the young Spartan became a full-fledged soldier. For the next ten years he lived the barracks life with his comrades. Allowed to take a wife, he saw her only during brief and furtive visits. In times of peace, the young men were instructors to the Spartan boys.

On his thirtieth birthday the Spartan was invested with the remainder of his civic rights and duties. Thenceforth he attended the apella, the assembly of the people, and could vote on measures proposed by the two kings or by the ephoroi, Sparta’s five-man judiciary. The Spartan could at last establish his own household, although still bound to dine in common with his peers.

The principal fare at these communal messes was a black broth much favored by the Spartans, although the other Hellenes found it hard to stomach. (After sampling it a visitor from opulent Sybarisis supposed to have exclaimed, “Now I know why Spartans have no fear of death!”)

The Spartans spiced their meals with a dry and pithy wit renowned through Hellas as much for its substance as for its sting. As Plutarch tells it, Lycurgus replied to a Spartan who had advocated democracy, “Begin, friend, and set it up in your family.” Or, as the Spartan women are supposed to have said when handing their sons their shields before they marched to battle, “With it or on it.”

Spartan law reinforced its citizens’ contempt for luxury by banning private ownership of gold and silver. The result, according to Plutarch, was that “merchants sent no shiploads into Laconian ports; no rhetoric-master, no itinerant fortune-teller, no harlot-monger, or gold- or silver-smith, engraver, or jeweler, set foot in a country that had no money; so that luxury, deprived little by little of that which fed and fomented it, wasted to nothing and died away of itself.” Like the Spartans’ wills, their coins were made of iron.

Sparta’s military life did not stifle the minds and spirits of its citizens. Early in its history Sparta was a leading center of poetry and music. Terpander and Alcman brought the lyre and lyric from Asia Minor to the banks of the Eurotas. Lame Tyrtaeus, Lacedaimon’s native son, shaped his country’s ethos with his martial songs. Choral songs and dances carried on, in which the Spartan men melodically affirmed their patriotism, and the Spartan maidens urged them on to future deeds of valor. Rightly Pindar sang of Sparta:

“Councils of wise elders here, /And the young men’s conquering spear, / And dance, and song, and joy appear.”

It was not so much the Spartans’ works of art as the Spartan ideal which won the admiration of great Hellenic thinkers such as Plato. There was something noble in the stem simplicity of the Spartan way of life. Sparta’s fundamental laws, the rhetroi, which Lycurgus was said to have received direct from “golden-haired Apollo,” were few, unwritten, and to the point. Their purpose, to mold men of character in the service of the common good, struck a responsive chord through allHellas.

It is not difficult to detect in the wistful praise the Hellenes paid to Sparta a longing for the values and uses of their Indo-European forebears. Outside of Sparta these had all too often been forgotten amid the lures of Oriental luxury, or lost forever due to mixing of Hellenic blood. The Spartans, just as they transformed the rough-hewn, wooden longhouses of their northern ancestors into gleaming Doric temples, developed from their innate, racial outlook a guide and bulwark for their state.

And, of course, it was on the battlefield that the Spartan arete, or manly excellence, found its chief expression. The Spartans asked not how many the enemy were, but only where they were. They were ignorant of surrender, but knew well how to die.

But let Plutarch speak once more: “It was at once a magnificent and a terrible sight to see them march on to the tune of their flutes, without any disorder in their ranks, any discomposure in their minds, or change in their countenances, calmly and cheerfully moving with the music to the deadly fight. Men in this temper were not likely to be possessed by fear or any transport of fury, but with the deliberate valor of hope and assurance, as if some divinity were attending and conducting them.”

Such were the men who faced Xerxes and his host atThermopylae.

Xerxes waited for four days, in the hope that the Greeks would abandon their position, as they had in Thessaly. His attempt at psychological warfare was lost on the Spartans. When a fearful Greek from the surrounding countryside informed the Spartan Dieneces that “so many are the Persian archers their arrows blot out the sun,” Dieneces was unperturbed: “If the Persians hide the sun, we shall have our battle in the shade.”

On the fifth day, seething with anger at the Greeks’ impertinence, Xerxes sent forth an assault force of Medes and Cissians, Iranian kindred to his own Persians.

Xerxes’ troops stormed the western gate to Thermopylae with a valor exceeding their skill in combat. The Spartans met and overwhelmed them in the narrow space between the rocks and the water. Well armored, wielding their long spears expertly, the Spartan heavy infantry was more than a match for the Iranians with their short swords and wicker shields. The Spartans cut them down by the hundreds at close quarters.

From a neighboring hill, seated on his throne of gold, Xerxes watched the fighting, fuming at what he deemed his soldiers’ incompetence. To bring the matter to a quick end, he ordered his elite guard, the King’s Immortals, forward to the deadly pass. Again the Spartans outfought the emperor’s men.

All at once the Spartans turned and fled, seemingly in panicky confusion. With a shout, the Immortals rushed forward in disarray. But the Spartans were all around them in an instant, and they cut the emperor’s picked troops to pieces. According to Herodotus, Xerxes, watching from his hill, “leapt to his feet three times, in terror for his army.”

The next day’s fighting went no better for the Persians. The Greek allies took turns spelling the Spartans at the western approach, and once again the Hellenes reaped a bloody harvest. As the sun set over the western mountains, the waters of the gulf lapped crimson at the heaps of Persians on the shore.

That night, as Xerxes puzzled bitterly how to break the death grip of the Greeks on Thermopylae, a traitor came forth from a local district, looking for a rich reward. The information he gave the emperor was the doom of the men of Thermopylae.

Ephialtes the Malian revealed to Xerxes the existence of a path over the hills and along the crest of Mt. Oetato the rear of Thermopylae. The path was not unknown to Thermopylae’s defenders, and Leonidas had stationed the Phocian troops along Mt.Oela’s ridge to ward off enemy attempts to flank his forces in the pass.

At dawn the next morning, the Phocians heard the sound of marching feet advancing through the fallen leaves which carpeted the floor of the oak forest below the summit of Mt. Oeta. As the Greeks sprang to arm themselves, the Immortals, their ranks reinforced, rushed up the mountainside. The Phocians retreated to the highest point on Mt. Oetaunder a hail of Persian arrows, but the emperor’s picked troops disdained to close with them. Swerving to the left, they made their way down the mountain to a point east of Thermopylae’s rear approach. The Hellenes in the pass were trapped between two Persian forces.

Leonidas learned of the threat from his lookouts along Mt. Oeta and stragglers from the Phocian contingent. He quickly took stock of the changed circumstances. It was evident to the Spartan king that the pass could not be held much longer. The Greeks to the south had need of the troops engaged in Thermopylae’s defense.

But there were other considerations. Leonidas and his 300 men were first of all Spartans. The laws and customs of their native city bade them to conquer or die at the posts assigned them, whatever the superiority of the enemy’s numbers. And there was an oracle, made known at the outset of the Persian invasion, which prophesied that Sparta or a Spartan king must fall in the coming conflict.

Leonidas dismissed the allied troops, all but the men of Thebes and Thespiae. The remainder of the Peloponnesians, as well as the Phocians and Locrians, made their way across the hills between the Persian armies, to fight again another day.

The next morning, after Xerxes had poured a libation to the rising sun, his men stormed Thermopylae from both sides. Scornful of their own lives, Leonidas and his men surged out to meet the Persians on the open ground before the narrow entrance to the pass. Godlike the Spartans swept forward, cutting a swath through the enemies’ ranks. Again they exacted a fearful toll, as the Persian officers drove their men on from the rear, making liberal use of their whips.

The Hellenes fought with reckless courage and with grim determination. When their spears splintered and broke, they fought on with their swords. Leonidas fell, and a fierce struggle raged over the body of the Spartan king. Four times the Persians were repulsed, and many of their leaders, including two of Xerxes’ brothers, were slain.

Gradually the remaining Spartans, bearing the fallen Leonidas, fell back to a small elevation within the pass. There they made a last stand. Beside them fought the brave citizens of Thespiae. The Thebans covered themselves with disgrace by throwing down their arms and submitting abjectly to Xerxes.

After a short but furious resistance, the Spartans and the Thespians were annihilated by the swarming Persian infantry. When all was still, and Xerxes walked among the dead on the battleground he had until then avoided, the Persian emperor was stricken with anger at the tenacity which Leonidas had displayed in thwarting his imperious will. He ordered the Spartan king beheaded, and his head fixed on a stake.

Once more Xerxes summoned Demaratus.

“Demaratus,” he began, “you are a good man. All you said has turned out true. Now tell me, how many men of Lacedaimon remain, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?”

“Sire,” Demaratus replied, “there are many men and towns in Lacedaimon. But I will tell you what you really want to know: Sparta alone boasts eight thousand men. All of them are the equals of the men who fought here.”

When Xerxes heard this he paled. The memory of Demaratus’s words must have been much with him during the next few months, until Leonidas’ Spartan comrades avenged him at the climactic battle of Plataea and drove the Persian horde forever from Hellenic soil.

The Greeks erected several monuments at Thermopylae, bearing suitable inscriptions. A lion marked the spot where Leonidas perished. But it was the marker the Spartans raised to the memory of their 300 countrymen which best evokes the spirit of their people. With laconic brevity it read:

“Wanderer, if you come to Sparta, tell them there / You have seen us lying here, obedient to their laws.”

Source: Kevin Alfred Strom, ed., The Best of Attack! and National Vanguard Tabloid (Arlington, Va.: National Vanguard Books, 1984), pp. 127-130.

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/10/leonidas-and-the-spartan-ethos/

jeudi, 26 juillet 2012

The Homeric Gods

The Homeric Gods

By Mark Dyal 

Ex. http://www.counter-currents.com

[1]

Athena

Walter F. Otto
The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion [2]
Translated by Moses Hadas
North Stratford, N.H.: Ayer Company Publishers, 2001

“My goal is to create total enmity between our current ‘culture’ and Antiquity. Whoever wants to serve the former must hate the latter.”—Friedrich Nietzsche[1]

“Every religion and every worldview is entitled to be judged not by the levels where it is flattened, coarsened, and, for want of character, is like any other, but by the clear and large contours of its heights. It is only there that it is what it truly is and what others are not.”—Walter F. Otto[2]

Along with Homer, Nietzsche, Evola, and Schmitt, a name with which every New Right thinker should be familiar is Walter F. Otto. Otto (1874–1958) was a German philologist who held positions in Switzerland and Germany, becoming one of National Socialist Germany’s leading scholars of the Classical world. From 1933 to 1945 he was a member, and administrator, of the Scientific Committee of the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar—at the time a sacred site amongst the Nazi “Nietzsche cult.”

Besides writing few books that have been translated in multiple languages, Otto and his blend of Nietzschean and Homeric political philosophy, helped lay the foundation for the contemporary manifestation of the Counter-Enlightenment, which we call the New Right. Indeed, Otto was part of the political evolution of many European New Right thinkers—Guillaume Faye, Alain de Benoist, and Pierre Krebs, to name but three; yet he remains virtually unknown in America, even among scholars.

In Europe, though, the Classical inheritance is lived and understood differently than in America. As Krebs explains, the vitalist natural spirit of the Homeric/Greek religion has stood in continual opposition to Asiatic/Judaic metaphysics since the dawn of the Homeric Age, some 3000 years ago.[3] In America, what we stood to inherit from the Greeks has been, at worst, perverted by Judeo-Christianity’s war on European nobility, and at best, subsumed within the multicultural system of racial and cultural commodity fetishism.

In other words, the Classical world matters to Europeans because they still live in the geographical and geopolitical world of the Greeks and Romans; while in America, bored bourgeois consumers think about Greece and Rome only when Hollywood promotes some democratic and ethically Christian version of a formerly noble tale of heroism and glory.

[3]Thus, it is to the North American New Right’s credit that the Classics and pre-Christian paganism is discussed at all. But even as we occasionally discuss them, they still seem foreign to the essential discourse of creating and being a new American Right. While there are Nazis, Norse pagans, atheists, and Christians—always quick to de-Jew Jesus—aplenty, Olympian, Roman, or even Augustan reform, pagans are seldom identified. Given the lack of Classical feeling in the American psyche, one must assume that these pagans simply do not exist here. Even in the European New Right’s best explanation of paganism, Alain de Benoist’s On Being a Pagan, Athena and Apollo—the most well developed and useful Homeric deities—are never brought to life.[4] Nor is one given a sense of what one would actually believe and do as a result of associating with these gods.

Collin Cleary sensed the “lack of gods” in Benoist’s On Being a Pagan and took offense with its overtly Nietzschean humanism and “moral relativism.”[5] Although the gods are present in The Homeric Gods, Otto’s project, like Benoist’s, is entirely and inherently Nietzschean. In fact, to properly understand Otto’s book, one should begin with Nietzsche, and not Homer.[6]

But this is understandable, assuming that one comprehends why Nietzsche is so central to how and why we know the Greeks today. As the first epigraph makes clear, Nietzsche uses the Greeks (and Romans) as a counter-valuation to the modern Judeo-Christian world. From his first notebooks and lectures to his last written words, Nietzsche’s ideal human types are Greek, nay, Homeric in origin. For it was these men that fought, struggled, killed, and died in a life-affirming quest for glory.

Nietzsche’s ideal form of life, which glorifies warfare, strife, and beauty, is Greek. Indeed, Nietzsche’s naturalization of morality can be found 2200 years prior in Herodotus’Histories. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra virtually summarizes the first book of Histories when he says that, “No people could live that did not first esteem; but if they want to preserve themselves, then they must not esteem as their neighbor esteems.”[7] For while Herodotus included the narratives that brought war to the barbarian peoples of the east, he did so to show that, while each people is motivated by what is good, the only good that matters is that of the Greeks.[8]

Even if Herodotus understood that each of Greece’s enemies had their own moral and ethical system, these systems did not apply to Greeks. The world beyond Greece simply did not exist in moralistic/altruistic terms. This is similar to the motivational thrust of Nietzsche’s critique of Judeo-Christian morality: it might be good for a certain human type, but not for us.

This “us” is a key to understanding why Nietzsche is often embraced by the Left (and New Right thinker Collin Cleary) as a moral relativist, for it assumes a preexisting knowledge of each of Nietzsche’s “mature” works that the large majority of his postmodern readers simply do not have.[9] Everything from Book Five of The Gay Science to the last notebook of the Nachlass is written for a fictitious audience of like-minded “free thinkers” who already embrace Nietzsche’s transvaluative project.

Thus, he never naturalizes morality “in general” but always in contrast to what is useful for a particular (heroic, strong, courageous, harsh) audience. Ultimately, moralities are important because every form of life has one, or some such system of valuation and evaluation; and each morality is the basis of a particular human type—one of which is democratic, soft, lazy, smug, complacent, flabby, in a word, decadent. But, because that human type is the optimal embodiment of its morality, the form of life’s truth regime also promotes its optimal status.

And again, because Nietzsche explains that truth is unknowable without valuation (thus linking truth and morality), and that there are as many truths as there are forms of life, i.e. perspectives, historically speaking, the Left embraces him as a general relativist;[10] just as it critiques Herodotus (and the Greeks) as ethnocentric and xenophobic, and Homer as a violence-obsessed savage.[11]

Otto’s The Homeric Gods embraces this generalization of Nietzsche and sets the Homeric gods in opposition not only to Judeo-Christianity but also to the bourgeois form of life in general. What makes Otto’s book unique and useful is that he actually uses Homer and other archaic and Classical sources to explain the gods. Thus, Judeo-Christian and modern notions of sin, soul, piety, and redemption are nonexistent.

Writing in the Nietzschean spirit, he celebrates the absence of “the holy” in the Homeric Greek worldview. “The somber religious reverberation, that melody of ineffable exaltation and consecration . . . seems to be wanting . . . This religion is so natural that holiness seems to have no place in it” (p. 3).

What we miss, then, is the “moral earnestness” that Judeo-Christianity, as the paradigm of religion, commands us to expect in a religion. Instead, we have gods that are “too natural and joyous to reckon morality as the supreme value” (p. 3). We have, as well, two key points to understanding how the religion works.

First, there is no communion between the gods and man. There is no sacrifice of the self, no intimacy, no oneness of god and man. Man and the gods are separated by each one’s nature.

Second, there is no promise of redemption in the religion. There is no need or desire to redeem man from his earthy existence because love of life and the natural capacities of man are the basis of Homeric religious feeling. As Faye said, “like Achilles [and Odysseus], the original European man does not prostrate himself before the gods, but stands upright.”[12] But as Otto explains, this is because the gods demand instead that one stands and fights—that one makes oneself worthy of the gods’ attention by courageous and heroic action. Otto brings this point home by reminding his readers that, while in the Old Testament, “Yahweh fights for his people, and without making any defense they are delivered from the pursuing Egyptians,” in Homer, “a god whispers a saving device to a baffled warrior at the right instant, we hear that he rouses spirit and kindles courage, that he makes limbs supple and nimble, and gives a right arm accuracy and strength” (p. 6). Man is not miraculously delivered by his God but is, instead, given the inspiration to command his own destiny.

The interaction between gods and man and between man and nature, then, is not only dependent upon man but upon nature. In other words, there is little to no magic, only the divinity of man in nature.

The faculty which in other religions is constantly being thwarted and inhibited here flowers forth with the admirable assurance of genius—the faculty of seeing the world in the light of the divine, not a world yearned for, aspired to, or mystically present in rare ecstatic experiences, but the world into which we were born, part of which we are, interwoven with it through our senses and, through our minds, obligated to it for all its abundance and vitality. (p. 11)

Speaking of its essence, the divine is a vital force that flows through each living thing. However, it is not “made divine” in the sense of the “holy spirit.” There is no need to feel universally connected to, or prohibited from attacking or devouring, one’s brothers-in man. For in nature, all life consumes and devours, but is still part of the richness of the world—a very Nietzschean naturalism this is! Homeric religion, in sum, dismisses morality, promises no redemption, and makes life itself divine.

It is in the descriptions of the gods, themselves that we find the true “plan” that the Homeric religion holds for man: that our divine nature demands that man act, and often heroically. “The gods belong on the side of life. In order to encounter them the living must move, go forward, be active. Then the gods encompass the living with their strength and majesty and in sudden revelation even show their heavenly countenance” (pp. 265–66). It matters not so much that man be patient, pious, or priestly, but that he not act cowardly, brutishly, or without dignity. “The purpose and goal of the Greeks,” Otto quotes Goethe, “is to deify man, not to humanize deity” (p. 236). Even as man in all of his nature is deified, Homer still presents a perfected vision of this nature.[13]

[4]Anyone who has read Homer (or Otto) can hardly disagree that Athena is the most extraordinary of the Homeric deities. Her role in the life of Achilles and Odysseus alone is enough to inspire men to war in hopes of garnering her attention. “First of all it is the warriors whose courage she kindles. Before battle begins they sense here inspiriting presence and yearn to perform heroic deeds worthy of her . . . the spirit of the goddess causes all hearts to thrill with battle glee” (p. 45).

Athena’s association with Heracles insured that she was the deity of choice for virile, athletic warriors, and his glory set the standard for Greek (and Roman) heroic endeavor. Remember correctly, though, that Heracles did not succeed through fury alone. Under Athena’s guidance, prudence and dignity are also necessary. Thus do we see her counseling Odysseus in moments which call not only for force but also shrewd calculation.

While her most celebrated recipients are, indeed, warriors and heroes, Athena’s influence can be seen across a wide spectrum of Greek life. She is a warrior, but she is also the goddess of wisdom. Moderns hear this, and their bourgeois form of life immediately informs them of a contradiction; for how can war and wisdom be unified and idealized to the point of divinity? That this unity is no contradiction, however, says all one needs to know of these Greeks and how far we have fallen from their glorious and heroic ideals.

[5]War and wisdom are related, through Athena, by the type of human perfection needed to be victorious at either. Precision. Precision under pressure. Precision under pressure of death. Precision under pressure of death when only the perfect movement or thought will preserve life and achieve one’s glory. Wisdom can only be gained in similar circumstances—through heroic or precise, pressure-filled, action.

Thoughts gained while sheepishly static and immobile, Nietzsche reminds us, are seldom heroic. Thus warriors in need of the perfect throw of a spear or slice of a sword, in the only instant that will kill their opponent, are united with artisans, artists, precision craftsmen—shipwrights, metalworkers, potters, weavers—and anyone needing intelligence and the will to decisiveness at every moment.

While Athena loves others beside the great heroes and warriors, her spirit and approach does not change circumstantially. She always desires “boldness, the will to victory, and courage,” but these are not fully useful without “directing reason and illuminating clarity” (p. 53). “Whenever in a life of action and heroism great things must be wrought, perfected, and struggled for, there Athena is present. Broad indeed is the spirit of a battle-loving people when it recognizes the same perfection wherever a clear and intelligent glance shows the path to achievement” (p. 53). Broad indeed is the spirit of a battle-loving people when it recognizes the same perfection wherever a clear and intelligent glance shows the path to achievement. Otto has just explained the crux of the Classical inheritance: the will to perfection. Stand alone in postmodern America and ponder the magnitude of a cultural impulse to perfection. Now also consider Otto’s National Socialist audience and one also begins to sense what National Socialism and Fascism were really up to—and how deep was the Fascist critique of modernity.[14]

[6]

Apollo

The perfection attainable through Athena is immediate. The precision to which she inspires is corporeal. She is “the heavenly presence and direction as illumination and inspiration to victorious comprehension and consummation. To Hermes belongs what is clandestine, twilight, uncanny; Athena is bright as day. Dreaminess, yearning, languishing, are alien to her” (pp. 53–54). Similarly obvious is the contrast between Athena and Apollo:

In Apollo we recognize the wholly masculine man. The aristocratic aloofness, the superiority of cognition, the sense of proportion, these and other related traits in a man, even music in the broadest sense of the word, are, in the last analysis, alien to a woman. Apollo is all these things. But perfection in the living present, untrammelled and victorious action, not in the service of some remote and infinite idea but for mastery over the moment—that is the triumph that has always delighted woman in a man, to which she inspires him, and whose high satisfaction he can learn from her. (p. 55)

Apollo is an archer, thus the will to precision is also present in him. But while Athena is immediate and near, Apollo is rational and distant. “In the figure of Apollo,” Otto explains, “man honors the nobility of serenity and freedom, the rays of the sun, which furnish light not for mysteries of the soul but for virile realization of life and worthy achievement” (p. 252). Once again, Otto makes sure we fully comprehend the cultural impetus of these deities. For like Athena, Apollo promotes a world of meaningful action and a life “capable of freedom, which neither follows impulses blindly nor is subjected to the categorical demands of a moral legislation. It is not to dutifulness or obedience that decision is allowed but to insight and taste; thus everywhere the intelligent is bound up with the beautiful” (p. 253).

It was the genius of the Greeks to promote the most exceptional and exemplary capabilities of man as divine; and not only divine but also natural. Thus man did not supplicate himself to a God, or, as Collin Cleary fears for neo-pagans, merely invoke the name of a deity. Instead he made himself worthy. “Wherever a great heart throbs and rages, wherever a liberating thought flares up, there Athena is present, summoned rather by heroic readiness than by humble supplication. From her own lips we hear that she is attracted by prowess, not by good will or devotion to her person” (pp. 238–239). In this we see that the agonic pulse that ran through the Greek world was more than just a will to prepare for war. It was also a means for men to maintain worthiness of the gods. For a perfect throw, a perfect hull, or a perfect word is still perfection and “for the Greeks, this is the prime meaning of insight and intelligence. Without these the truly divine is inconceivable” (p. 247).

Perhaps nothing separates modern man from the Greeks as much as his aversion to thinking about the human in terms of perfection. The artistic embodiment of the Homeric deities served as an optimal status criterion of the form and content of human perfection. Extremely elevated standards were maintained in physiognomy, creativity, and discernment, always with a view to the interconnectedness of warfare, wisdom, and beauty. Grandeur, prowess, dignity, and nobility seem available for all who act heroically and with nobility. However, this is only so because it is not the mediocrity of the rabble that is being elevated to the pinnacle of human worthiness.

Only a modern would think to celebrate (or even care about) the Helots and slaves that toiled in the shadow of greatness. Indeed, the moderns who glorify the non-victorious and the failures—the majority—at the expense of the heroic and life affirming few, dwell in eternal darkness compared to these Greeks.

Instead this is a religion (and form of life) for masters. This is the religion of those who value glory over justice. And, “for a spirit which craves glory rather than prosperity, the justice of divine sway is a different thing from what the husbandman or commoner intent on possessions and gain might wish it to be” (p. 258). Achilles, the bravest and “most loved by the gods” of the Greeks at Troy, has a short life, but it is a life filled with the greatest imaginable glory. As Otto deftly explains, only a spiritually poor age would think to reduce the human capacity for heroic action to a search for bourgeois comfort, safety, and happiness. Likewise, only a spiritually impoverished religion would feel it necessary to make God an arbiter of justice. While the “history of religions” (i.e., modern theology which makes Asiatic monotheistic religions the paradigm of religiontout court) considers it a deepening of divine providence to give God the power of justice, Otto explains that it as a sign of decadence (p. 257).

The Homeric gods, as mentioned above, are solely deities of life. Death, the only fate of man, is controlled by the furies—the archaic deities more closely related to elemental forces than the more spiritual Olympians. It is not fated that a man does anything but die. What he does with his life is up to him, including meting out justice. (In his Oresteia, Aeschylus presents a dramatic account of Athena and Apollo arguing successfully against the furies for the right of man to justice.) While the gods are powerless against death and care nothing for justice, they often work with a man’s fate to allow a maximum amount of honor and glory. For a form of life that spiritualizes life, honor, and glory, a “call to justice is . . . a sign of the de-deification of the world” and evidence of a mobbish right to prosperity and slavish assumption that someone may be blamed for one’s suffering a lack of prosperity (p. 258).

It is important to remember that Homer was the basis of Classical Greek culture. The deities and heroic men and women he described originated the shared values, mores, and conditions of possibility of the many Greek peoples. Homeric models of heroism and nobility became the boundary marker between the Greek and the barbarian. The metaphors used by the nobility and freemen alike came from Homer, as did the bases of truth, beauty, and good reasoning. The Homeric Gods gives ample reasons why this was so. With its Nietzschean undertones (Nietzsche is only mentioned once in the book) and its clear delineation of what separates the Homeric from the Judaic, Otto’s study must have been intended to bolster the Fascist reawakening of Classical feeling in European man; for it paints a picture of the very type anti-humanist (Nietzschean) humanism that characterizes so much of Fascist political mythology and philosophy. What makes Otto’s The Homeric Gods so important, in this light, is its sheer monumentality. It explains that Greek humanism was anything but secular, and deified the greatest potentials of human life. It places life clearly in the control of man, with the understanding that greatness is only achievable through actions worthy of the gods. The book is designed to inspire—to make Athena’s touch be felt again—and to give notice that bourgeois modern men will be unforgivingly outmatched by those seeking glory rather than comfort.

The Homeric Gods is no substitute for the remarkable experience of reading or hearing Homer’s epics. However, it is a companion that will deepen one’s experience of Homer so much that Dominique Venner’s suggestion that his epics act as a “European bible” will make perfect sense.[15] Of course, heroic men of the Homeric ideal have no need of a bible—just as the Nietzschean ideal would chafe at the blasphemy of suggesting Zarathustra as a bible. If bible is a strong word—intended only for the weakest ears, that is—perhaps Homer can instead act as guidebook of the European peoples’ capacity for greatness.

In any case Homer, and Homeric religion, is exemplary, and demonstrate a system of valuation at extraordinary odds with modern bourgeois man. Perhaps modernity has destroyed man’s ability to act as heroically as the ideals and deities of Homer would expect of their heirs. Certainly it has delimited his freedom to do so. But, “history,” Nietzsche advised in a notebook entry, “must speak only of the great and unique, of the model to be emulated.”[16] That, as Venner explains, is exactly what we have in Homer: “To be noble and brave for a man, to be gentle, loving, and faithful for a woman. [Homer] bequeathed a digest of what Greece offered thereafter to posterity: nature as model, the striving towards beauty, the creative force that strives always to surpass, excellence as the ideal of life.”[17]

Notes

[1] Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Early Notebooks, ed. Raymond Geuss and Alexander Nehamas. Trans. Ladislaus Löb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 203.

[2] Walter F. Otto, The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion, Trans. Moses Hadas. Reprint Edition (North Stratford, NH: Ayer Company Publishers, 2001), p.12.

[3] Pierre Krebs, Fighting for the Essence: Western Enthnosuicide or European Renaissance? Trans. Dr. Alexander Jacob (London: Arktos, 2012), pp. 46–47.

[4] Alain de Benoist, On Being a Pagan, ed. Greg Johnson, trans. Jon Graham (Atlanta: Ultra, 2004).

[5] Collin Cleary, “Paganism Without Gods,” in Summoning The Gods, ed. Greg Johnson (San Francisco: Counter-Currents, 2011), pp. 62–80.

[6] I assume everyone has read and re-read both The Iliad and The Odyssey. If not, drop everything, get an audiobook, and listen to these epics.

[7] Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. Adrian Del Caro and Robert B. Pippin. Trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 42.

[8] Herodotus, The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories, ed. Robert B. Strassler. Trans. Andrea L. Purvis (New York: Pantheon, 2007), pp. 112–15.

[9] There is no distinction to be made between postmodern and Left.

[10] Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990).

[11] Elizabeth Vandiver, Heroes in Herodotus: The Interaction of Myth and History (New York: Peter Lang, 1991).

[12] Guillaume Faye, “Mars and Hephaestus: The Return of History,” trans. Greg Johnson, in North American New Right, Volume 1, ed. Greg Johnson (San Francisco: Counter-Currents, 2012), p. 239.

[13] Space and necessity permit only a focus on Athena and Apollo. The Homeric Gods offers chapter-length examinations of Athena, Apollo, Artemis, Aphrodite, and Hermes; while Ares, Poseidon, and Hephaestus also feature heavily.

[14] Zeev Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution, trans. David Maisel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[15] Dominique Venner, “Homer: The European Bible,” trans. Greg Johnson, in North American New Right, Volume 1, ed. Greg Johnson (San Francisco: Counter-Currents, 2012), pp. 220–36.

[16] Nietzsche, Early Notebooks, 95.

[17] Venner, 226.

 


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mercredi, 04 juillet 2012

Introduction to Aristotle’s Politics

Introduction to Aristotle’s Politics
Part 1: The Aim & Elements of Politics

Posted By Greg Johnson

Part 1 of 2

Author’s Note:

The following introduction to Aristotle’s Politics focuses on the issues of freedom and popular government. It is a reworking of a more “academic” text penned in 2001.

250px-Aristotle_Altemps_Inv8575.jpg

1. The Necessity of Politics

Aristotle is famous for holding that man is by nature a political animal. But what does this mean? Aristotle explains that,

even when human beings are not in need of each other’s help, they have no less desire to live together, though it is also true that the common advantage draws them into union insofar as noble living is something they each partake of. So this above all is the end, whether for everyone in common or for each singly (Politics 3.6, 1278b19–22).[1]

Here Aristotle contrasts two different needs of the human soul that give rise to different forms of community, one pre-political and the other political.

The first need is material. On this account, men form communities to secure the necessities of life. Because few are capable of fulfilling all their needs alone, material self-interest forces them to co-operate, each developing his particular talents and trading his products with others. The classical example of such a community is the “city of pigs” in the second book of Plato’s Republic.

The second need is spiritual. Even in the absence of material need, human beings will form communities because only through community can man satisfy his spiritual need to live nobly, i.e., to achieve eudaimonia, happiness or well-being, which Aristotle defines as a life of unimpeded virtuous activity.

Aristotle holds that the forms of association which arise from material needs are pre-political. These include the family, the master-slave relationship, the village, the market, and alliances for mutual defense. With the exception of the master-slave relationship, the pre-political realm could be organized on purely libertarian, capitalist principles. Individual rights and private property could allow individuals to associate and disassociate freely by means of persuasion and trade, according to their own determination of their interests.

But in Politics 3.9, Aristotle denies that the realm of material needs, whether organized on libertarian or non-libertarian lines, could ever fully satisfy man’s spiritual need for happiness: “It is not the case . . . that people come together for the sake of life alone, but rather for the sake of living well” (1280a31), and “the political community must be set down as existing for the sake of noble deeds and not merely for living together” (1281a2). Aristotle’s clearest repudiation of any minimalistic form of liberalism is the following passage:

Nor do people come together for the sake of an alliance to prevent themselves from being wronged by anyone, nor again for purposes of mutual exchange and mutual utility. Otherwise the Etruscans and Carthaginians and all those who have treaties with each other would be citizens of one city. . . . [But they are not] concerned about what each other’s character should be, not even with the aim of preventing anyone subject to the agreements from becoming unjust or acquiring a single depraved habit. They are concerned only that they should not do any wrong to each other. But all those who are concerned about a good state of law concentrate their attention on political virtue and vice, from which it is manifest that the city truly and not verbally so called must make virtue its care. (1280a34–b7)

Aristotle does not disdain mutual exchange and mutual protection. But he thinks that the state must do more. It must concern itself with the character of the citizen; it must encourage virtue and discourage vice.

But why does Aristotle think that the pursuit of virtue is political at all, much less the defining characteristic of the political? Why does he reject the liberal principle that whether and how men pursue virtue is an ineluctably private choice? The ultimate anthropological foundation of Aristotelian political science is man’s neoteny. Many animals can fend for themselves as soon as they are born. But man is born radically immature and incapable of living on his own. We need many years of care and education. Nature does not give us the ability to survive, much less flourish. But she gives us the ability to acquire the ability. Skills are acquired abilities to live. Virtue is the acquired ability to live well. The best way to acquire virtue is not through trial and error, but through education, which allows us to benefit from the trials and avoid the errors of others. Fortune permitting, if we act virtuously, we will live well.

Liberals often claim that freedom of choice is a necessary condition of virtue. We can receive no moral credit for a virtue which is not freely chosen but is instead forced upon us. Aristotle, however, holds that force is a necessary condition of virtue. Aristotle may have defined man as the rational animal, but unlike the Sophists of his day he did not think that rational persuasion is sufficient to instill virtue:

. . . if reasoned words were sufficient by themselves to make us decent, they would, to follow a remark of Theognis, justly carry off many and great rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them. But, as it is, words seem to have the strength to incite and urge on those of the young who are generous and to get a well-bred character and one truly in love with the noble to be possessed by virtue; but they appear incapable of inciting the many toward becoming gentlemen. For the many naturally obey the rule of fear, not of shame, and shun what is base not because it is ugly but because it is punished. Living by passion as they do, they pursue their own pleasures and whatever will bring these pleasures about . . . ; but of the noble and truly pleasant they do not even have the notion, since they have never tasted it. How could reasoned words reform such people? For it is not possible, or nor easy, to replace by reason what has long since become fixed in the character. (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1179b4–18)

The defect of reason can, however, be corrected by force: “Reason and teaching by no means prevail in everyone’s case; instead, there is need that the hearer’s soul, like earth about to nourish the seed, be worked over in its habits beforehand so as to enjoy and hate in a noble way. . . . Passion, as a general rule, does not seem to yield to reason but to force” (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1179b23–25). The behavioral substratum of virtue is habit, and habits can be inculcated by force. Aristotle describes law as “reasoned speech that proceeds from prudence and intellect” but yet “has force behind it” (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180a18). Therefore, the compulsion of the appropriate laws is a great aid in acquiring virtue.

At this point, however, one might object that Aristotle has established only a case for parental, not political, force in moral education. Aristotle admits that only in Sparta and a few other cities is there public education in morals, while “In most cities these matters are neglected, and each lives as he wishes, giving sacred law, in Cyclops’ fashion, to his wife and children” (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180a24–27). Aristotle grants that an education adapted to an individual is better than an education given to a group (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180b7). But this is an argument against the collective reception of education, not the collective provision. He then argues that such an education is best left to experts, not parents. Just as parents have professional doctors care for their childrens’ bodies, they should have professional educators care for their souls (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180b14–23). But this does not establish that the professionals should be employees of the state.

Two additional arguments for public education are found in Politics 8.1:

[1] Since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that everyone must also have one and the same education and that taking care of this education must be a common matter. It must not be private in the way that it is now, when everyone takes care of their own children privately and teaches them whatever private learning they think best. Of common things, the training must be common. [2] At the same time, no citizen should even think he belongs to himself but instead that each belongs to the city, for each is part of the city. The care of each part, however, naturally looks to the care of the whole, and to this extent praise might be due to the Spartans, for they devote the most serious attention to their children and do so in common. (Politics, 8.1 [5.1], 1337a21–32)

The second argument is both weak and question-begging. Although it may be useful for citizens to “think” that they belong to the city, not themselves, Aristotle offers no reason to think that this is true. Furthermore, the citizens would not think so unless they received precisely the collective education that needs to be established. The first argument, however, is quite strong. If the single, overriding aim of political life is the happiness of the citizens, and if this aim is best attained by public education, then no regime can be legitimate if it fails to provide public education.[2]

Another argument for public moral education can be constructed from the overall argument of the Politics. Since public education is more widely distributed than private education, other things being equal, the populace will become more virtuous on the whole. As we shall see, it is widespread virtue that makes popular government possible. Popular government is, moreover, one of the bulwarks of popular liberty. Compulsory public education in virtue, therefore, is a bulwark of liberty.

2. Politics and Freedom

Aristotle’s emphasis on compulsory moral education puts him in the “positive” libertarian camp. For Aristotle, a free man is not merely any man who lives in a free society. A free man possesses certain traits of character which allow him to govern himself responsibly and attain happiness. These traits are, however, the product of a long process of compulsory tutelage. But such compulsion can be justified only by the production of a free and happy individual, and its scope is therefore limited by this goal. Since Aristotle ultimately accepted the Socratic principle that all men desire happiness, education merely compels us to do what we really want. It frees us from our own ignorance, folly, and irrationality and frees us for our own self-actualization. This may be the rationale for Aristotle’s claim that, “the law’s laying down of what is decent is not oppressive” (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180a24). Since Aristotle thinks that freedom from the internal compulsion of the passions is more important than freedom from the external compulsion of force, and that force can quell the passions and establish virtue’s empire over them, Aristotle as much as Rousseau believes that we can be forced to be free.

But throughout the Politics, Aristotle shows that he is concerned to protect “negative” liberty as well. In Politics 2.2–5, Aristotle ingeniously defends private families, private property, and private enterprise from Plato’s communistic proposals in the Republic, thereby preserving the freedom of large spheres of human activity.

Aristotle’s concern with privacy is evident in his criticism of a proposal of Hippodamus of Miletus which would encourage spies and informers (2.8, 1268b22).

Aristotle is concerned to create a regime in which the rich do not enslave the poor and the poor do not plunder the rich (3.10, 1281a13–27).

Second Amendment enthusiasts will be gratified at Aristotle’s emphasis on the importance of a wide distribution of arms in maintaining the freedom of the populace (2.8, 1268a16-24; 3.17, 1288a12–14; 4.3 [6.3], 1289b27–40; 4.13 [6.13], 1297a12–27; 7.11 [4.11], 1330b17–20).

War and empire are great enemies of liberty, so isolationists and peace lovers will be gratified by Aristotle’s critique of warlike regimes and praise of peace. The good life requires peace and leisure. War is not an end in itself, but merely a means to ensure peace (7.14 [4.14], 1334a2–10; 2.9, 1271a41–b9).

The best regime is not oriented outward, toward dominating other peoples, but inward, towards the happiness of its own. The best regime is an earthly analogue of the Prime Mover. It is self-sufficient and turned inward upon itself (7.3 [4.3], 1325a14–31). Granted, Aristotle may not think that negative liberty is the whole of the good life, but it is an important component which needs to be safeguarded.[3]

3. The Elements of Politics and the Mixed Regime

Since the aim of political association is the good life, the best political regime is the one that best delivers the good life. Delivering the good life can be broken down into two components: production and distribution. There are two basic kinds of goods: the goods of the body and the goods of the soul.[4] Both sorts of goods can be produced and distributed privately and publicly, but Aristotle treats the production and distribution of bodily goods as primarily private whereas he treats the production and distribution of spiritual goods as primarily public. The primary goods of the soul are moral and intellectual virtue, which are best produced by public education, and honor, the public recognition of virtue, talent, and service rendered to the city.[5] The principle of distributive justice is defined as proportionate equality: equally worthy people should be equally happy and unequally worthy people should be unequally happy, commensurate with their unequal worth (Nicomachean Ethics, 5.6–7). The best regime, in short, combines happiness and justice.

But how is the best regime to be organized? Aristotle builds his account from at least three sets of elements.

First, in Politics 3.6–7, Aristotle observes that sovereignty can rest either with men or with laws. If with men, then it can rest in one man, few men, or many men. (Aristotle treats it as self-evident that it cannot rest in all men.) The rulers can exercise political power for two different ends: for the common good and for special interests. One pursues the common good by promoting the happiness of all according to justice. Special interests can be broken down into individual or factional interests. A ruler can be blamed for pursuing such goods only if he does so without regard to justice, i.e., without a just concern for the happiness of all. When a single man rules for the common good, we have kingship. When he rules for his own good, we have tyranny. When the few rule for the common good, we have aristocracy. When they rule for their factional interest, we have oligarchy. When the many rule for the common good, we have polity. When they rule for their factional interest, we have democracy. These six regimes can exist in pure forms, or they can be mixed together.

Second, Aristotle treats social classes as elemental political distinctions. In Politics 3.8 he refines his definitions of oligarchy and democracy, claiming that oligarchy is actually the rule by the rich, whether they are few or many, and democracy is rule by the poor, whether they are few or many. Similarly, in Politics 4.11 (6.1) Aristotle also defines polity as rule by the middle class. In Politics 4.4 (6.4), Aristotle argues that the social classes are irreducible political distinctions. One can be a rich, poor, or middle class juror, legislator, or office-holder. One can be a rich, poor, or middle class farmer or merchant. But one cannot be both rich and poor at the same time (1291b2–13). Class distinctions cannot be eliminated; therefore, they have to be recognized and respected, their disadvantages meliorated and their advantages harnessed for the common good.

Third, in Politics 4.14 (6.14), Aristotle divides the activities of rulership into three different functions: legislative, judicial, and executive.[6]

Because rulership can be functionally divided, it is possible to create a mixed regime by assigning different functions to different parts of the populace. One could, for instance, mix monarchy and elite rule by assigning supreme executive office to a single man and the legislative and judicial functions to the few. Or one could divide the legislative function into different houses, assigning one to the few and another to the many. Aristotle suggests giving the few the power to legislate and the many the power to veto legislation. He suggests that officers be elected by the many, but nominated from the few. The few should make expenditures, but the many should audit them (2.12, 1274a15–21; 3.11, 1281b21–33; 4.14 [6.14], 1298b26–40).

In Politics 3.10, Aristotle argues that some sort of mixed regime is preferable, since no pure regime is satisfactory: “A difficulty arises as to what should be the controlling part of the city, for it is really either the multitude or the rich or the decent or the best one of all or a tyrant? But all of them appear unsatisfactory” (1281a11–13). Democracy is bad because the poor unjustly plunder the substance of the rich; oligarchy is bad because the rich oppress and exploit the poor; tyranny is bad because the tyrant does injustice to everyone (1281a13–28). Kingship and aristocracy are unsatisfactory because they leave the many without honors and are schools for snobbery and high-handedness (1281a28–33; 4.11 [6.11], 1295b13ff). A pure polity might be unsatisfactory because it lacks a trained leadership caste and is therefore liable to make poor decisions (3.11, 1281b21–33).

4. Checks and Balances, Political Rule, and the Rule of Law

Aristotle’s mixed regime is the origin of the idea of the separation of powers and “checks and balances.” It goes hand in hand with a very modern political realism. Aristotle claims that, “all regimes that look to the common advantage turn out, according to what is simply just, to be correct ones, while those that look only to the advantage of their rulers are mistaken and are all deviations from the correct regime. For they are despotic, but the city is a community of the free” (3.6, 1279a17–21).

It is odd, then, that in Politics 4.8–9 (6.8–9) Aristotle describes the best regime as a mixture of two defective regimes, oligarchy and democracy–not of two correct regimes, aristocracy and polity. But perhaps Aristotle entertained the possibility of composing a regime that tends to the common good out of classes which pursue their own factional interests.

Perhaps Aristotle thought that the “intention” to pursue the common good can repose not in the minds of individual men, but in the institutional logic of the regime itself. This would be an enormous advantage, for it would bring about the common good without having to rely entirely upon men of virtue and good will, who are in far shorter supply than men who pursue their own individual and factional advantages.

Related to the mixed regime with its checks and balances is the notion of “political rule.” Political rule consists of ruling and being ruled in turn:

. . . there is a sort of rule exercised over those who are similar in birth and free. This rule we call political rule, and the ruler must learn it by being ruled, just as one learns to be a cavalry commander by serving under a cavalry commander . . . Hence is was nobly said that one cannot rule well without having been ruled. And while virtue in these two cases is different, the good citizen must learn and be able both to be ruled and to rule. This is in fact the virtue of the citizen, to know rule over the free from both sides. (3.4, 1277b7–15; cf. 1.13, 1259b31–34 and 2.2, 1261a32–b3)

Aristotle makes it clear that political rule can exist only where the populace consists of men who are free, i.e., sufficiently virtuous that they can rule themselves. They must also be economically middle-class, well-armed, and warlike. They must, in short, be the sort of men who can participate responsibly in government, who want to participate, and who cannot safely be excluded. A populace that is slavish, vice-ridden, poor, and unarmed can easily be disenfranchised and exploited. If power were entirely in the hands of a free populace, the regime would be a pure polity, and political rule would exist entirely between equals. If, however, a free populace were to take part in a mixed regime, then political rule would exist between different parts of the regime. The many and the few would divide power and functions between them. Not only would members of each class take turns performing the different functions allotted to them, the classes themselves would rule over others in one respect and be ruled in another. In these circumstances, then, checks and balances are merely one form of political rule.

In Politics 3.16, Aristotle connects political rule to the rule of law:

What is just is that people exercise rule no more than they are subject to it and that therefore they rule by turns. But this is already law, for the arrangement is law. Therefore, it is preferable that law rule rather than any one of the citizens. And even if, to pursue the same argument, it were better that there be some persons exercising rule, their appointment should be as guardians and servants of the laws. For though there must be some offices, that there should be this one person exercising rule is, they say, not just, at least when all are similar. (1287a15–22)

Aristotle’s point is simple. If two men govern by turns, then sovereignty does not ultimately repose in either of them, but in the rule that they govern by turns. The same can be said of checks and balances. If the few spend money and the many audit the accounts, then neither group is sovereign, the laws are. If sovereignty reposes in laws, not men, the common good is safe. As Aristotle points out, “anyone who bids the laws to rule seems to bid god and intellect alone to rule, but anyone who bids a human being to rule adds on also the wild beast. For desire is such a beast and spiritedness perverts rulers even when they are the best of men. Hence law is intellect without appetite” (1287a23–31). The greatest enemy of the common good is private interest. The laws, however, have no private interests. Thus if our laws are conducive to the common good, we need not depend entirely on the virtue and public-spiritedness of men.

Aristotle would, however, hasten to add that no regime can do without these characteristics entirely, for the laws cannot apply themselves. They must be applied by men, and their application will seldom be better than the men who apply them. Furthermore, even though a regime may function without entirely virtuous citizens, no legitimate regime can be indifferent to the virtue of the citizens, for the whole purpose of political association is to instill the virtues necessary for happiness.

Notes

1. All quotes from Aristotle are from The Politics of Aristotle, trans. and ed. Peter L. Phillips Simpson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). Simpson’s edition has two unique features. First, The Politics is introduced by a translation of Nicomachean Ethics 10.9. Second, Simpson moves books 7 and 8 of The Politics, positioning them between the traditional books 3 and 4. I retain the traditional ordering, indicating Simpson’s renumbering parenthetically. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are from The Politics. Quotes from the Nicomachean Ethics will be indicated as such.

2. A useful commentary on these and other Aristotelian arguments for public education is Randall R. Curren, Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

3. For a fuller discussion of the value Aristotle puts on liberty, see Roderick T. Long, “Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” The Review of Metaphysics 49, no. 4 (June 1996), pp. 787–802.

4. One could add a third category of instrumental goods, but these goods are instrumental to the intrinsic goods of the body, the soul, or both, and thus could be classified under those headings.

5. As for the highest good of the soul, which is attained by philosophy, Aristotle’s flight from Athens near the end of his life shows that he recognized that different political orders can be more or less open to free thought, but I suspect that he was realist enough (and Platonist enough) to recognize that even the best cities are unlikely to positively cultivate true freedom to philosophize. I would wager that Aristotle would be both surprised at the freedom of thought in the United States and receptive to Tocquevillian complaints about the American tendency toward conformism that makes such freedom unthreatening to the reigning climate of opinion. A cynic might argue that if Americans actually made use of their freedom of thought, it would be quickly taken away.

6. On the complexities of the executive role in the Politics, see Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), chs. 2–3.

Introduction to Aristotle’s Politics
Part 2: In Defense of Popular Government

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Part 2 of 2

5. The Good Man and the Good Citizen

Having now surveyed Aristotle’s thoughts on the elements and proper aim of politics, we can now examine his arguments for popular government. When I use the phrase “popular government,” it should be borne in mind that Aristotle does not advocate a pure polity, but a mixed regime with a popular element.

Aristotle’s first case for bringing the many into government can be discerned in Politics 3.4. Aristotle’s question is whether the virtues of the good man and the good citizen are the same. They are not the same, insofar as the virtue of the good citizen is defined relative to the regime, and there are many different regimes, while the virtue of the good man is defined relative to human nature, which is one. One can therefore be a good citizen but not a good man, and a good man but not a good citizen. History is replete with examples of regimes which punish men for their virtues and reward them for their vices. Aristotle does, however, allow that the good man and the good citizen can be one in a regime in which the virtues required of a good citizen do not differ from the virtues of a good man.

The chief virtue of a good man is prudence. But prudence is not required of a citizen insofar as he is ruled. Only obedience is required. Prudence is, however, required of a citizen insofar as he rules. Since the best regime best encourages happiness by best cultivating virtue, a regime which allows the many to govern along with the few is better than a regime which excludes them. By including the many in ruling, a popular regime encourages the widest cultivation of prudence and gives the greatest opportunity for its exercise. The best way to bring the many into the regime is what Aristotle calls political rule: ruling and being ruled in turn, as prescribed by law.

Political rule not only teaches the virtue of prudence to the many, it teaches the virtue of being ruled to the few, who must give way in turn to the many. Since the few aspire to rule but not be ruled, Aristotle argues that they cannot rule without first having been ruled: “the ruler must learn [political rule] by being ruled, just as one learns to be a cavalry commander by serving under a cavalry commander . . . Hence is was nobly said that one cannot rule well without having been ruled. And while virtue in these two cases is different, the good citizen must learn and be able both to be ruled and to rule. This is, in fact, the virtue of a citizen, to know rule over the free from both sides. Indeed, the good man too possesses both” (3.4, 1277b7–16).

Aristotle names justice as a virtue which is learned both in ruling and being ruled. Those born to wealth and power are liable to arrogance and the love of command. By subjecting them to the rule of others, including their social inferiors, they learn to respect their freedom and justly appraise their worth.

6. Potlucks, Chimeras, Juries

Aristotle’s next case for bringing the many into the regime is found in Politics 3.11.[1] Aristotle seeks to rebut the aristocratic argument against popular participation, namely that the best political decisions are wise ones, but wisdom is found only among the few, not the many. Popular participation, therefore, would inevitably dilute the quality of the political decision-makers, increasing the number of foolish decisions. Aristotle accepts the premise that the wise should rule, but he argues that there are circumstances in which the few and the many together are wiser than the few on their own. The aristocratic principle, therefore, demands the participation of the many:

. . . the many, each of whom is not a serious man, nevertheless could, when they have come together, be better than those few best–not, indeed, individually but as a whole, just as meals furnished collectively are better than meals furnished at one person’s expense. For each of them, though many, could have a part of virtue and prudence, and just as they could, when joined together in a multitude, become one human being with many feet, hands, and senses, so also could they become one in character and thought. That is why the many are better judges of the works of music and the poets, for one of them judges one part and another another and all of them the whole. (1281a42–b10)

At first glance, this argument seems preposterous. History and everyday life are filled with examples of wise individuals opposing foolish collectives. But Aristotle does not claim that the many are always wiser than the few, simply that they can be under certain conditions (1281b15).

The analogy of the potluck supper is instructive (cf. 3.15, 1286a28–30).[2] A potluck supper can be better than one provided by a single person if it offers a greater number and variety of dishes and diffuses costs and labor. But potluck suppers are not always superior–that is the “luck” in it. Potlucks are often imbalanced. On one occasion, there may be too many desserts and no salads. On another, three people may bring chicken and no one brings beef or pork. The best potluck, therefore, is a centrally orchestrated one which mobilizes the resources of many different contributors but ensures a balanced and wholesome meal.

Likewise, the best way to include the many in political decision-making is to orchestrate their participation, giving them a delimited role that maximizes their virtues and minimizes their vices. This cannot be accomplished in a purely popular regime, particularly a lawless one, but it can be accomplished in a mixed regime in which the participation of the populace is circumscribed by law and checked by the interests of other elements of the population.

Aristotle’s second analogy–which likens the intellectual and moral unity of the many to a man with many feet, hands, and sense organs, i.e., a freak of nature–does not exactly assuage doubters. But his point is valid. While even the best of men may lack a particular virtue, it is unlikely that it will be entirely absent from a large throng. Therefore, the many are potentially as virtuous or even more virtuous than the few if their scattered virtues can be gathered together and put to work. But history records many examples of groups acting less morally than any member on his own. Thus the potential moral superiority of the many is unlikely to emerge in a lawless democracy. But it could emerge in a lawful mixed regime, which actively encourages and employs the virtues of the many while checking their vices. This process can be illustrated by adapting an analogy that Aristotle offers to illustrate another point: A painting of a man can be more beautiful than any real man, for the painter can pick out the best features of individual men and combine them into a beautiful whole (3.11, 1281b10–11).

Aristotle illustrates the potential superiority of collective judgment with another questionable assertion, that “the many are better judges of the works of music and the poets, for one of them judges one part and another another and all of them the whole.” Again, this seems preposterous. Good taste, like wisdom, is not widely distributed and is cultivated by the few, not the many. Far more people buy “rap” recordings than classical ones. But Aristotle is not claiming that the many are better judges in all cases. Aristotle is likely referring to Greek dramatic competitions. These competitions were juried by the audience, not a small number of connoisseurs.

A jury trial or competition is a genuine collective decision-making process in which each juror is morally enjoined to pay close attention the matter at hand and to render an objective judgment.[3] Although each juror has his own partial impression, when jurors deliberate they can add their partial impressions together to arrive at a more complete and adequate account. To the extent that a jury decision must approach unanimity, the jurors will be motivated to examine the issue from all sides and persuade one another to move toward a rationally motivated consensus. A jury decision can, therefore, be more rational, well-informed, and objective than an individual one.[4] The market, by contrast, is not a collective decision-making process. It does not require a consumer to compare his preferences to those of others, to persuade others of their validity or defend them from criticism, or to arrive at any sort of consensus. Instead, the market merely registers the collective effects of individual decisions.[5]

7. Freedom and Stability

Another argument for popular government in Politics 3.11 (1281b21–33) is that it is more stable. Aristotle grants the Aristocratic principle that it is not safe for the populace to share in “the greatest offices” because, “on account of their injustice and unwisdom, they would do wrong in some things and go wrong in others.” But then he goes on to argue that it would not be safe to exclude the many from rule altogether, since a city “that has many in it who lack honor and are poor must of necessity be full of enemies,” which would be a source of instability. Instability is, however, inconsistent with the proper aim of politics, for the good life requires peace. The solution is a mixed regime which ensures peace and stability by allowing the many to participate in government, but not to occupy the highest offices. In Politics 2.9, Aristotle praises the Spartan Ephorate for holding the regime together, “since, as the populace share in the greatest office, it keeps them quiet. . . . For if any regime is going to survive, all the parts of the city must want it both to exist and to remain as it is” (1270b17–22; cf. Aristotle’s discussion of the Carthaginians in 2.9, 1272b29–32; see also 4.13 [6.13], 1297b6).

In Politics 2.12, Aristotle offers another reason for including the populace in government. Solon gave the populace, “the power that was most necessary (electing to office and auditing the accounts), since without it they would have been enslaved and hostile” (1274a4–6). Here Aristotle makes it clear that he values liberty, and he values popular government because it protects the liberty of the many.

8. Expert Knowledge

In Politics 3.11 Aristotle rebuts the argument that the many should not be involved in politics because they are amateurs, and decisions in politics, as in medicine and other fields, should be left to experts. In response to this, Aristotle repeats his argument that the many, taken together, may be better judges than a few experts. He then adds that there are some arts in which the products can be appreciated by people who do not possess the art: “Appreciating a house, for example, does not just belong to the builder; the one who uses it, namely the household manager, will pass an even better judgment on it. Likewise, the pilot judges the rudder better than the carpenter and the dinner guest judges the feast better than the chef” (1282a19–22). If the art of statesmanship is like these, then the best judge of the quality of a statesman is not the few political experts, but the many political laymen who are ruled by him. The judgment of the populace should not, therefore, be disdained.

9. Resistance to Corruption

In Politics 3.15 Aristotle argues that popular regimes are more resistant to corruption. Even in a regime in which law ultimately rules, there are particular circumstances which the laws do not anticipate. Where the law cannot decide, men must do so. But this creates an opportunity for corruption. Aristotle argues that such decisions are better made by large bodies deliberating in public: “What is many is more incorruptible: the multitude, like a greater quantity of water, is harder to ruin than a few. A single person’s judgment must necessarily be corrupted when he is overcome by anger or some other such passion, but getting everyone in the other case to become angry and go wrong at the same time takes a lot of doing. Let the multitude in question, however, be the free who are acting in no way against law, except where law is necessarily deficient” (1286a33–38). Aristotle’s argument that the many may collectively possess fewer vices than the few is merely a mirror image of his earlier collective virtue argument. Here, as elsewhere, Aristotle defends popular government only under delimited circumstances. The populace must be free, not slavish, and they must decide only when the laws cannot.

10. Delegation and Diffusion of Power

Politics 3.16 is devoted to arguments against total kingship. One of these arguments can be turned into a case for popular government. Aristotle claims that total kingship is unsustainable: “It is not easy for one person to oversee many things, so there will need to be many officials appointed in subordination to him. Consequently, what is the difference between having them there right from the start and having one man in this way appoint them? . . . if a man who is serious is justly ruler because he is better, then two good men are better than one” (1287b8–12, cf. 1287b25–29).

Since total kingship is unworkable, kings must necessarily appoint superior men as “peers” to help them. But if total kingship must create an aristocracy, then why not have aristocracy from the start?

This argument could, however, be pushed further to make a case for popular government. An aristocracy cannot effectively rule the people without the active participation of some and the passive acquiescence of the rest. As we have seen above, Aristotle argues that the best way to bring this about is popular government. But if aristocracy must eventually bring the populace into the regime, then why not include them from the very beginning?

11. When Regimes Fail

In Politics 4.2 (6.2), Aristotle returns to his list of pure regime types. The three just regimes are kingship, aristocracy, and polity; the three unjust ones are tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Aristotle proceeds to rank the three just regimes in terms of the kinds of virtues they require. Thus Aristotle identifies kingship and aristocracy as the best regimes because they are both founded on “fully equipped virtue” (1289a31). Of the two, kingship is the very best, for it depends upon a virtue so superlative that it is possessed by only one man. Aristocracy is less exalted because it presupposes somewhat more broadly distributed and therefore less exalted virtue. Polity depends upon even more widespread and modest virtue. Furthermore, the populace, unlike kings and aristocrats, lacks the full complement of material equipment necessary to fully exercise such virtues as magnificence.

By this ranking, polity is not the best regime, but the least of the good ones. But Aristotle then offers a new, politically realistic standard for ranking the just regimes which reverses their order. Kingship may be the best regime from a morally idealistic perspective, but when it degenerates it turns into tyranny, which is the worst regime. Aristocracy may be the second best regime from a morally idealistic perspective, but when it degenerates it turns into oligarchy, which is the second worst regime. Polity may be the third choice of the moral idealist, but when it degenerates, it merely becomes democracy, which is the best of a bad lot.

Since degeneration is inevitable, the political realist ranks regimes not only in terms of their best performances, but also in terms of their worst. By this standard, polity is the best of the good regimes and kingship the worst. Kingship is best under ideal conditions, polity under real conditions. Kingship is a sleek Jaguar, polity a dowdy Volvo. On the road, the Jaguar is clearly better. But when they go in the ditch, the Volvo shows itself to be the better car overall.

12. The Middle Class Regime

Aristotle displays the same political realism in his praise of the middle class regime in Politics 4.11 (6.11): “If we judge neither by a virtue that is beyond the reach of private individuals, nor by an education requiring a nature and equipment dependent on chance, nor again a regime that is as one would pray for, but by a way of life that most can share in common together and by a regime that most cities can participate in . . . ,” then a large, politically enfranchised middle class has much to recommend it: “In the case of political community . . . the one that is based on those in the middle is best, and . . . cities capable of being well governed are those sorts where the middle is large . . .” (1295b35–36).

Since the middle class is the wealthier stratum of the common people, Aristotle’s arguments for middle class government are ipso facto arguments for popular government. Aristotle makes it clear from the beginning, however, that he is not talking about a purely popular regime, but a mixed one compounded out of a middle class populace and those elements of aristocracy which are not out of the reach of most cities (1295a30–34).

Aristotle’s first argument for the middle regime seems a sophistry: “If it was nobly said in the Ethics that the happy way of life is unimpeded life in accordance with virtue and that virtue is a mean, then necessarily the middle way of life, the life of a mean that everyone can attain, must be best. The same definitions must hold also for the virtue and vice of city and regime, since the regime is a certain way of life of a city” (1295a35–40).

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes it clear that the fact that virtue can be understood as a mean between two vices, one of excess and the other of defect, does not imply either that virtue is merely an arithmetic mean (Nicomachean Ethics, 2.2, 1106a26–b8), or that virtue is to be regarded as mediocrity, not as superlative (Nicomachean Ethics, 2.2, 1107a9–27). Here, however, Aristotle describes the mean not as a superlative, but as a mediocrity “that everyone can attain.” This conclusion follows only if we presuppose that the morally idealistic doctrine of the Ethics has been modified into a moral realism analogous to the political realism of Politics 4.2.

Aristotle then claims that in a regime the mean lies in the middle class: “In all cities there are in fact three parts: those who are exceedingly well-off, those who are exceedingly needy, and the third who are in the middle of these two. So, since it is agreed that the mean and middle is best, then it is manifest that a middling possession also of the goods of fortune must be best of all” (1295b1–3). Aristotle is, however, equivocating. He begins by defining the middle class as an arithmetic mean between the rich and the poor. He concludes that the middle class is a moral mean. But he does not establish that the arithmetic mean corresponds with the moral.

Aristotle does, however, go on to offer reasons for thinking that the social mean corresponds to the moral mean. But the middle class is not necessarily more virtuous because its members have been properly educated, but because their social position and class interests lead them to act as if they had been.

First, Aristotle argues that “the middle most easily obeys reason.” Those who are “excessively beautiful or strong or well-born or wealthy” find it hard to follow reason, because they tend to be “insolent and rather wicked in great things.” By contrast, those who are poor and “extremely wretched and weak, and have an exceeding lack of honor” tend to become “villains and too much involved in petty wickedness.” The middle class is, however, too humble to breed insolence and too well-off to breed villainy. Since most injustices arise from insolence and villainy, a regime with a strong middle class will be more likely to be just.

Second, Aristotle argues that the middle class is best suited to ruling and being ruled in turn. Those who enjoy, “an excess of good fortune (strength, wealth, friends, and other things of the sort)” love to rule and dislike being ruled. Both of these attitudes are harmful to the city, yet they naturally arise among the wealthy. From an early age, the wealthy are instilled with a “love of ruing and desire to rule, both of which are harmful to cities” (1295b12), and, “because of the luxury they live in, being ruled is not something they get used to, even at school” (1295b13–17). By contrast, poverty breeds vice, servility, and small-mindedness. Thus the poor are easy to push around, and if they do gain power they are incapable of exercising it virtuously. Therefore, without a middle class, “a city of slaves and masters arises, not a city of the free, and the first are full of envy while the second are full of contempt.” Such a city must be “at the furthest remove from friendship and political community” (1295b21–24). The presence of a strong middle class, however, binds the city into a whole, limiting the tendency of the rich to tyranny and the poor to slavishness, creating a “city of the free.”

Third, Aristotle argues that middle class citizens enjoy the safest and most stable lives, imbuing the regime as a whole with these characteristics. Those in the middle are, among all the citizens, the most likely to survive in times of upheaval, when the poor starve and the rich become targets. They are sufficiently content with their lot not to envy the possessions of the rich. Yet they are not so wealthy that the poor envy them. They neither plot against the rich nor are plotted against by the poor.

Fourth, a large middle class stabilizes a regime, particularly if the middle is “stronger than both extremes or, otherwise, than either one of them. For the middle will tip the balance when added to either side and prevent the emergence of an excess at the opposite extremes” (1295b36–40). Without a large and powerful middle class, “either ultimate rule of the populace arises or unmixed oligarchy does, or, because of excess on both sides, tyranny” (1296a3; cf. 6.12, 1297a6ff).

Fifth is the related point that regimes with large middle classes are relatively free of faction and therefore more concerned with the common good. This is because a large middle class makes it harder to separate everyone out into two groups (1296a7–10).

Finally, Aristotle claims that one sign of the superiority of middle class regimes is that the best legislators come from the middle class. As examples, he cites Solon, Lycurgus, and Charondas (1296a18–21).

Conclusion: Aristotle’s Polity and Our Own

If the proper aim of government is to promote the happiness of the citizen, Aristotle marshals an impressive array of arguments for giving the people, specifically the middle class, a role in government. These arguments can be grouped under five headings: virtue, rational decision-making, freedom, stability, and resistance to corruption.

Popular government both presupposes and encourages widespread virtue among the citizens, and virtue is a necessary condition of happiness. Middle class citizens are particularly likely to follow practical reason and act justly, for they are corrupted neither by wealth nor by poverty. Popular participation can improve political decision-making by mobilizing scattered information and experience, and more informed decisions are more likely to promote happiness. In particular, popular government channels the experiences of those who are actually governed back into the decision-making process.

Popular participation preserves the freedom of the people, who would otherwise be exploited if they had no say in government. By preserving the freedom of the people, popular participation unifies the regime, promoting peace and stability which in turn are conducive to the pursuit of happiness. This is particularly the case with middle class regimes, for the middle class prevents excessive and destabilizing separation and between the extremes of wealth and poverty.

Popular governments are also more resistant to corruption. It is harder to use bribery or trickery to corrupt decisions made by many people deliberating together in public than by one person or a few deciding in private. This means that popular regimes are more likely to promote the common good instead of allowing the state to become a tool for the pursuit of one special interest at the expense of another. Furthermore, if a popular regime does become corrupt, it is most likely to become a democracy, which is the least unjust of the bad regimes and the easiest to reform.

All these are good arguments for giving the people a role in government. But not just any people. And not just any role.

First, Aristotle presupposes a small city-state. He did not think that any regime could pursue the common good if it became too large. This is particularly true of a popular regime, for the larger the populace, the less room any particular citizen has for meaningful participation.

Second, he presupposes a populace which is racially and culturally homogeneous. A more diverse population is subject to faction and strife. It will either break up into distinct communities or it will have to be held together by violence and governed by an elite. A more diverse population also erodes a society’s moral consensus, making moral education even more difficult.

Third, political participation will be limited to middle-class and wealthy property-owning males, specifically men who derive their income from the ownership of productive land, not merchants and craftsmen.

Fourth, Aristotle circumscribes the role of the populace by assigning it specific legal roles, such as the election of officers and the auditing of accounts–roles which are checked and balanced by the legal roles of the aristocratic element, such as occupying leadership positions.

If Aristotle is right about the conditions of popular government, then he would probably take a dim view of its prospects in America.

First and foremost, Aristotle would deplore America’s lack of concern with moral education. Aristotle’s disagreement would go beyond the obvious fact that the American founders did not make moral education the central concern of the state. America has neglected to cultivate even the minimal moral virtues required to maintain a liberal regime, virtues such as independence, personal responsibility, and basic civility.

Second, Aristotle would predict that multiculturalism and non-white immigration will destroy the cultural preconditions of popular government.

Third, Aristotle would reject America’s ever-widening franchise–particularly the extension of the vote to women, non-property owners, and cultural aliens–as a sure prescription for lowering the quality of public decision-making in the voting booth and jury room.

Fourth, Aristotle would be alarmed by the continuing erosion of the American working and middle classes by competition from foreign workers both inside and outside America’s borders. He would deplore America’s transformation from an agrarian to an industrial-mercantile civilization and support autarky rather than free trade and economic globalization.

Fifth, Aristotle would be alarmed by ongoing attempts to disarm the populace.

Sixth, he would condemn America’s imperialistic and warlike policies toward other nations.

Finally, Aristotle would likely observe that since genuine popular government is difficult with hundreds of thousands of citizens it will be impossible with hundreds of millions.

In short, if Aristotle were alive today, he would find himself to the right of Patrick J. Buchanan, decrying America’s decline from a republic to an empire. Aristotle challenges us to show whether and how liberty and popular government are compatible with feminism, multiculturalism, and globalized capitalism.

To conclude, however, on a more positive note: Although Aristotle gives reasons to think that the future of popular government in America is unpromising, he also gives reasons for optimism about the long-term prospects of popular government in general, for his defense of popular government is based on a realistic assessment of human nature, not only in its striving for perfection, but also in its propensity for failure.

Notes

1. For useful discussions of the arguments of Politics 3.11, see Mary P. Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), 66–71, and Peter L. Phillips Simpson, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 166-71.

2. On the potluck supper analogy, see Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Fear of Diversity: The Birth of Political Science in Ancient Greek Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 222–24.

3. I wish to thank M. L. C. for suggesting the model of a jury trial.

4 . For a beautiful description of the deliberative process of a jury, see John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, in Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun, ed. Ross M. Lence (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992), 49–50.

5. Friedrich A. Hayek’s classic essay “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” in his Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), argues that the market is superior to central planning because it better mobilizes widely scattered information. The market is, of course, larger than any possible jury and thus will always command more information. However, if one were to compare a market and a jury of the same size, the jury would clearly be a more rational decision-making process, for the market registers decisions based on perspectives which are in principle entirely solipsistic, whereas the jury requires a genuine dialogue which challenges all participants to transcend their partial and subjective perspectives and work toward a rational consensus which is more objective than any individual decision because it more adequately accounts for the phenomena in question than could any individual decision. It is this crucial disanalogy that seems to vitiate attempts to justify the market in terms of Gadamerian, Popperian, or Habermasian models and communicative rationality. For the best statement of this sort of approach, see G. B. Madison, The Political Economy of Civil Society and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 1998), esp. chs. 3–5.

 


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jeudi, 26 avril 2012

Platon, encore et toujours

Platon, encore et toujours

par Claude BOURRINET

Est-il une époque dans laquelle la possibilité d’une prise de distance ait été si malaisée, presque iplatocooperativeindividualismorg.jpgmpossible, et pour beaucoup improbable ? Pourtant, les monuments écrits laissent entrevoir des situations que l’on pourrait nommer, au risque de l’anachronisme, « totalitaires », où non seulement l’on était sommé de prendre position, mais aussi de participer, de manifester son adhésion passivement ou activement.

L’Athènes antique, l’Empire byzantin, l’Europe médiévale, l’Empire omeyyade, et pour tout dire la plupart des systèmes socio-politiques, de la Chine à la pointe de l’Eurasie, et sans doute aussi dans l’Amérique précolombienne ou sur les îles étroites du Pacifique, les hommes se sont définis par rapport à un tout qui les englobait, et auquel ils devaient s’aliéner, c’est-à-dire abandonner une part plus ou moins grande de leur liberté.

S’il n’est pas facile de définir ce qu’est cette dernière, il l’est beaucoup plus de désigner les forces d’enrégimentement, pour peu justement qu’on en soit assez délivré pour pouvoir les percevoir. C’est d’ailleurs peut-être justement là un début de définition de ce que serait la « liberté », qui est avant tout une possibilité de voir, et donc de s’extraire un minimum pour acquérir le champ nécessaire de la perception.

Si nous survolons les siècles, nous constatons que la plupart des hommes sont « jetés » dans une situation, qu’ils n’ont certes pas choisie, parce que la naissance même les y a mis. Le fait brut des premières empreintes de la petite enfance, le visage maternel, les sons qui nous pénètrent, la structuration mentale induite par les stimuli, les expériences sensorielles, l’apprentissage de la langue, laquelle porte le legs d’une longue mémoire et découpe implicitement, et même formellement, par le verbe, le mot, les fonctions, le réel, l’éducation et le système de valeurs de l’entourage immédiat, tout cela s’impose comme le mode d’être naturel de l’individu, et produit une grande partie de son identité.

L’accent mis sur l’individu s’appelle individualisme. Notons au passage que cette entité sur laquelle semble reposer les possibilités d’existence est mise en doute par sa prétention à être indivisible. L’éclatement du moi, depuis la « mort de Dieu », du fondement métaphysique de sa pérennité, de sa légitimité, accentué par les coups de boutoir des philosophies du « soupçon », comme le marxisme, le nietzschéisme, la psychanalyse, le structuralisme, a invalidé tout régime s’en prévalant, quand bien même le temps semble faire triompher la démocratie, les droits de l’homme, qui supposent l’autonomie et l’intégrité de l’individu en tant que tel.

Les visions du monde ancien supposaient l’existence, dans l’homme, d’une instance solide de jugement et de décision. Les philosophies antiques, le stoïcisme, par exemple, qui a tant influencé le christianisme, mais aussi les religions, quelles qu’elles soient, païennes ou issues du judaïsme, ne mettent pas en doute l’existence du moi, à charge de le définir. Cependant, contrairement au monde moderne, qui a conçu le sujet, un ego détaché du monde, soit à partir de Hobbes dans le domaine politique, ou de Descartes dans celui des sciences, ce « moi » ne prend sa véritable plénitude que dans l’engagement. Aristote a défini l’homme comme animal politique, et, d’une certaine façon, la société chrétienne est une république où tout adepte du Christ est un citoyen.

On sait que Platon, dégoûté par la démagogie athénienne, critique obstiné de la sophistique, avait trouvé sa voie dans la quête transcendante des Idées, la vraie réalité. La mort de Socrate avait été pour lui la révélation de l’aporie démocratique, d’un système fondé sur la toute puissance de la doxa, de l’opinion. Nul n’en a dévoilé et explicité autant la fausseté et l’inanité. Cela n’empêcha pas d’ailleurs le philosophe de se mêler, à ses dépens, du côté de la Grande Grèce, à la chose politique, mais il était dès lors convenu que si l’on s’échappait vraiment de l’emprise sociétale, quitte à y revenir avec une conscience supérieure, c’était par le haut. La fuite « horizontale », par un recours, pour ainsi dire, aux forêts, si elle a dû exister, était dans les faits inimaginables, si l’on se souvient de la gravité d’une peine telle que l’ostracisme. Être rejeté de la communauté s’avérait pire que la mort. Les Robinsons volontaires n’ont pas été répertoriés par l’écriture des faits mémorables. Au fond, la seule possibilité pensable de rupture socio-politique, à l’époque, était la tentation du transfuge. On prenait parti, par les pieds, pour l’ennemi héréditaire.

Depuis Platon, donc, on sait que le retrait véritable, celui de l’âme, à savoir de cet œil spirituel qui demeure lorsque l’accessoire a été jugé selon sa nature, est à la portée de l’être qui éprouve une impossibilité radicale à trouver une justification à la médiocrité du monde. L’ironie voulut que le platonisme fût le fondement idéologique d’un empire à vocation totalitaire. La métaphysique, en se sécularisant, peut se transformer en idéologie. Toutefois, le platonisme est l’horizon indépassable, dans notre civilisation (le bouddhisme en étant un autre, ailleurs) de la possibilité dans un même temps du refus du monde, et de son acceptation à un niveau supérieur.

Du reste, il ne faudrait pas croire que la doctrine de Platon soit réservée au royaume des nuées et des vapeurs intellectuelles détachées du sol rugueux de la réalité empirique. Qui n’éprouve pas l’écœurement profond qui assaille celui qui se frotte quelque peu à la réalité prosaïque actuelle ne sait pas ce que sont le bon goût et la pureté, même à l’état de semblant. Il est des mises en situation qui s’apparentent au mal de mer et à l’éventualité du naufrage.

Toutefois, du moment que notre âge, qui est né vers la fin de ce que l’on nomme abusivement le « Moyen Âge », a vu s’éloigner dans le ciel lointain, puis disparaître dans un rêve impuissant, l’ombre lumineuse de Messer Dieu, l’emprise de l’opinion, ennoblie par les vocables démocratique et par l’invocation déclamatoire du peuple comme alternative à l’omniscience divine, s’est accrue, jusqu’à tenir tout le champ du pensable. Les Guerres de religion du XVIe siècle ont précipité cette évolution, et nous en sommes les légataires universels.

Les périodes électorales, nombreuses, car l’onction du ciel, comme disent les Chinois, doit être, dans le système actuel de validation du politique, désacralisé et sans cesse en voie de délitement, assez fréquent pour offrir une légitimité minimale, offrent l’intérêt de mettre en demeure la vérité du monde dans lequel nous tentons de vivre. À ce compte, ce que disait Platon n’a pas pris une ride. Car l’inauthenticité, le mensonge, la sidération, la manipulation, qui sont le lot quotidien d’un type social fondé sur la marchandise, c’est-à-dire la séduction matérialiste, la réclame, c’est-à-dire la persuasion et le jeu des pulsions, le culte des instincts, c’est-à-dire l’abaissement aux Diktat du corps, l’ignorance, c’est-à-dire le rejet haineux de l’excellence et du savoir profond, plongent ce qui nous reste de pureté et d’aspiration à la beauté dans la pire des souffrances. Comment vivre, s’exprimer, espérer dans un univers pareil ? Le retrait par le haut a été décrédibilisé, le monde en soi paraissant ne pas exister, et le mysticisme n’étant plus que lubie et sublimation sexuelle, voire difformité mentale. Le défoulement électoraliste, joué par de mauvais acteurs, de piètres comédiens dirigés par de bons metteurs en scène, et captivant des spectateurs bon public, niais comme une Margot un peu niaise ficelée par une sentimentalité à courte vue, nous met en présence, journellement pour peu qu’on s’avise imprudemment de se connecter aux médias, avec ce que l’humain comporte de pire, de plus sale, intellectuellement et émotionnellement. On n’en sort pas indemne. Tout n’est que réduction, connotation, farce, mystification, mensonge, trompe-l’œil, appel aux bas instincts, complaisance et faiblesse calculée. Les démocraties antiques, qui, pourtant, étaient si discutables, n’étaient pas aussi avilies, car elles gardaient encore, dans les faits et leur perception, un principe aristocratique, qui faisait du citoyen athénien ou romain le membre d’une caste supérieure, et, à ce titre, tenu à des devoirs impérieux de vertu et de sacrifice. L’hédonisme contemporain et l’égalitarisme consubstantiel au totalitarisme véritable, interdisent l’écart conceptuel indispensable pour voir à moyen ou long terme, et pour juger ce qui est bon pour ne pas sombrer dans l’esclavage, quel qu’il soit. Du reste, l’existence de ce dernier, ce me semble, relevait, dans les temps anciens, autant de nécessités éthiques que de besoins économiques. Car c’est en voyant cette condition pitoyable que l’homme libre sentait la valeur de sa liberté. Pour éduquer le jeune Spartiate, par exemple, on le mettait en présence d’un ilote ivre. Chaque jour, nous assistons à ce genre d’abaissement, sans réaction idoine. La perte du sentiment aristocratique a vidé de son sens l’idée démocratique. Cette intuition existentielle et politique existait encore dans la Révolution française, et jusqu’à la Commune. Puis, la force des choses, l’avènement de la consommation de masse, l’a remisée au rayon des souvenirs désuets.

Claude Bourrinet


Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=2424

lundi, 07 novembre 2011

Lucien Jerphagnon: il parlait à l'oreille des anciens

Lucien Jerphagnon: il parlait à l'oreille des anciens

Le grand historien de l'antiquité européenne laisse des livres à lire!

par Guilhem Kieffer

Ex: http://www.metamag.fr/

Morts quasiment en même temps, que valait un Lucien Jerphagnon à côté d’un Steve Jobs ? Rien à Wall Street. Pas davantage en exclamations, pleurs, soupirs. A quelques jours près, il n’a fait ni la une des télé ou des journaux hormis, heureusement, quelques colonnes dans Le Monde ou Le Point. Mais rien sur iPad ou facebook. On a su à peine qu’il était mort. Il n’était pas une icône-marchande. C’était un prof…


Lucien Jerphagnon

Et, en plus, un prof qui s’intéressait à des mondes disparus, dont les apparatchiks orwelliens traquent les ultimes résidus jusque dans nos salles de cours et de bibliothèques : le monde et la pensée romaine, l’antiquité et ses langues. Qu’il pratiquait fort, comme pas mal de nos parents ou grands-parents. N’avouait-il pas avoir « avalé », dans sa jeunesse, les 30 volumes -en latin- des Confessions de Saint Augustin? 

De sa confrontation avec l’histoire et les maîtres antiques, chrétiens ou non, comme Socrate, Platon, Plotin, mais aussi de son intelligence, Lucien Jerphagnon, qui eut le grand philosophe juif, Vladimir Yankélévitch, comme « maître», avait abouti à un enseignement essentiel et pourtant délaissé aujourd’hui. Il le confiait, dans un long entretien, à La Nouvelle Revue d’Histoire en 2006 . « En regardant les philosophes , on a le sentiment qu’ils sont coupés du monde et de leur temps. Ceux qui étudient les philosophes (ndlr : mais on peut appliquer le même raisonnement à l’histoire) le font comme s’ils vivaient dans un éternel présent.

Messager de Delphes

Or, il n’y a pas d’éternel présent, ni d’homme éternel quoi qu’on en ait dit, qui subsisterait toujours semblable en son fond, des cavernes aux satellites habités . Il y a des couches successives, peuplées de consciences diversement conditionnées, des strates qui ont chacune leur vérité et leurs erreurs, leur idée du possible  et de l’impossible, du concevable et de l’absurde et c’est seulement pour la commodité, pour le confort intellectuel que nous englobons toutes ces consciences disparates sous le même concept d’homme. Le temps bouge continuellement sous les yeux d’êtres qui eux-mêmes se transforment
. »




Mais au-dessus de ce fleuve, en mouvement constant, il y a quelques personnages-ponts. Ponts entre les pensées, entre les hommes, entre les époques . Lucien Jerphagnon était de ceux-là . Avec « La…. Sottise ? Vingt-huit siècles qu’on en parle », publié l’an dernier, quelle démonstration plus sagace et ironique pouvait-il donner au grand public? Aux esprits cultivés, ce maître, titulaire de la chaire de la pensée antique et médiévale à l’université de Caen, fournit d’autres exemples de sa plasticité et de son empathie.



Spécialiste de Saint Augustin (entré avec lui dans La Pléiade), il étonna avec une biographie novatrice sur son antithèse, l’empereur Julien (faussement qualifié d’ »apostat ») qui, des siècles durant, « fera l’objet  d’une incroyable cristallisation. » De cet exercice de nomadisme mental, de cet échange intemporel, de cette hygiène spirituelle, Michel Onfray, qui fut un de ses, chanceux, élèves normands, a livré témoignage dans un hommage reconnaissant (Le Point du 22 septembre).

« Quand il arrivait dans la salle, grand et maigre, la moustache d’un officier de la coloniale toujours impeccablement symétrique il sortait son volume de Budé (…) et commençait un spectacle extraordinaire. Seul, il jouait tous les rôles du théâtre antique : il fulminait, susurrait, ricanait, délirait, le tout avec une érudition époustouflante  (…) S’il parlait d’un bordel, c’était avec la caution de Juvénal, d’une partie de jambes en l’air avec celle de Perse, d’une trait d’esprit avec Tibulle, s’il lançait une saillie contre les grands de ce monde, c’était sous couvert de Tacite ou Suétone (…) » Au terme de son one man show, « on avait beaucoup appris, tout compris et, surtout, tout retenu 

De cet agnostique qui, quelques jours avant sa mort, confiait –«j’essaie de faire remonter vers le divin tout ce qu’il y a de divin en moi»- paraîtra, en février, un texte posthume qu’il venait d’achever: « Connais-toi toi-même »… (et tu connaîtras l’univers et les dieux). Une injonction venue de Delphes ! Destinée à chacun d’entre nous.

jeudi, 13 octobre 2011

Pericles & the Athenian Ideal

Pericles & the Athenian Ideal

By Troy Southgate

Ex: http://www.toqonline.com/

Bust of Pericles bearing the inscription “Pericles, son of Xanthippus, Athenian”. Marble, Roman copy after a Greek original by Cresilas, ca. 430 BC (Museo Pio-Clementino)

Bust of Pericles bearing the inscription “Pericles, son of Xanthippus, Athenian”. Marble, Roman copy after a Greek original by Cresilas, ca. 430 BC (Museo Pio-Clementino)

There is already much discussion in our circles about the example of Sparta, not least as a result of the recent Hollywood blockbuster 300 [1] which was rather loosely based on the exploits of King Leonidas, but in this article I intend to examine Sparta’s chief rival Athens.

The Athenian statesman, Pericles (495 – 429 BCE) once claimed that his city was an educational role model for the whole of Greece, but how far was this really true?

Pericles’ boast is part of his funeral oration recorded by Thucydides (460 – 395 BCE) in his The Peloponnesian War [2]. The aim of Pericles’ oration is to establish that Athens was a society worth dying for. Thus the speech is designed to exploit in his listeners deep-seated feelings of local pride and identity, inviting them to recall the glory of Athenian growth and prosperity. His verbal tapestry begins by lauding Athenian ancestry, emphasizing the fact that the people’s “courage and virtues have handed on to us, a free country.”

He mentions “the constitution and the way of life that has made us great” and points to certain social improvements such as power being democratically channeled into the hands “of the whole people,” the fairness and “equality before the law” and the fact that, in terms of social classification, status is not determined by “membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses.” Pericles was also careful to mention the prevailing moral ethos which underpinned fifth-century Athenian society, that of sovereign, “unwritten laws which it is an acknowledged shame to break.”

Then Pericles lists what he considered to be the noblest attributes of his native city, with particular reference to the cultural activities that provided “recreation for our spirits.” This tactic was designed to pave the way for a contrasting description of the traditional enemy, Sparta.

Pericles then polemically denounced Spartan militarism and the rigorous training to which it “submitted” its youth, lauding the Athenian educational system by contrast. He also praised Athens for apparently maintaining a confident superiority above and beyond all other Greek states, emphasizing the importance of thought before action.

When Pericles finally describes Athens as “an education to Greece,” he explains precisely why he considers this to be the case. Athens stands for the freedom of the citizen, who is “rightful lord and owner of his own person.” Because of its constitution, Athens has waxed powerful: “Athens, alone of the states we know, comes to her testing time in a greatness that surpasses what was imagined of her . . . future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now.” But with greatness comes peril: “it is clear that for us there is more at stake than there is for others who lack our advantages.”

Pericles then offers an inspiring account of the necessity of personal sacrifice. The slain warriors, in whose honor the funeral had been held, were depicted as heroes who had lain down their very lives for the continuation of Athenian culture, heritage and tradition, itself “a risk most glorious.” Pericles then challenges the living to emulate the honored dead, making “up your minds that happiness depends on being free, and freedom depends on being courageous .  .  . for men to end their lives with honor, as these have done, and for you honorably to lament them: their life was set to a measure where death and happiness went hand in hand.”

But can Athens really can be considered to have been a role model for the whole of Greece, or was Pericles merely deluding  himself and his contemporaries? Let us examine the historical record.

Pericles is renowned for the prominent role he played in the democratization of the Athenian political system, which itself had “been fixed by Cleisthenes (570 – 507 BCE) and further reformed after the battle of Marathon” (J. B. Bury, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great [3] [Macmillan, 1951], 346).

After overthrowing Thucydides and assuming the leadership of the people, Pericles and Ethialtes (d. 461 BCE) set about reducing the power of the judiciary in the Areopagus. At this time, the archons or chief magistrates were appointed by lot, but only from a select number of pre-elected candidates. Pericles abolished this system with the result that the archons themselves became “appointed by lot from all the eligible citizens [who now] had an equal chance of holding political office, and taking part in the conduct of political affairs” (Bury, 349). This system was also extended to the Boule, or Council of the Five Hundred.

In addition, Pericles effectively dismantled the hereditary powers of the traditionally oligarchic Areopagus completely, restricting its activities in order to redefine its role as little more than a “supreme court for charges of murder” (A. R. Burn, Pericles and Athens [4] [English Universities Press, 1964], 46). In 462 BCE, Pericles also initiated a scheme whereby jurors and those holding offices of state received payment for their services to the city, “a feature which naturally won him popularity with the masses” (Bury, 349).

This very popularity, in fact, had been deliberately engineered by Pericles himself in order to counteract the large support that Cimon (510 – 450 BCE), an accomplished naval hero, was able to command from the Athenian nobility. Although Pericles was himself an aristocrat, he “decided to attach himself to the people’s party and to take up the cause of the poor and the many instead of that of the rich and the few, in spite of the fact that this was quite contrary to his own temperament”(Plutarch, The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives [5] [Penguin, 1960], 171).

Indeed, Thucydides attacked Periclean reforms and labeled them “democracy in name, but in practice government by the first citizen” (Plutarch, 173). So what began as Greek democracy under Cleisthenes around 500 BCE had become a dictatorship under Pericles by 430 BCE.

Despite all the speculation surrounding Pericles motives for initiating democratic reforms, in terms of her constitution and statecraft Athens undoubtedly stood far ahead of her rivals.

One measure of the seriousness of Athenian democratization was the introduction of new political technologies, such as allotment-machines, water-clocks, juror’s ballots, and juror’s tickets.

Another sign of Athenian political acumen is the transfer of the headquarters and treasure of the Delian league from Delos to Athens in 454 BCE. The Delian League was a crucial alliance of 150 Greek city-states established prior to the Peloponnesian wars to defend Hellas from the Persians. The transfer of its headquarters to Athens gave the Athenians enormous political and economic influence over the member states.

Sparta had an entirely different political structure. In Bury’s words, Sparta was imbued with a “conservative spirit.” The Spartan constitution, unlike its continually revised and reformed counterpart in Athens, had remained virtually the same since its inception.

Sparta had a mixed constitution with monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements. Sparta was ruled nominally by kings, an order going back to the times of Homer. The aristocratic element was the Council of Elders, or Gerusia, which consisted of thirty men who were elected for life and chosen by acclamation in the general assembly of citizens. Membership was described as a prize for virtue. However, the Spartan Assembly of the People, or Apella, contained only males over thirty years of age who decided matters of state purely on the basis of a particular speaker receiving the loudest cheers from those in attendance. Theoretically, the Spartan constitution was democratic, but if the elders and magistrates did not approve of the decision of the majority, they could annul the proceedings by refusing to proclaim the decision.

The Athenians were always very keen to stress the political differences between themselves and their Peloponnesian rivals. Many island states — often artificially created by colonial means — usually followed the example of Athens rather than Sparta. Athenian democracy, unlike the American variety, was not spread around the world at gunpoint. Instead, the states that adopted the Athenian system seemed genuinely inspired by her example.

Sparta, on the other hand, had few imitators, and the states that did resemble Sparta did not appear to imitate her. So as far as Athenian politics was concerned, at least, Pericles was right to claim that Athens was the educator of Greece.

Athens was an example to Greece in politics. But what about the economic and cultural realms?

According to Plutarch, Athens became fantastically wealthy after Themistocles (524 – 459 BCE) had directed the revenue of the city’s lucrative silver mines at Laurium towards the construction of a strong navy, including a new fleet of triremes, which made possible the reconquest of Athens after its inhabitants had been forced to flee from the invading Persians.

When Athens became host to the treasury of the Delian League in 454 BCE, Pericles used its funds for the rebuilding of Athenian temples, claiming they had been destroyed by the Persians in the common cause of Greece, thus it was appropriate that they be rebuilt from the common funds.

In 449 BCE, a pan-Hellenic Congress was proposed to raise funds for further projects. This plan met with fierce opposition from Thucydides among others. According to Plutarch, Pericles answered his critics by declaring that “the Athenians were not obliged to give the allies an account of how their money was spent, provided that they carried on the war for them and kept the Persians away.” Pericles had effectively plundered the common treasure of Greece and turned it into the adornment of Athens.

Athenian trade also began to flourish during the rule of Pericles, and Themistocles’ fortification of the Piraeus made Athens one of the greatest ports in Greece. The decline of merchant cities in Ionia also contributed greatly to the Athenian economy.

But the most striking developments in fifth-century Athens took place in the cultural sphere.

Although Greek philosophy began in Ionia, it flourished in Athens. Because of her wealth, political power, and cultural refinement, she attracted the best minds from all over Greece. The Sophists, in particular, contributed much to the development of political theory, rhetoric, and logic and stimulated the thought of Athens’ native geniuses Socrates and Plato.

Athens is also renowned for her great architecture, a matter in which Pericles himself played a prominent role. Pericles enlisted Pheidias (480 – 430 BCE) to be the director of his building program, assisted by such skilled architects as Callicrates, Ictinus, Coroebus, and Metagenes. Among their projects were the Parthenon, the Temple of Athena, the adornment of the Acropolis, the Odeon, the Concert Hall, and the temples of Eleusis and Hephaistos.

When Pericles was attacked for his lavish use of public funds, he offered to pay for the construction work himself, if he could take all the glory. This did the trick. Even Pericles’ most zealous critics wished to share in his renown, so they insisted that he complete the buildings at public expense.

Pericles’ construction projects were remarkable not merely for their expense, but also for their artistry, craftsmanship, and good taste, which no other Greek states were able to match, least of all Sparta. In fact, C. M. Bowra wrote that the “remains of Sparta are so humble that it is hard to believe that this was the power which for many years challenged and finally conquered Athens” (Periclean Athens [Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1971], p. 180). But although Pericles’ construction program clearly was an “education” to the rest of Greece, it was no safeguard against eventual Spartan conquest.

What we call ancient Greek drama is better deemed ancient Athenian drama. The great tragedians Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripedes were Athenians, as were the comic playwrights Aristophanes and Menander. Sparta had its share of talented poets — among them Tyrtaeus during the mid-seventh century BCE — but they could not compete with the new trends being set in Athens. As Bury put it, when a stranger visited Sparta he must have experienced “a feeling of being transported into an age long past, when men were braver, better, and simpler, unspoiled by wealth, undeveloped by ideas” (p. 134).

The social status of women in Athens was far lower than it was in Sparta. Athenian women took no part in public life and were instructed solely in domestic arts. In his Funeral Oration, Pericles said that women should merely aim “to be least talked about by men, whether they are praising you or criticising you.” In Sparta, however, women were permitted to engage in gymnastic training and “enjoyed a freedom which was in marked contrast with the seclusion of women in other Greek states” (Bury, p. 133). So as far as respect for women was concerned, Athens could not really claim to have exported an policy worthy of emulation, although Ionia also shared the fundamental Athenian weakness of excluding women from education.

Religious and sporting festivals were much the same throughout Greece and, although it is always the Athenians who are remembered for their gods and sporting heroes, most other Greek states were equally advanced.

Thus when Pericles declared that Athens was “an education to Greece.” he was, on the whole, making an accurate observation. This is not to say that Athens was superior to Sparta in every respect, of course, and her democratic system left much to be desired.

Although other Greek states shared some Athenian political, social and economic principles, it remains the case that Athens gave birth to some of the finest Greek accomplishments. These accomplishments, moreover, provided key elements for the development of European art, architecture, drama, philosophy, rhetoric, and politics for 2500 years. Thus Athens continues to serve not only as an “education” for Greece, but for the world.


Troy Southgate is from Crystal Palace in South London and has been a Revolutionary Nationalist activist and writer for almost 25 years. He has also been involved with more than twenty music projects. He is a founder of National Anarchism and author of Tradition and Revolution (Aarhus, Denmark: Integral Tradition).

mardi, 16 août 2011

Aeschylus' Agamemnon: The Multiple Uses of Greek Tragedy

Aeschylus’ Agamemnon:
The Multiple Uses of Greek Tragedy

Jonathan BOWDEN

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

eschyle.jpgGreek tragedy is all but forgotten in mainstream culture, but there is a very good reason for looking at it again with fresh eyes. The reasons for this are manifold, but they basically have to do with anti-materialism and the culture of compression. To put it bluntly, reading Greek tragedy can give literally anyone a crash course in Western civilization which is short, pithy, and terribly apt.

Let’s take — for purposes of illustration — the first part of the Oresteia by Aeschylus, which concentrates on Agamemnon’s murder by his wife Clytemnestra. This work would take about two hours to read in a verse translation by Lewis Campbell (say). You will learn more about the civilization in those two hours than many a university foundation course, or hour after hour of public television, are capable of giving you.

The real reason for perusing this material, however, is the sense of excitement which it is capable of generating. Agamemnon and his entourage have returned to Argos after the successful sack of Troy and the destruction of Priam’s city.

A series of torches across the Greek peninsula announces the triumph, and the Watchman on the palace roof is the first to bear witness to the signal. The Chorus of Argive Elders soon gathers and is addressed in turn by a herald and then Clytemnestra. She swears undying loyalty to her husband (falsely) and makes way for his triumphant entry, although for those with acute ears there is a sense of foreboding in the imagery and early language of the play.

Agamemnon enters and speaks of his victories, but is ill-disposed to walk on the purple vestments that his wife has had strewn on the ground. He considers them unworthy or liable to damage his standing with the Gods. Clytemnestra seems to want her husband to behave more like an Eastern potentate than a Greek monarch. After much show of reluctance — he accedes to his wife’s wishes, kicks off his sandals and walks on the Imperial purple . . . in a manner that Clytemnestra knows will antagonize the Gods. She wishes this due to the future assassination which she has in view.

The prophetess Cassandra is then introduced from Agamemnon’s car, and she outlines — in ecstatic asides and verbal follies — the likelihood of her paramour’s death at the hands of his wife. She also speculates on the origin of the curse deep in the history of the House of Atreus — when Thyestes’ own children were baked in a pie for the edification of their father in revenge for adultery. This sets in train the codex of revenge and hatred which inundates the House’s walls with blood and gore and sets the ground for new horrors at a later date. Cassandra, surrounded by the near-seeing and purblind chorus, goes into the House where her Fate is sealed.

After a discrete interval, Clytemnestra emerges in one of the most dramatic sequences in all of Western art. She clutches a dagger in one hand and is partly covered in blood; whereas Agamemnon, her previous lord and husband, lies dead inside the folds of a net, with Cassandra raving and raving over him. The prototype for Lady Macbeth and every other three-dimensional female villain, Clytemnestra boasts of her deed and how she executed it — to the shock, horror, and awe of the Argive elders.

The killing is justified — in her eyes at least — by the sacrifice of her daughter, Iphigenia, to make the wind change its direction when the Greek fleet is becalmed at Aulis on the way to Troy. For this willful act of child-murder, Clytemnestra has lain in wait with her lover, Aegisthus, to slay the King of Argos. (Aegisthus is descended from Thyestes and has his own reasons for wishing doom to the House of Atreus.)

This particular play ends with a confrontation between Aegisthus’ soldiers and the elderly members of the Chorus, but Clytemnestra — by now sick of bloodshed and desiring peace — intervenes so as to prevent further conflict. The play concludes with the two tyrants, surrounded by their mercenaries, walking back towards the palace where they will rule over the Argives.

The question is always raised in modernity: Why bother with this material now? The real reason is the abundant ethnic and racial health of ancient Greek culture. Although tragic, blood-thirsty, and mordant in tone, it is abundantly alive at several different levels. It also exists as the prototype for so much Western culture, whether high or low.

As I have already intimated, a two-hour read is broadly equivalent to a short university course in and of itself. Also, the pre-Christian semantics of this material speaks across two and a half thousand years very directly to us today, certainly in the post-Christian context of Western Europe. Another reason for parents reading this material to adolescent children (at the very least) is its pagan immediacy. This is not cultural fare that can be dismissed as lacking pathos, blood-and-guts, or a sense of reality, if not normalcy.

Another reason for refusing to give this work a wide berth has to be the fact that various forces which were out-gunned and defeated in the twentieth century definitely took the Greek side in various cultural debates. This can also be seen in Wyndham Lewis’ Childermass which I reviewed [2] elsewhere on this site, where the chorus of opposition to the Humanist Bailiff (a sort of democratic Punch) has to be the philosopher Hesperides and his band of Greeks.

The culture of the Greeks still has dangers associated with it, hence the re-routing of Classics to a netherworld in the Western academy. Yet the refutation of Bernal’s Black Athena is still everywhere around us; as long as people have the wit to pick up the plays of Aeschylus and read.


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/08/aeschylus-agamemnon/

jeudi, 05 mai 2011

Sippenpflege in Athen und in Sparta

Sippenpflege in Athen und in Sparta

Hans Friedrich Karl Günther

Ex: http://centrostudilaruna.it/

Eine attische Sippenpflege [läßt sich im ganzen Hellenentum wahrnehmen], wenn auch nirgends so entschieden wie in Sparta, ein Rassenglaube, den Jacob Burckhardt so bezeichnet und eingehender dargestellt hat. Dieser Rassenglaube, ein Vertrauen zu den ausgesiebten Anlagen der bewährten Geschlechter und die Gewißheit, daß leibliche Vortrefflichkeit als ein Anzeichen geistigen und seelischen Vorrangs gelten dürfe, überdauert in Athen und bei anderen hellenischen Stämmen die Zeiten der Adelsherrschaft und der Tyrannis und reicht bei den Besten noch weit in die Zeiten der Volksherrschaft hinein. In Athens „Blütezeit“, einer Spätzeit der lebenskundlich gesehenen athenischen Geschichte, bricht der Rassenglaube noch einmal bei Euripides hervor. Überall bei den Hellenen verließ man sich „auf den Anblick der Rasse, welche mit der physischen Schönheit den Aus-druck des Geistes verband“ (J. Burckhardt); es gab einen allgemeinen hellenischen Glau-ben „an Erblichkeit der Fähigkeiten“, eine allgemeine hellenische Überzeugung von der Unabänderlichkeit ererbter Eigenschaften: der Wohlgeborene sei durch nichts zu verschlechtern, der Schlechtgeborene durch nichts zu verbessern, und alle Schulung (pai-deusis) bedeute den Anlagen gegenüber nur wenig. Aus diesen Überzeugungen ergab sich die echt hellenische Zielsetzung der „Schön-Tüchtigkeit“ (kalokagathía), dieser Ausruf zuerst für die Gattenwahl und Kinderzeugung, dann für die Erziehung, die eine günstige Entfaltung guter Anlagen verbürgen sollte. Am mächtigsten bricht dieser Rassenglaube bei dem thebanischen Dichter Pindaros hervor (Olympische Ode IX, 152; X, 24/25; XI, 19 ff; XIII, 16; Nemeische Ode 70 ff). Das Auslesevorbild des Wohlgearteten blieb bis in die Zerfallszeiten hinein in den besten Geschlechtern aller hellenischen Stämme bestehen. Die Bezeichnung gennaios enthält wie die lateinische Bezeichnung generosus („wohlgeboren, wohlgeartet“) die Vorstellung edler Artung als ererbter und vererblicher Beschaffenheit (vgl. auch Herodotos 111,81; Sohn XXIII, 20 D). Herodotos (VII, 204) zählt die tüchtigen Ahnen des bei den Thermopylen gefallenen Spartanerkönigs Leonidas auf bis zu Herakles zurück.

Die staatliche Stärke Spartas wurde von den hellenischen Geschichtsschreibern der Siebung, Auslese und Ausmerze des Stammes und seiner Geschlechter zugeschrieben. Xenophon hat in seiner Schrift über die Verfassung der Lakedaimonier (1,10; V, 9) zunächst ausgesprochen, die lykurgischen Gesetze hätten Sparta Männer verschafft, die durch hohen Wuchs und Kraft ausgezeichnet seien, und dann zusammenfassend geurteilt: „Es ist leicht zu erkennen, daß diese [siebenden, auslesenden und ausmerzenden] Maßnahmen einen Stamm hervorbringen würden, überragend an Wuchs und Stärke; man wird nicht leicht ein gesünderes und tauglicheres Volk finden als die Spartaner”. Herodotos (IX, 72) nennt die Spartaner die schönsten Männer unter den Hellenen. Die rassische Eigenart der Spartanerinnen wird durch den um – 650 in Sparta wirkenden Dichter Alkman (Bruchstücke 54) gekennzeichnet, der seine Base Agesichora rühmt: ihr Haar blühe wie unvermischtes Gold über silberhellem Antlitz. Der Vergleich heller Haut mit dem Silber findet sich schon bei Homer. Im 5. Jh. rühmte der Dichter Bakchylides (XIX, 2) die „blonden Mädchen aus Lakonien“. Noch der Erzbischof von Thessalonike (Saloniki), der im 12 Jh. lebende Eustathios, der Erläuterungen zu Homer schrieb, bekundete bei Erwähnung einer Iliasstelle (IV, 141), bei den Spartanern hätten helle Haut und blondes Haar die Zeichen männlichen Wesens bedeutet.

Einsichtige Männer der anderen hellenischen Stämme haben immer die edle Art des Spartanertums anerkannt, selbst dann, wenn ihr Heimatstaat mit Sparta im Kriege lag. Der weitblickende Thukydides (III, 83) beklagt das Schwinden des Edelmuts und der Auf-richtigkeit bei den Dorern während des Peloponnesischen Krieges, den seine Vaterstadt Athen gegen Sparta führte. In ganz Hellas haben die Edlergearteten in Sparta ein Wunschbild besten Hellenentums erblickt. So hat auch Platon gedacht, dessen Vorschläge zu einer staatlichen Erbpflege dem dorischen Vorbilde folgen. Männlichkeit und Staatsgesinnung des Dorertums in Sparta, dessen Bewahrung von Maß und Würde, diese apollinischen Züge eines sich selbst beherrschenden, zum Befehl geschaffenen Edelmannstums: alle diese Wesenszüge sind von den Besten in Hellas bewundert worden. Die gefestigte Einheitlichkeit spartanischen Wesens durch die Jahrhunderte ist aber sicherlich ein Ergebnis der bestimmt gerichteten Auslese im Stamm der Spartaner gewesen, einer bewußten Einhaltung der lykurgischen Ausleserichtung.

* * *

Sorge: Lebensgeschichte des hellenischen Volkes, Pähl 1965, S. 158 f.

mercredi, 04 mai 2011

Helios von Emesa

Helios von Emesa

Franz Altheim

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

 

Auf den ersten Blick hin scheinen Verbindungen zu den Baalim von Baalbek und von Damaskus zu bestehen. Iupiter Helipolitanus und Iupiter Damascenus tragen die Übereinstimmung im Namen. Auch bei Emesas Gott konnte man die Frage aufwerfen, ob er Iupiter gleichzusetzen sei. Doch wird sich zeigen, daß es bei ihm anders liegt.

In Baalbeek war die Dreiheit von Iupiter-Hadad, Venus-Atargatis und Mercurius-Schamasch nach ihrer Reihenfolge jüngeren Ursprungs. Anfänglich stand der Sonnengott, eben Schamasch, an der Spitze. Erst unter dem Einfluß babylonischer oder, wie das spätere Altertum sie nannte: chaldäischer Vorstellungen wurde Hadad zum Herrn des Schicksals, rückte er an die erste Stelle. Schamaschi, nachträglich Mercurius gleichgesetzt, mußte sich mit einer dienenden Rolle begnügen: gleich dem Götterboten Hermes oder Mercurius wurde er zum ausführenden Organ des obersten Gottes. Im Pantheon von Palmyra stand Helios, der Sonnengott, neben Bel. Erneut war er Bote und Mittler, während Bel als Weltenherr im obersten Himmel thronte. Von seiner dienenden Stellung erhielt der Sonnengott den Namen: als Malakbel, ‚Bote des Bel’, begegnet er in der göttlichen Dreiheit Palmyras, wiederum Mercurius gleichgesetzt.

Auch in Emesa kannte man den babylonischen Schicksalsglauben und seine Zwillingsschwester, die Astrologie. Iulia, späterer Gattin des Kaisers Septimus Severus (193-211), war durch ihr Horoskop verheißen, sie werde dereinst einen Herrscher ehelichen; sie entstammte dem Priesterhaus von Emesa. Im Aithiopienroman Heliodors, der mancherlei von emesenischer Vorstellungswelt vermittelt, heißt es, die Bahn der Gestirne bestimme unentrinnbar das menschliche Geschick. Ausgrabungen nordöstlich der Stadt haben astrologische Tafeln in Keilschrift zutage gefördert.

Und doch hat sich der Sonnengott in Emesa nicht, wie Schamasch in Baalbek und Palmyra, vom ersten Platz vertreiben lassen. Münzen und Inschriften zeigen, daß er sich keineswegs zu Iupiter, zu Baal oder Bel gewandelt hat, sondern der Sonnengott blieb. Deus Sol Elagabalus oder Invictus Sol Elagabalus lauten eindeutig; man versteht, daß auf einer Inschrift aus Cordoba der ‚große Helios’ von Emesa dem ägyptischen Sonnengott Re angeglichen ist. Auch als ‚Stammvater’ wurde er angerufen, wie denn Emesener zuweilen die Herkunft von der Sonne oder ‚dem Gott’ schlechthin im Namen tragen.

Auch der zweite Gott, Dusares, hatte sich der Sonne verbunden, Hauptgott der Nabatäer, findet man ihn überall, wohin ihr Karawanenhandel und ihr Machtbereich sich erstreckt haben. Wie alle Sonnengötter trug Dusares den Beinamen des Unbesieglichen; er war mit Mithras verbunden, und sein Geburtstag fiel auf den 25. Dezember. Gleich dem göttlichen Herrn Emesas besaß er einen heiligen Stein.

Man kennt diese Art der Verehrung auch bei dem Mondgott von Karrhai, überhaupt bei Göttern, die arabischen Ursprungs waren. Der Name dieser ‚Baityloi’ besagt, daß sie Wohnung der betreffenden Götter waren, nicht diese selbst. In Emesa besaß der heilige Stein die Gestalt eines Kegels, unten mit runder Grundfläche, oben spitz zulaufend. Erhebungen, die sich auf der Oberfläche abhoben, zeigten einen Adler mit Schlange im Schnabel. Man erkannte darin das Symbol der Sonne. Wiederum also fiel der Stein nicht mit dieser zusammen; er trug ihr Bild. Und doch war der Gott in den Stein eingegangen, war ihm irgendwie gesellt, wie man dies auch von den zahlreichen Steinblöcken weiß, die im vorislamischen Arabien verehrt wurden.

Meist hört man von ihnen, wenn muslimischer Gotteseifer daranging, solche Idole zu zerstören. Die Priester altarabischer Gottheiten mahnten diese, bei den Steinen den Kampf gegen die Vertreter der neuen Religion zu wagen. Denn sie verlieren ihren Kult und ihr Ansehen, gelingt es ihnen nicht, ihren Stein und damit ihr ‚Haus’ zu behaupten. Ein Gott, der bei seinem Stein nicht kämpft, ist eine ‚wertlose Sache’. Al-Uzza, die einen ähnlichen Kampf verloren hat – es ging bei ihr nicht um heilige Steine, sondern um drei ihr gehörige Bäume – ‚wird hinfort nie wieder verehrt werden’, lautete das Urteil des siegreichen Propheten Mohammed (569 bis 632).

Steine sind nicht einem bestimmten Ort verhaftet: sie sind beweglich. Einführung von Göttern geschieht derart, daß man sich Göttersteine schenken läßt oder aus bestehendem Heiligtum solche mitbringt. Als der Kult des Sonnengottes nach Rom verlegt wurde, wanderte Emesas heiliger Stein ans Tiberufer. Als man dort nach Elagabals Ermordung (222) sich des Fremdkultes zu entledigen wünschte, schickte man den Stein in seine syrische Heimat zurück.

Neben der Verehrung des heiligen Steines steht, gleichfalls eine uralte Form, der Höhlenkult. ‚Elagabal’ war ursprünglich Name des Gottes selbst: er bezeichnete diesen als ‚Herrn des Berges’. Gemeint war der Burgberg von Emesa, denn dort hatte der Gott seinen Sitz. Aus der Ebene, darin die Stadt sich erstreckt, erhebt sich im Südwesten die Zitadelle, unmittelbar den nördlichen Ausläufern des Libanon gegenüber. Hier stand der Tempel, dessen First, nach den Worten eines antiken Gewährsmannes, mit den bewaldeten Höhen des Gebirges wetteiferte.

Wieder läßt sich Dusares vergleichen. Südöstlich des Toten Meeres, schon an den Pforten des eigentlichen Arabien, liegt Petra. Hauptstadt der Nabatäer, gehörte es einem Volk, das seine Inschriften in einem überkommenen aramäischen Dialekt aufzeichnete, aber nach Ausweis seiner Eigennamen arabisch war. Inmitten eines steinernen Kessels, eingebettet in die roten und violetten Schroffen eines Felsmassivs von urtümlicher Gewalt, scheint dieses Petra seiner Umgebung entrückt. Nur ein steiniges Bachbett, das sich tief in die steilen Wände eingeschnitten hat, ermöglicht den Zugang. Stätte der Sicherheit, scheint dieser Ort durch seine Menschenferne, seine Verzauberung wie geschaffen, die Nähe der Gottheit empfinden zu lassen. Unter der Fülle der Gräber, Höhlen und Tempel beeindruckt der Opferplatz auf dem höchsten Gipfel in den anstehenden Fels geschnitten. Altar und Schlachtbank, das eingetiefte Becken, darein das Blut des Opfertieres floß, zwei Baitylen unweit davon – sie vermitteln eine Vorstellung davon, was ein altsemitischer Höhlenkult gewesen sein mag.

Nicht zufällig wurden die angezogenen Vergleiche aus der arabischen Welt genommen. Dieser entstammen, wie gesagt, die Nabatäer und auch ihr göttlicher Herr Dusares. Emesas Gott wird in denselben Bereich führen.

* * *

Sorge: Der unbesiegte Gott. Heidentum und Christentum; Rowohlts Deutsche Enzyklopädie; Hamburg 1957.

samedi, 23 avril 2011

Homer in the Baltic - Summary

Homer in the Baltic. Summary

Autore: Felice Vinci

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

 

The real scene of the Iliad and the Odyssey can be identified not in the Mediterranean Sea, where it proves to be weakened by many incongruities, but in the north of Europe. The sagas that gave rise to the two poems came from the Baltic regions, where the Bronze Age flourished in the 2nd millennium B. C. and many Homeric places, such as Troy and Ithaca, can still be identified. The blond seafarers who founded the Mycenaean civilization in the 16th century B. C. brought these tales from Scandinavia to Greece after the decline of the “climatic optimum”. Then they rebuilt their original world, where the Trojan War and many other mythological events had taken place, in the Mediterranean; through many generations the memory of the heroic age and the feats performed by their ancestors in their lost homeland was preserved, and handed down to the following ages. This key allows us to easily open many doors that have been shut tight until now, as well as to consider the age-old question of the Indo-European diaspora and the origin of the Greek civilization from a new perspective.

Ever since ancient times, Homeric geography has given rise to problems and uncertainty. The conformity of towns, countries and islands, which the poet often describes with a wealth of detail, with traditional Mediterranean places is usually only partial or even nonexistent. We find various cases in Strabo (the Greek geographer and historian, 63 B. C. – 23 A.D.), who, for example, does not understand why the island of Pharos, situated right in front of the port of Alexandria, in the Odyssey inexplicably appears to lie a day’s sail from Egypt. There is also the question of the location of Ithaca, which, according to very precise indications found in the Odyssey, is the westernmost in an archipelago which includes three main islands, Dulichium, Same and Zacynthus. This does not correspond to the geographic reality of the Greek Ithaca in the Ionian Sea, located north of Zacynthus, east of Cephallenia and south of Leucas. And then, what of the Peloponnese, described in both poems as a plain?

In other words, Homeric geography refers to a context with a toponymy with which we are familiar, but which, if compared with the actual physical layout of the Greek world, reveals glaring anomalies, which are hard to explain, if only on account of their consistency throughout the two poems. For example, the “strange” Peloponnese appears to be a plain not sporadically but regularly, and Dulichium, the “Long Island” (in Greek “dolichos” means “long”) located by Ithaca, is repeatedly mentioned not only in the Odyssey but also in the Iliad, but was never discovered in the Mediterranean. Thus we are confronted with a world which appears actually closed and inaccessible, apart from some occasional convergences, although the names are familiar (this, however, tends to be more misleading than otherwise in solving the problem).

A possible key to finally penetrating this puzzling world is provided by Plutarch (46 – 120 A.D.). In his work De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet (“The face that appears in the moon circle”), he makes a surprising statement: the island of Ogygia, (where Calypso held Ulysses before allowing him to return to Ithaca) is located in the North Atlantic Ocean, “five days’ sail from Britain”.

Plutarch’s indications lead us to identify Ogygia with one of the Faroe Islands (where we also come across an island with a Greek-sounding name: Mykines). Starting from here, the route eastwards, which Ulysses follows (Book V of the Odyssey) in his voyage from Ogygia to Scheria allows us to locate the latter, i.e. the land of the Phaeacians, on the southern coast of Norway, in an area perfectly fitting the account of his arrival, where archaeological traces of the Bronze Age are plentiful. Moreover, while on the one hand “sker” in Old Norse means a «sea rock», on the other in the narration of Ulysses’s landing Homer introduces the reversal of the river current (Od., V, 451-453), which is unknown in the Mediterranean world but is typical of the Atlantic estuaries during high tide.

From here the Phaeacians took Ulysses to Ithaca, located on the far side of an archipelago, which Homer talks about in great detail. At this point, a series of precise parallels makes it possible to identify a group of Danish islands, in the south of the Baltic Sea, which correspond exactly to all of Homer’s indications. Actually, the South-Fyn Archipelago includes three main islands: Langeland (the “Long Island”; which finally unveils the puzzle of the mysterious island of Dulichium), Aerø (which corresponds perfectly to Homeric Same) and Tåsinge (ancient Zacynthus). The last island in the archipelago, located westwards, “facing the night”, is Ulysses’s Ithaca, now known as Lyø. It is astonishing how closely it coincides with the directions of the poet, not only in its position, but also its topographical and morphological features. And here, amongst this group of islands, we can also identify the little island «in the strait between Ithaca and Same», where Penelope’s suitors tried to waylay Telemachus.

Moreover, the Elis, i.e. one of the regions of the Peloponnese, is described as facing Dulichium, thus is easily identifiable with a part of the large Danish island of Zealand. Therefore, the latter is the original «Peloponnese», i.e. the “Island of Pelops”, in the real meaning of the word “island” (“nêsos” in Greek). On the other hand, the Greek Peloponnese (which lies in a similar position in the Aegean Sea, i.e. on its southwestern side) is not an island, despite its name. Furthermore, the details reported in the Odyssey regarding both Telemachus’s swift journey by chariot from Pylos to Lacedaemon, along «a wheat-producing plain», and the war between Pylians and Epeans, as narrated in Book XI of the Iliad, have always been considered inconsistent with Greece’s uneven geography, while they fit in perfectly with the flat island of Zealand.

Let us look for the region of Troy now. In the Iliad it is located along the Hellespont Sea, which is systematically described as being «wide» or even «boundless». We can, therefore, exclude the fact that it refers to the Strait of the Dardanelles, where the city found by Schliemann lies. The identification of this city with Homer’s Troy still raises strong doubts: we only have to think of Finley’s criticism in the World of Odysseus. It is also remarkable that Schliemann’s site corresponds to the location of the Greek-Roman Troy; however, Strabo categorically denies that the latter is identifiable with the Homeric city (Geography 13, 1, 27). On the other hand, the Danish Medieval historian Saxo Grammaticus, in his Gesta Danorum, often mentions a population known as «Hellespontians» and a region called Hellespont, which, strangely enough, seems to be located in the east of the Baltic Sea. Could it be Homer’s Hellespont? We can identify it with the Gulf of Finland, which is the geographic counterpart of the Dardanelles (as both of them lie northeast of their respective basins). Since Troy, as we can infer from a passage in the Iliad (XXI, 334-335), lay North-East of the sea (further reason to dispute Schliemann’s location), then it seems reasonable, for the purpose of this research, to look at a region of southern Finland, where the Gulf of Finland joins the Baltic Sea. In this area, west of Helsinki, we find a number of name-places which astonishingly resemble those mentioned in the Iliad and, in particular, those given to the allies of the Trojans: Askainen (Ascanius), Karjaa (Caria), Nästi (Nastes, the chief of the Carians), Lyökki (Lycia), Tenala (Tenedos), Kiila (Cilla), Raisio (Rhesus), Kiikoinen (the Ciconians) etc. There is also a Padva, which reminds us of Italian Padua, which was founded, according to tradition, by the Trojan Antenor and lies in Venetia (the «Eneti» or «Veneti» were allies of the Trojans). What is more, the place-names Tanttala and Sipilä (the mythical King Tantalus, famous for his torment, was buried on Mount Sipylus) indicate that this matter is not only limited to Homeric geography, but seems to extend to the whole world of Greek mythology.

What about Troy? Right in the middle of this area, halfway between Helsinki and Turku, we discover that King Priam’s city has survived the Achaean sack and fire. Its characteristics correspond exactly to those Homer handed down to us: the hilly area which dominates the valley with its two rivers, the plain which slopes down towards the coast, and the highlands in the background. It has even maintained its own name almost unchanged throughout all this time. Today, Toija is a peaceful Finnish village, unaware of its glorious and tragic past.

Various trips to these places, from July 11 1992 onwards, have confirmed the extraordinary correspondence between the Iliad‘s descriptions and the area surrounding Toija. What is more, there we come across many significant traces of the Bronze Age. Incredibly, towards the sea we find a place called Aijala, which recalls the “beach” («aigialos»), where, according to Homer, the Achaeans beached their ships (Il., XIV, 34). The correspondence extends to the neighbouring areas. For example, along the Swedish coast facing Southern Finland, 70 km north of Stockholm, the long and relatively narrow Bay of Norrtälje recalls Homeric Aulis, whence the Achaean fleet set sail for Troy. Nowadays, ferries leave here for Finland, following the same ancient course. They pass the island of Lemland, whose name reminds us of ancient Lemnos, where the Achaeans stopped and abandoned the hero Philoctetes. Nearby is Åland, the largest island of the homonymous archipelago, which probably coincides with Samothrace, the mythical site of the metalworking mysteries. The adjacent Gulf of Bothnia is easily identifiable with Homer’s Thracian Sea, and the ancient Thrace, which the poet places to the North-West of Troy on the opposite side of the sea, probably lay along the northern Swedish coast and its hinterland (it is remarkable that the Younger Edda identifies the home of the god Thor with Thrace). Further south, outside the Gulf of Finland, the island of Hiiumaa, situated opposite the Esthonian coast, corresponds exactly to Homer’s Chios, which, according to the Odyssey, lay on the return course of the Achaean fleet after the war.

In short, apart from the morphological features of this area, the geographic position of the Finnish Troas fits Homer’s directions like a glove. Actually, this explains why a «thick fog» often fell on those fighting on the Trojan plain, and Ulysses’s sea is never as bright as that of the Greek islands, but always «dark-wine» and «misty». As we travel through Homer’s world, we experience the harsh weather which is typical of the Northern world. Everywhere in the two poems the weather, with its fog, wind, rain, cold temperatures and snow (which falls on the plains and even out to sea), has little in common with the Mediterranean climate; moreover, sun and warm temperatures are hardly ever mentioned.

There are countless examples of this; for instance, when Ulysses recalls an episode of the Trojan War:

«The night was bad, after the north wind dropped,
and freezing; then the snow began to fall like icy frost
and ice congealed on our shields
» (Od., XIV, 475-477).

In a word, most of the time the weather is unsettled, so much so that a bronze-clad fighting warrior invokes a cloudless sky during the battle (Il., XVII, 643-646). We are worlds away from the torrid Anatolian lowlands. The way in which Homer’s characters are dressed is in perfect keeping with this kind of climate. In the sailing season they wear tunics and heavy cloaks which they never remove, not even during banquets. This attire corresponds exactly to the remains of clothing found in Bronze Age Danish graves, down to such details as the metal brooch which pinned the cloak at the shoulder (Od., XIX, 226). Moreover, this fits in perfectly with what Tacitus states on Germanic clothing:

«The suit for everyone is a cape with a buckle»
sagum fibula consertum»; Germania, 17, 1).

This northern collocation also explains the huge anomaly of the great battle which takes up the central books of the Iliad. The battle continues for two days (Il., XI, 86; XVI, 777) and one night (Il., XVI, 567). The fact that the darkness does not put a stop to the fighting is incomprehensible in the Mediterranean world, but it becomes clear in the Baltic setting. What allows Patroclus’s fresh troops to carry on fighting through to the following day, without a break, is the faint night light, which is typical of high latitudes during the summer solstice. This interpretation -corroborated by the overflowing of the Scamander during the following battle (in the northern regions this occurs in May or June owing to the thaw)- allows us to reconstruct the stages of the whole battle in a coherent manner, dispelling the present-day perplexities and strained interpretations. Furthermore, we even manage to pick out from a passage in the Iliad (VII, 433) the Greek word used to denominate the faintly-lit nights typical of the regions located near the Arctic Circle: the «amphilyke nyx» is a real “linguistic fossil” which, thanks to the Homeric epos, has survived the migration of the Achaeans to Southern Europe.

It is also important to note that the Trojan walls, as described by Homer, appear as a sort of rustic fence made of wood and stone, similar to the archaic Northern wooden enclosures (such as the Kremlin Walls up to the 15th century) much more than the mighty strongholds of the Aegean civilizations.

Troy, therefore, was not deserted after the Achaeans plundered and burnt it down, but was rebuilt, as the Iliad states:

«At this point Zeus has come to hate Priam’s stock,
so Aeneas’s power will rule the Trojans now
and then his children’s children and those who will come later on
» (Il., XX, 306-308).

On the contrary, Virgil’s quite tendentious, and much more recent, tale of Aeneas’s flight by sea from the burning city of Troy (a homage paid to the emperor Augustus’s family, considered Aeneas’s descendant) is absolutely unrelated to the real destiny of the Trojan hero and his city after the war. As regards this “Finnish” Aeneas, the first king of the dynasty that, according with Homer, ruled Troy after the war (that is a kingdom which, under Priam, dominated a vast area in southern Finland; Il., XXIV, 544-546) it should be very tempting to suppose a relationship between his name and «Aeningia», Finland’s name in Roman times (Pliny, Natural History, IV, 96).

It is remarkable that farmers often come across Bronze and Stone Age relics in the fields surrounding Toija. This is proof of human settlements in this territory many thousands of years ago. Further, in the area surrounding Salo (only 20 km from Toija), archaeologists have found splendid specimens of swords and spear points that date back to the Bronze Age and are now on display in the National Museum of Helsinki. These findings come from burial places, which include tumuli made of large mounds of stones that can be found at the top of certain hills, which rise from the plain today, but which, thousands of years ago, when the coastline was not as far back as it is nowadays, faced directly onto the sea. This relates to a passage in the Iliad, where Hector challenges an Achaean hero to a duel, undertaking, in case of victory, to give back the corpse of his opponent

«so that the long-haired Achaeans can bury him
and erect a mound for him on the broad Hellespont,
and some day one of the men to come,
sailing with a multioared ship on the wine-dark sea, will say:
“This is the mound of a man slain in ancient times,
he excelled but renowned Hector killed him”
»

(Il., VII, 85-90; the description of Achilles’ tomb in the last canto of the Odyssey is analogous).

These Homeric mounds «on the broad Hellespont» and the Bronze Age ones near Salo are remarkably similar.

Let us now examine the so-called Catalogue of Ships from Book II of the Iliad, that lists the twenty-nine Achaean fleets which took part in the Trojan War, together with the names of their captains and places of origin. This list unwinds in an anticlockwise direction, starting from Central Sweden, travelling along the Baltic coasts and finishing in Finland. If we combine this with the data contained in the two poems and in the rest of Greek mythology, we may completely reconstruct the Achaean world around the Baltic Sea, where, as archaeology confirms, the Bronze Age was flourishing in the 2nd millennium B. C., favoured by a warmer climate than today’s.

In this new geographical context, the entire universe belonging to Homer and Greek mythology finally discloses itself with its astonishing consistency. For example, by following the Catalogue sequence, we immediately locate Boeotia (corresponding to the area around Stockholm). Here it is easy to identify Oedipus’s Thebes and the mythical Mount Nysa (which was never found in the Greek world), where the Hyads nursed baby Dionysus. Homer’s Euboea coincides with today’s island of Öland, located off the Swedish coast in a similar position to that of its Mediterranean counterpart. Mythical Athens, Theseus’s native land, lay in the area of present day Karlskrona in southern Sweden (this explains why Plato, in his dialogue Critias, refers to it as being an undulating plain full of rivers, which is totally alien to Greece’s rough morphology). The features of other Achaean cities, such as Mycenae or Calydon, as described by Homer also appear completely different from those of their namesakes on Greek soil. In particular, Mycenae lay in the site of today’s Copenhagen, where the island of Amager possibly recalls its ancient name and explains why it was in the plural. Here, in the flat island of Zealand (i.e. the Homeric «Peloponnese»), we can easily identify Agamemnon’s and Menelaus’s kingdoms, Arcadia, the River Alpheus, and in particular, king Nestor’s Pylos, whose location was held to be a mystery even by the ancient Greeks. By setting Homer’s poems in the Baltic, this age-old puzzle is also solved at once. What is more, it is equally easy to solve the problem of the strange border between Argolis and Pylos, which is mentioned in the Iliad (IX, 153) but is “impossible” in the Greek world. After the Peloponnese, the Catalogue mentions Dulichium and continues with Ithaca’s archipelago, which was already identified by making use of the indications the Odyssey supplies. We are thus able to verify the consistency of the information contained in the two poems as well as their congruity with the Baltic geography. After Ithaca, the list continues with the Aetolians, who recall the ancient Jutes. They gave their name to Jutland, which actually lies near the South-Fyn Islands. Homer mentions Pylene in the Aetolian cities, which corresponds to today’s Plön, in Northern Germany, not far from Jutland. Opposite this region, in the North Sea, the name of Heligoland, one of the North Frisian Islands, recalls Helike, a sanctuary of the god Poseidon mentioned in the Iliad (it is remarkable that an old name for Heligoland was Fositesland, where «Fosite», an ancient Frisian god, is virtually identical to Poseidon).

As regards Crete, the «vast land» with «a hundred cities» and many rivers, which is never referred to as an island by Homer, it corresponds to the Pomeranian region in the southern Baltic area, which stretches from the German coast to the Polish same. This explains why in the rich pictorial productions of the Minoan civilization, which flourished in Aegean Crete, we find no hint of Greek mythology, and ships are so scantily represented. It would also be tempting to assume a relationship between the name «Polska» and the Pelasgians, the inhabitants of Homeric Crete. At this point, it is also easy to identify Naxos (where Theseus left Ariadne on his return journey from «Crete» to «Athens») with the island of Bornholm, situated between Poland and Sweden, where the town of Neksø still recalls the ancient name of the island. Likewise, we discover that the Odyssey‘s «River Egypt» probably coincides with the present-day Vistula, thus revealing the real origin of the name the Greeks gave to Pharaohs’ land, known as «Kem» in the local language. This explains the incongruous position of the Homeric Egyptian Thebes, which, according to the Odyssey, is located near the sea. Evidently the Egyptian capital, which on the contrary lies hundreds of kilometres from the Nile delta and was originally known as Wò’se, was renamed by the Achaeans with the name of a Baltic city, after they moved down to the Mediterranean. The real Thebes probably was the present-day Tczew, on the Vistula delta. To the north of the latter, in the centre of the Baltic Sea, the island of Fårö recalls the Homeric Pharos, which according to the Odyssey lay in the middle of the sea at a day’s sail from «Egypt» (whereas Mediterranean Pharos is not even a mile’s distance from the port of Alexandria). Here is the solution to another puzzle of Homeric geography that so perturbed Strabo.

The Catalogue of Ships now touches the Baltic Republics. Hellas lay on the coast of present-day Esthonia, and thus next to the Homeric Hellespont (i.e. the «Helle Sea»), today’s Gulf of Finland. In this area also lies Kurland -the Curians’ country, that is the mythical Curetes, linked with the worship of Zeus- where is found the figure of a supreme god, who is called Dievas in Lithuania and Dievs in Latvia; in local folklore he shows features typical of Hellenic Zeus (the genitive case of the name «Zeus» in Greek is «Diòs»; Il., I, 5). Moreover, Lithuanian has very archaic features and a notable affinity with the ancient Indo-European language. Phthia, Achilles’s homeland, lay on the fertile hills of southeastern Esthonia, along the border with Latvia and Russia, stretching as far as the Russian river Velikaja and the lake of Pskov. Myrmidons and Phthians lived there, ruled by Achilles and Protesilaus (the first Achaean captain who fell in the Trojan War) respectively. Next, proceeding with the sequence, we reach the Finnish coast, facing the Gulf of Bothnia, where we find Jolkka, which reminds us of Iolcus, Jason’s mythical city. Further north, we are also able to identify the region of Olympus, Styx and Pieria in Finnish Lapland (which in turn recalls the Homeric Lapithae, i.e. the sworn enemies of the Centaurs who also lived in this area). This location of Pieria north of the Arctic Circle is confirmed by an apparent astronomical anomaly, linked to the moon cycle, which is found in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes: it can only be explained by the high latitude. The «Home of Hades» was even further northwards, on the icy coasts of Russian Karelia: here Ulysses arrived, his journeys representing the last vestige of prehistoric routes in an era which was characterised by a very different climate from today’s.

In conclusion, from this review of the Baltic world, we find its astonishing consistency with the Catalogue of Ships -which is, therefore, an extraordinary “photograph” of the Northern Early Bronze Age peoples- as well as with the whole of Greek mythology. It is very unlikely that this immense number of geographic, climatic, toponymical and morphological parallels is to be ascribed to mere chance, even leaving aside the glaring contradictions arising from the Mediterranean setting.

As regards Ulysses’ trips, after the Trojan War, when he is about to reach Ithaca, a storm takes him away from his world; so he has many adventures in fabulous localities until he reaches Ogygia, that is one of the Faroe Islands. These adventures, presumably taken from tales of ancient seamen and elaborated again by the poet’s fantasy, represent the last memory of the sea routes followed by the ancient navigators of the Northern Bronze Age out of the Baltic, in the North Atlantic (where the «Ocean River» flows, i.e. the Gulf Stream), but they became unrecognizable because of their transposition into a totally different context. For example, the Eolian island, ruled by the «King of the winds», «son of the Knight», is one of the Shetlands (maybe Yell), where there are strong winds and ponies. Cyclops lived in the coast of Norway (near Tosenfjorden: the name of their mother is Toosa): they coincide with the Trolls of the Norwegian folklore. The land of Lestrigonians was in the same coast, towards the North; Homer says that there the days are very long (the famous scholar Robert Graves places the Lestrigonians in the North of Norway; moreover, in that area we find the island of Lamøj, which is probably the Homeric Lamos). The island of sorceress Circe -where there are clear hints at the midnight sun (Od., X, 190-192) and the revolving dawns (Od., XII, 3-4), typical phenomena of the Arctic regions- is one of the Lofoten, beyond the Arctic Circle. Charybdis is the well-known whirlpool named Maelstrom, south of the island of Moskenes (one of the Lofoten). South of Charybdis Odysseus meets the island Thrinakia, that means «trident»: really, near the Maelstrom lies Mosken, a three-tip island. The Sirens are shoals and shallows, off the western face of the Lofoten, before the Maelstrom area, which are made even more dangerous by the fog and the size of the tides. The sailors could be attracted by the misleading noise of the backwash (the «Sirens’ Song» is a metaphor similar to Norse «kenningar») on the half-hidden rocks into deceiving themselves that landing is at hand, but if they get near, shipwreck on the reefs is inevitable.

Besides, we can find remarkable parallels between Greek and Norse mythology: for example, Ulysses is similar to Ull, archer and warrior of Norse mythology; the sea giant Aegaeon (who gave his name to the Aegean Sea) is the counterpart of the Norse sea god Aegir, and Proteus, the Old Man of the Sea (who is a mythical shepherd of seals, who lives in the sea depths and is capable of foretelling the future) is similar to the «marmendill» (mentioned by the Hàlfs Saga ok Hàlfsrekka and the Landnàmabòk), a very odd creature, who resembles a misshapen man with a seal-shaped body below the waist, and has the gift of prophecy but only talks when he feels like it, just like Proteus. On the other hand, there are remarkable analogies between the Achaean and Viking ships: by comparing the details of Homeric ships with the remains of Viking ships found in the bay of Roskilde, we realize that their features were very similar. We refer to the flat keel (one infers this from Od., XIII, 114), the double prow (we can deduce this from the expression «amphiélissai» Homer frequently uses with regard to their double curve, i.e. at the stern and the prow), and the removable mast -this is a sophisticated feature typical of Viking ships, which was typical of Homeric ships, too: many passages in both the Iliad (I, 434; I, 480) and the Odyssey (II, 424-425; VIII, 52) confirm without a shadow of doubt that the operations of setting up and taking down the mast were customary at the beginning and the end of each mission.

More generally speaking, apart from the respective mythologies, remarkable parallels are found between the customs of the Achaeans and those of the populations of Northern Europe, although they are separated by almost 3000 years. The systems of social relations, interests and lifestyles of the Homeric world and Viking society, despite the elapsed years, are surprisingly similar. For instance, the «agorà», the public assembly in the Homeric world, corresponds to the «thing» of the Vikings: this was the most important political moment in the running of the community for both peoples. In his turn, Tacitus informs us that at his time the northern populations held public assemblies (Germania, chap. 11), that appear to be very similar to the «thing» (therefore, to the «agorà», too). In a word, the parallels between the Homeric Achaeans, who lived during the Bronze Age, the Germans of the Roman period, and the Medieval Vikings testify to the continuity of the Northern world throughout the ages.

We should note that many Homeric peoples, as the Danaans, Pelasgians, Dorians, Curetes, Lybians and Lapithae, whose traces are not found in the Mediterranean, probably still exist in the Baltic world: they find their present counterparts in the Danes, Poles, Thuringians, Kurlandians, Livonians and Lapps (this identification is supported by their respective geographic locations). Moreover, both poems mention the Sintians, mythical inhabitants of Lemnos who were linked with the smith god Hephaestus (Il., I, 594; Od., VIII, 294): their name is exactly the same as today’s Sintians, i.e. a tribe of Gypsies’, who traditionally are metalworkers and coppersmiths. We also note a possible relationship between the «Argives», another name for the Achaeans, «Argeioi» in Greek -i.e. (V)argeioi, considering the usual loss of the initial V (the «digamma») in the Homeric language- and the “Varangians” (Swedish Vikings).

As regards the Homeric DanaansDànaioi» in Greek, who were also Achaeans), at the beginning of the Gesta Danorum, Saxo Grammaticus states that «Dudon, who wrote a story about Aquitania, believes that the Danes owe their origins and name to the Danaans» (I, I, 1). This comparison has hitherto been interpreted as a means of exalting the origin of the Danes, but now one could start to see them in a new light. If we still dwell upon the digamma, we should consider now the relationship between the Greek words «areté» (valour) and «àte» (fault or error) and their Latin counterparts «virtus» and «vitium» respectively (apart from the initial V, the vowels A and I are often interchangeable: for example, «ambush» corresponds to the Italian «imboscata»). By applying the same alteration (i.e. A→VI) to the name of the AchaeansAchaioi» in Greek), we get the word “Vikings”. In a word, Argeioi, Danaioi, and Achaioi, i.e. the three main names Homer gives the peoples comprising the protagonists of his poems, possibly came down to modern times as Varangians, Danes, and Vikings (never found in the Mediterranean area, even in ancient times) respectively.

Here, therefore, is the “secret” which is hidden inside Homer’s poems and is responsible for all the oddities of Homeric geography: the Trojan War and the other events Greek mythology handed down were not set in the Mediterranean, but in the Baltic area, i.e. the primitive home of the blond, «long-haired» Achaeans (the Odyssey claims that Ulysses was fair-haired; XIII, 399; XIII, 431). On this subject, the distinguished Swedish scholar, Professor Martin P. Nilsson, in his works reports considerable archaeological evidence uncovered in the Mycenaean sites in Greece, corroborating their northern origin. Some examples are: the existence of a large quantity of baltic amber in the most ancient Mycenaean tombs in Greece (which is not to be ascribed to trade, because the amber is very scarce in the coeval Minoan tombs in Crete as well as in later graves on the continent); the typically Northern features of their architecture (the Mycenaean megaron is identical to the hall of the ancient Scandinavian Kings); the similarity of two stone slabs found in a tomb in Dendra with the menhirs known from the Bronze Age of Central Europe; the Northern-type skulls found in the necropolis of Kalkani, etc.. Moreover, Aegean art and Scandinavian remains dating back to the Bronze Age present a remarkable affinity -for example, the figures engraved on Kivik’s tomb in Sweden- so much so that a 19th century scholar suggested the monument was built by the Phoenicians.

Another sign of the Achaean presence in the Northern world in a very distant past is a Mycenaean graffito found in the megalithic complex of Stonehenge in Southern England. Other remains revealing the Mycenaean influence were found in the same area (“Wessex culture”), which date back to a period preceding the Mycenaean civilization in Greece. A trace of contact is found in the Odyssey, which mentions a market for bronze placed overseas, in a foreign country, named «Temese», never found in the Mediterranean area. Since bronze is an alloy of copper and tin, which in the North is only found in Cornwall, it is very likely that the mysterious Temese corresponds to the Thames, named «Tamesis» or «Tamensim» in ancient times. So, following Homer, we learn that, during the Bronze Age, the ancient Scandinavians used to sail to Temese-Thames, «placed overseas in a foreign country», to supply themselves with bronze.

This theory -which has already undergone a positive check by means of inspections carried out on the territories concerned, and meets Popper’s requirement on “falsifiability”- solves many other problems, such as the backwardness of the Homeric civilization compared to the Mycenaeans’; the absence of reference to seafaring and Greek mythology in the Minoan-Cretan world; the inconsistencies between the morphology of several Homeric cities, such as Mycenae and Calydon, and their Greek namesakes; the absurdities concerning the regions of the Peloponnese, and the distance of the allies of the Trojans from the Dardanelles area, and so on. We should also note that oxen are of the utmost importance in the Homeric world: this is the yet further evidence that we are not dealing with a Greek setting, undoubtedly more suitable for goats than oxen, but with a Northern one. Moreover, in a Greek environment one would expect a surfeit of pottery, but this is not the case: in both poems tableware is made solely of metal or wood, while pottery is absent. The poet talks of metal vases, usually of gold or silver.

For example, in Ulysses’s palace in Ithaca,

«a maid came to pour water from a beautiful
golden jug into a silver basin
» (Od., I, 136-137).

People poured wine «into gold goblets» (Od., III, 472) and «gold glasses» (Od., I, 142). Lamps (Od., XIX, 34), cruets (Od., VI, 79) and urns, like the one (Il., XXIII, 253) containing Patroclus’s bones, were made of gold. The vessels used for pouring wine were also of metal: when one of them fell to the ground, instead of breaking, it «boomed» (Od., XVIII, 397). In a word, on the one hand, the Homeric poems do not mention any ceramic pottery, which is typical of the Mediterranean world, but, on the other, they are strikingly congruent with the Northern world, where scholars find a stable and highly advanced bronze founding industry, compared to the pottery one, which was far more modest. As to the poor, they used wooden jugs (Od., IX, 346; XVI, 52), i.e. the cheapest and most natural form of vessel, considering the abundance of this material in the North: Esthonia and Latvia have a very ancient tradition of wooden beer tankards.

Therefore, it was along the Baltic coast that Homer’s events took place, before the Mycenaean migration southwards, in the 16th century B. C.. This period is close to the end of an exceptionally hot climate that had lasted several thousands of years, the “post-glacial climatic optimum”. It corresponds to the Atlantic phase of the Holocene, when temperatures in northern Europe were much higher than today (at that time the broad-leaved forests reached the Arctic Circle and the tundra disappeared even from the northernmost areas of Europe). The “climatic optimum” reached its peak around 2500 B. C. and began to drop around 2000 B. C. (“Sub-Boreal phase”), until it came to an end some centuries later. It is highly likely that this was the cause that obliged the Achaeans to move down to the Mediterranean for this reason. They probably followed the Dnieper river down to the Black Sea, as the Vikings (whose culture is, in many ways, quite similar) did many centuries later. The Mycenaean civilisation, which did not originate in Greece, was thus born and went on to flourish from the 16th century B. C., soon after the change in North European climate.

The migrants took their epos and geography along with them and attributed the same names they had left behind in their lost homeland to the various places where they eventually settled. This heritage was immortalized by the Homeric poems and Greek mythology (the latter lost the memory of the great migration from the North probably after the collapse of the Mycenaean civilization, around the 12th century B. C., but kept a vague memory of its “hyperborean” links). Moreover, they renamed with Baltic names not only the new countries where they settled, but also other Mediterranean regions, such as Libya, Crete and Egypt, thus creating an enormous “geographical misunderstanding” which has lasted until now. The above-mentioned transpositions of Northern place-names were certainly encouraged, if not suggested, by a certain similarity (which the Mycenaeans realized owing to their inclination for seafaring) between Baltic geography and that of the Aegean: we only have to think of the analogy Öland-Euboea or Zealand-Peloponnese (where they were obliged to force the concept of island in order to maintain the original layout). The increasing presence of Greek-speaking populations in the Mediterranean basin, with their cultural and trade supremacy, later consolidated this phenomenon, from the time of Mycenaean civilization to the Hellenistic-Roman period.

In short, besides the geographic correspondences, in favour of this theory there is the remarkable temporal concurrence between the end of the “climatic optimum” in northern Europe and the settling of the Mycenaeans in the Aegean area. We should also note that a catastrophic event happened at that time: we refer to the eruption of the volcano of Thera (Santorini), around the year 1630 B. C., which presumably extinguished the Minoan civilization in Crete and certainly had severe climatic consequences worldwide (traces of it were found even in the annual rings of very ancient American trees), giving rise to atmospheric phenomena which must have terrorized the Bronze Age civilizations in Northern Europe. If we consider that the “optimum” had begun to decline some centuries before, this event probably started, or quickened, the final collapse.

This is the same age as the arising of Aryan, Hyksos, Hittite and Cassite settlements in India, Egypt, Anatolia and Mesopotamia respectively. In a word, the end of the “climatic optimum” can explain the cause of the contemporary migrations of other Indo-European populations (following a recent research carried on by Prof. Jahanshah Derakhshani of Teheran University, the Hyksos very likely belong to the Indo-European family). The original homeland of the Indo-Europeans was probably located in the furthest north of Europe, when the climate was much warmer than today’s. However, on the one hand G. B. Tilak in The Arctic home of the Vedas claims the Arctic origin of the Aryans, “cousins” of the Achaeans, on the other both Iranian and Norse mythology remember that the original homeland was destroyed by cold and ice. It is also remarkable that, following Tilak (The Orion), the original Aryan civilization flourished in the «Orionic period», when the constellation of Orion marked the spring equinox. It happened in the period from 4000 up to 2500 B. C., corresponding to the peak of the “climatic optimum”.

We also note the presence of a population known as the Tocharians in the Tarim Basin (northwest China) from the beginning of the 2nd millennium B. C. They spoke an Indo-European language and were tall, blond with Caucasian features. This dating provides us with yet another confirmation of the close relationship between the decline of the “climatic optimum” and the Indo-European diaspora from Scandinavia and other Northern regions. In this picture, it is amazing that the Bronze Age starts in China just between the 18th and the 16th centuries B. C. (Shang dynasty). We should note that the Chinese pictograph indicating the king is called «wang», which is very similar to the Homeric term «anax», i.e. “the king” (corresponding to «wanax» in Mycenaean Linear B tablets).

On the other hand, the terms «Yin» and «Yang» (which express two complementary principles of Chinese philosophy: Yin is feminine, Yang masculine) could be compared with the Greek roots «gyn-» and «andr-» respectively, which also refer to the “woman” and the “man” («anér edé gyné», “man and woman”, Od., VI, 184). Moreover, it is no accident that in this period the Steppe peoples -the Scythians, as the Greeks used to call them- who were blond or red-haired, flourished in the area where the Volga and the Dnieper run, the rivers that played such an important role as trade and transit routes between north and south. A passage from Herodotus about the origin of the Scythians corroborates this picture:

«They say that 1000 years elapsed from their origin and their first king Targitaos to Darius’s expedition against them» (History, IV, 7).

As this expedition dates back to 514 B. C., their origin would thus date back to the 16th century B. C., i.e. the epoch of the Mycenaean migration. One could venture to include in this picture the Olmecs also. They seem to have reached the southern Gulf Coast of Mexico in about the same period; thus, one could infer that they were a population who had formerly lived in the extreme north of the Americas (being connected to the Indo-European civilization through the Arctic Ocean, which was not frozen at that time), and then moved to the South when the climate collapsed (this, of course, could help to explain certain similarities with the Old World, apart from other possible contacts).

Returning to Homer, this reconstruction not only explains the extraordinary consistency between the Baltic-Scandinavian context and Homer’s world (compared to all the contradictions, over which the ancient Greek scholars racked their brains in vain, arising when one tries to place the Homeric geography in the Mediterranean), but also clarifies why the latter was decidedly more archaic than the Mycenaean civilization. Evidently, the contact with the refined Mediterranean and Eastern cultures favoured its rapid evolution, also considering their marked inclination for trade and seafaring which pervades not only the Homeric poems, but also all Greek mythology. Furthermore, this thesis fits in very well with the strong seafaring characterisation of the Mycenaeans. As a matter of fact, archaeologists confirm that the latter had been intensely practicing seafaring from their settling in Greece (their trade stations are found in many Mediterranean shores). Therefore, they had inherited a tradition dating back to a long time before, which implies that their original land lay near the sea. Further, the northern features of their architecture and their own physical traits fit in perfectly with the parallels between Homeric and Norse myths, which not only possess extremely archaic features, but also are of an undeniably seafaring nature. This is hard to explain with the current hypotheses about the continental origin of the Indo-Europeans, whereas the remains found in England fit in very well with the idea of a previous coastal homeland (by associating this with the typically northern features of their architecture we remove any doubt as to their place of origin).

Many signs prove the antiquity of the two poems and their temporal incongruity with Greek culture (this also explains why any reliable information regarding the author, or authors, of the poems had been lost before classical times), showing that they in fact belong to a “barbaric” European civilization, very far from the Aegean, as has been noticed by authoritative scholars, such as Prof. Stuart Piggott in his Ancient Europe. Moreover, Radiocarbon dating, corrected with dendrochronology (i.e. tree-ring calibration) has recently questioned the dogma of the Eastern origin of European civilization. Prof. Colin Renfrew describes the consequences for traditional chronology:

«These changes bring with them a whole series of alarming reversals in chronological relationships. The megalithic tombs of western Europe now become older than the Pyramids or the round tombs of Crete, their supposed predecessors. The early metal-using cultures of the Balkans antedate Troy and the early bronze age Aegean, from which they were supposedly derived. And in Britain, the final structure of Stonehenge, once thought to be the inspiration of Mycenaean architectural expertise, was complete well before the Mycenaean civilization began» (Before civilization, the radiocarbon revolution and prehistoric Europe, chap. 4, “The Tree-ring Calibration of Radiocarbon”).

Consequently, Prof. Renfrew goes so far as to say:

«The whole carefully constructed edifice comes crashing down, and the story-line of the standard textbooks must be discarded» (Before civilization, chap. 5, “The Collapse of the Traditional Framework”).

To conclude, this key could allow us to easily open many doors that have been shut tight until now, as well as to consider the age-old question of the Indo-European diaspora from a new perspective.

 

Felice Vinci

mardi, 19 avril 2011

Ptolemaios Germania-Karte entschlüsselt?

Ptolemaios Germania-Karte entschlüsselt?

VON: DK - ex: http://www.tojaburg-ev.de/

Geodäsie identifiziert zahlreiche germanische Städte des Altertums


Die norwegische Insel Smola - das Thule Pytheas?

Neben Tacitus „Germania“ ist die „Geographie“ des Ptolemaios (ca. 100-170) die grundlegende Überlieferung zu den alten Germanen. Während Tacitus seinen Fokus auf den Menschen legte, ist die Überlieferung des griechischen Autoren die ausführlichste topographische Beschreibung von weltweit insgesamt 6300 Siedlungen in 84 Regionen. In seinem zweiten buch befindet sich die Darstellung der nicht zum Römischen Reich gehörenden Germanischen Städte (Germania Megalé) zwischen Rhein und Weichsel.

Trotz der von Ptolemaios vermerkten Koordinaten gelang es bislang nicht, die insgesamt 94 genannten Ortschaften heutien Städten zuzuordnen, denn die verwendeten Daten sind gegenüber heutigen Koordinaten verzerrt. Zum einen weicht der damalige nullmeridian vom heutigen ab, zum anderen unterliefen dem Karthographen Maßstabsfehler aufgrund der Unterschätzung des Erdumfanges. Das Gebiet Germaniens ist bei ihm zu schmal und langgestreckt. Dazu kommt, daß die meisten der ptolemäischen Orte in keiner anderen antiken Quelle genannt werden und zudem die heutigen Namen oft nicht den früheren entsprechen.

Dank eines mathematischen Umrechneverfahrens gelang es nun Berliner Geodäten, einen großen Teil der germanischen städte genau zu lokalisieren. Die Forscher rechneten die Abweichungen zwischen Ptolemaios und heutigen Koordinaten von in Abgleich mit dem sogenannten Barrington-Atlas bereits identifizierten Orten auf die Vielzahl nicht identifizierter Orte hoch.   

Zu den lokalisierten Orten zählen Mörs-Asberg (Asciburgium), ein Ort, direkt am Rhein, der der Sage nach von Odysseus gegründet worden sei, Borken (Mediolanium) Aalen (Cantioebis) und Donauwörth (Brodeltia). Der Großteil der Lokalisierungen bleibt allerdings unsicher, so daß die Autoren die alten Ortsbezeichnungen „bei“ bekannten Städten ansiedeln, wie im Falle von Hildesheim (Ascalingium) oder Braunschweig (Tulisurgium).   

Erstaunlich mutet dabei die Nennung der drei bedeutendsten Städte innerhalb des freien Germaniens an: Brünn (Eburodunum), Geismar bei Fritzlar (Amisia) und Bernburg (Saale) (Luppia).

Während in der Nähe von Fritzlar der Missionar Bonifatius der Legende nach im Jahr 723 die Donar-Eiche des Stammesheiligtums der Chatten fällte und Brünn als alte Station einer Bernsteinstraße gilt, fällt Bernburg aus der Reihe. Zwar wird 806 der Stadtteil Waldau als militärisches Zentrum in einer Klosterchronim erwähnt, allerdings fehlt es an einem bedeutenden Handelsweg.

Fraglich erscheint allerdings die zuordnung von Budoris mit dem Drachenfels (Siebengebirge) bei Königswinter, den die Autoren fälschlich bei Bad Dürkheim verorten. Ebenso erschließt sich dem Leser die Identifizierung von Navalia als Essen-Hinsel (heute Essen-Überruhr-Hinsel), nicht so recht, auch wenn es archäologische Befunde eines germanischen Gräberfeldes stützen.   

Schließlich erscheint auch die gleichsetzung der vor Trondheim liegenden norwegischen Kleininsel Smola mit dem Thule des Pytheas als äußerst fragwürdig. Angesichts der literarischen Bedeutung des mythischen Ortes Thule dürfte die Gleichsetzung mit der geschichtlich unbedeutenden Smola auf den mehr mathematischen als hostorischen hintergrund der Autoren hindeuten – zumal die Entfernung von Britannien nach Smola etwa genau der Entfernung von Britannien nach Island entspricht und auch Grönland nicht viel weiter entfernt liegt.

In der Bilanz ist der Wert der Veröffentlichung aber insofern nicht zu unterschätzen, als daß er eine neue Diskussionsgrundlage für die Deutung der ptolemaischen Germania-Karte liefert.    


Links:

www.zdf.de/ZDFmediathek/beitrag/video/1218320/Germania+war+anders

 

jeudi, 30 décembre 2010

Hypathie, Synésios et la philosophie pérenne

agora_haut23.jpg

Hypatie, Synésios et la philosophie pérenne

par Claude BOURRINET

Ex: http://www.europemaxima.com/

Agora, l’excellent film de Alejandro Amenabar, qui conte le sort tragique d’Hypatie (ou Hypatia), philosophe néoplatonicienne du IVe siècle, est à voir non comme une reconstitution historique, bien que, somme toute, malgré quelques invraisemblances, dont l’âge de l’héroïne, l’Alexandrie de cette époque soit remarquablement restituée et les événement assez fidèlement respectés,  mais comme une lecture de notre époque.

La loi du genre cinématographique exige une concentration dramatique qui resserre des éléments narratifs et biographiques dont l’étalement dans le temps diluerait l’attention. D’autre part, la dimension romanesque doit aussi avoir sa part. Nous avons fait allusion à l’âge d’Hypatie, trop jeune pour les événements qui sont présentés. En vérité, elle a été assassinée par les fanatiques chrétiens en 415, à l’âge de 45 ans. L’intrigue concernant l’esclave chrétien relève aussi de la pure fantaisie.

Dans le long métrage apparaissent deux personnages très importants, deux de ses élèves, Synésios de Cyrène, un futur évêque, et  Oreste, le futur préfet de la ville, qui, dans le film (mais la relation historique ne confirme pas que ce fût lui qui était en cause), presse vainement la philosophe de ses assiduités amoureuses.

Un spectateur du XXIe siècle, en prenant connaissance d’un épisode assez méconnu de la fin du paganisme, ne peut s’empêcher de transférer dans le champ spatio-temporel contemporain les problématiques d’alors.

Alexandrie d’abord, la ville cosmopolite par excellence, dans les murs de laquelle coexistent depuis plus de sept cents ans, voire davantage, Égyptiens, Grecs et Juifs (et au IVe siècle des chrétiens de toutes origines ethniques), est le centre intellectuel, culturel, au même rang que l’Athènes universitaire, du monde gréco-romain. Ce n’est pas pour rien que l’époque hellénistique, qui court depuis l’épopée d’Alexandre jusqu’à l’occupation de la Grèce par Rome, est aussi appelée époque alexandrine. On y trouve la fameuse bibliothèque, qui est une partie d’un plus vaste ensemble créé en – 288 par un des généraux d’Alexandre, Ptolémée Ier Sôter, le Museiôn (palais des Muses), qui était en fait une université de pointe où les recherches scientifiques étaient particulièrement poussées. Sous César, la bibliothèque groupa jusqu’à 700 000 volumes et dut subir quelques avanies. Certaine hypothèses quant à sa destruction font état du rôle néfaste de l’empereur Théodose qui, en 391, ordonna de détruire les temples païens. Comme le Serapeion, temple dédié au dieu-taureau Apis (assimilé au dieu grec Osiris, fusion qui allait donner Sérapis) contenait la bibliothèque, les troubles religieux fomentés par l’évêque Théophile entraîneront la ruine de cet ensemble cultuel d’une renommée considérable. Mais certains historiens arabes, Abd al-Latif, en 1203, Ibn al-Kifti et le grand Ibn Khaldoun, évoquent la responsabilité du calife Omar, lequel ordonna en 642 à Amr ibn al-As, son général, de détruire les ouvrages inutiles (c’est-à-dire qui ne sont pas le Coran). Il est probable que ces décisions se conjuguèrent pour anéantir l’un des plus grands trésors de l’humanité.

Notre âge connaît aussi un mélange de cultures, un brassage cosmopolite et une tentative de rassemblement du savoir universel. Toute grande métropole occidentale est susceptible de rappeler Alexandrie, singulièrement New York, qui se veut le cœur culturel du Nouvel ordre mondial. On y trouve en effet la présence d’une forte communauté juive, un urbanisme démesuré, une volonté de modernité scientifique et artistique, ainsi qu’une ambition de régenter l’esprit du Monde. Les images en douche qui montrent les heurts entre chrétiens et païens, les gros plans sur les silhouettes noires qui sèment la terreur font irrésistiblement penser à des djihadistes, des talibans du IVe siècle. Aussi n’est-il pas abusif de considérer que le film doit beaucoup au 11 septembre et à ce qui s’est ensuivi. Hypatie n’est-elle pas une femme libre victime de la misogynie et de l’intolérance d’une religion proche-orientale ? C’est évidemment le libéralisme sociétal et politique de l’Occident, face à l’obscurantisme, qui est en partie invoqué derrière la liberté païenne attaquée. Et, par delà, l’intolérance du monothéisme. La nature des « recherches » d’Hypatie, l’expérimentation qu’elle pratique sur un navire, évoquent bien entendu Galilée, son héliocentrisme et son expérience, sur la chute des corps, du sommet de la Tour de Pise. Anachronisme, bien sûr, et pas seulement dans les aspects strictement scientifiques : les Anciens en effet n’appréhendaient pas les lois « physiques » et cosmologiques de manière mécaniste, et le néoplatonisme était par bien des côtés plus proche de la magie (la théurgie) que de la quantification de l’univers. Mais qu’importe : on voit que ce qui est souligné est le parallèle avec la lutte que dut entreprendre la modernité contre la superstition des âges obscurs. Credo quia absurdum, disait-on au Moyen Âge.

La boucle est donc bouclée : comme Hypatie en son temps, nous devons combattre, si nous ne voulons pas que notre civilisation s’effondre, les fanatiques actuels de tous poils (évangélistes compris ?).

Il serait trop long d’expliquer en quoi le monde d’aujourd’hui doit plus qu’il ne croit à la vision chrétienne. Je renvoie à l’ouvrage de Marcel Gauchet, Le désenchantement du monde. Malgré tout, on ne peut pas dire que le pronostic soit totalement erroné, et que la liberté des modernes ne tienne pas, d’un certain point de vue, à celle des païens.

Le christianisme, contrairement aux religions à « mystères », était irrécupérable dans le cadre de la rationalité grecque. Il devait la subvertir en le retournant. Dans la contrainte de justifier rationnellement la foi, il avait emprunté à la philosophie hellénique, mais au prix d’un travestissement du sens et d’un autre emploi du vocabulaire métaphysique. En vérité, la liberté d’interprétation, le libre jeu de la recherche intellectuelle n’avaient plus cours. Nous étions passés sous d’autres cieux, dans lequel un dieu jaloux régnait. Le monde des idées était mis sous tutelle, et le dogme s’imposait, transformant la philosophie en servante de la religion. Le mythe (mythistoire, en ce qui concerne le christianisme) avait dévoré le logos, la fable la raison. La religion à étages qui caractérisait le monde antique (les mythes, les cultes civiques et la « mystique » intellectualisée des philosophes, d’une élite) permettait une économie relativement sereine du « problème divin ». Il s’agissait de réguler le lien entre le ciel et la terre, tout en consacrant l’ordre cosmique, donc par ricochet la sphère politique. L’intention perdure, mais non sans complications. Le dieu subjectif, personnel, absolument transcendant des juifs, dont les chrétiens sont les héritiers, enjoint de manifester sa foi à tous les niveaux, c’est-à-dire dans tous les compartiments de la vie sociale, politique et privée. Le Bas-Empire », qui, depuis les Sévère, manifestait des tendances autocratiques, avec une sacralisation progressive de l’État que Dioclétien renforça, ne pouvait que verser sur la pente d’un totalitarisme dont l’Église chrétienne deviendrait la clef de voûte. Comme Lucien Jerphagnon l’écrit, dans son excellent ouvrage, Les divins Césars : « À la différence des anciens cultes, le christianisme engageait le plan de la conscience personnelle; il exigeait de ses adeptes une adhésion intérieure qui les rendait justiciables d’instances spirituelles censément intermédiaires entre le divin et l’humain. » Une fois l’alliance entre l’Empire et le goupillon scellée, l’obéissance et l’implication subjective, dues à l’une, devait s’appliquer à l’autre, ce qui était tout profit pour les deux s’épaulant, les « agentes in rebus », appelés aussi les «  curiosi « , autrement dit les barbouzes du régime, aidant du reste de leur mieux à convaincre les récalcitrants.

En effet, ce fut sous le premier empereur chrétien qu’un ouvrage, un  pamphlet érudit de Porphyre, Contre les chrétiens, fut l’objet du premier autodafé de l’Histoire ordonné pour des raisons religieuses. C’était un coup d’essai qui ne demandait qu’à se confirmer, et qui était complètement contraire au libéralisme qui régnait dans le monde intellectuel païen. Comme l’affirme Ambroise, l’évêque de Milan, qui impressionna tant Augustin en cette fin du IVe siècle : « On doit le respect d’abord à l’Église catholique, et ensuite seulement aux lois : reverentiam primo ecclesiae catholicae deinde etiam et legibus ». L’Empereur Gratien en sut quelque chose, bien qu’il ne fût pas lui-même un parangon de tolérance.

Ce qu’il y avait aussi d’inédit dans la manière dont le christianisme s’imposait, c’était son prosélytisme, son ambition missionnaire de convertir l’humanité. Il rencontrait certes la logique universaliste de l’Empire romain qui, comme tout Empire, avait vocation à dominer le monde, mais, en même temps, la sage gestion des choses divines, qui prévalait jusqu’alors, était complètement embrouillée. Il n’y avait plus, en droit, plusieurs approches, des interprétations hiérarchisées du monde et des dieux, mais un dogme qu’il fallait mettre à la portée de tous. Nietzsche avait parlé d’un platonisme placé au niveau des masses, dont la grossièreté devenait une source de troubles.

Les « débats » métaphysiques sur les relations entre le Père, le Fils et le Saint-Esprit, en brassant des concepts alambiqués, débordaient sur la place publique. La « démocratisation » de la question religieuse, qui devenait un enjeu idéologique derrière lequel se dissimulaient des conflits ethniques ou nationalistes (les donatistes par exemple expriment le ressentiment berbère, les futurs monophysites se trouveront surtout chez les Égyptiens, à l’esprit particulariste exacerbé) libère dans le démos tous les démons du fanatisme, comme si les cloisons antiques qui permettaient de canaliser les conflits avaient sauté. Les moines, dont le nombre devient vite pléthorique, et qui recrutent en Égypte surtout dans la paysannerie inculte et particulièrement rude, constituent des troupes de choc, souvent violentes, et feront peser sur l’État byzantin un danger constant. Ils se déversent dans la rue en gueulant des slogans, comme nos modernes gauchistes, constituent des sectes, des coteries, des clans, et en même temps l’infanterie lors des combats urbains. Ainsi Cyrille, à Alexandrie, bénéficie-t-il des « services » de ses parabalani (infirmiers ou croquemorts) dévoués corps et âmes à leur chef. Libanios, un des philosophes « païens » qui accompagnèrent Julien dans son épopée, dit de Constance II, bigot qui avait décrété l’interdiction des cultes anciens, qu’il « introduisait à la cour les hommes pâles, les ennemis des dieux, les adorateurs des tombes… ».

L’« Antiquité tardive » est un monde où la haine s’exaspère, les gens des campagnes en voulant à ceux des villes qui les exploitent, détestant encore plus propriétaires et fonctionnaires, les prolétaires en voulant aux bourgeois, et l’armée étant vomie par l’ensemble de la société. Tous les ingrédients étaient présents pour recevoir avec empressement ce dieu d’amour et de revanche qu’était Yahvé-Jésus.

Julien (empereur de 361 à 363) évoquera cette haine du chrétien pour le chrétien, la rabies theologica : « Aucune bête féroce, écrit aussi  Ammien Marcellin (contemporain de Julien), n’est aussi acharnée contre l’homme que le sont la plupart des chrétiens les uns contre les autres. »

Pour en revenir à Alexandrie, on peut dire qu’elle était la matrice d’un courant, le néoplatonisme, qui était la symbiose du platonisme, de l’aristotélisme et du stoïcisme, et qui allait influencer, par Plotin, la pensée occidentale jusqu’à maintenant. Elle avait vu en son sein œuvrer Philon le juif, qui avait essayé de concilier le judaïsme et l’hellénisme, Pantène, Clément, qui étaient chrétiens, et surtout  Ammonios Sakkas, qui n’a rien écrit, mais qui fut le maître d’Origène et de Plotin, ce qui n’est pas rien.

Il faut imaginer Hypatia dans cette atmosphère tendue, en tous points exaltante si l’on considère la tradition dans laquelle elle s’inscrivait, mais ô combien chargée de menaces. En 388, on avait fermé les temples. En 392, on saccageait le Sérapeion. La ville était sous la coupe des patriarches, Théophile et Cyrille, son neveu. Un État dans l’État.

Hypatia était fille de Théon, mathématicien célèbre. Elle était « géomètre » (comme le recommandait Platon), astronome, vierge et vertueuse, s’accoutrait du court manteau des cyniques – le tribon -, symbole d’abstinence plutôt que d’appartenance à l’école des « chiens ». Elle était rémunérée par l’État, mais donnait aussi des cours privés.

Synésios de Cyrène avait réalisé sur ses indications un planisphère.  C’était un fils de bonne famille, intelligent et riche, de même âge que son professeur. Il était fasciné par Hypatia. Plus tard, dans une « lettre à un ami », il écrit : « Nous avons vu et entendu celle qui détient le privilège d’initier aux mystères de la philosophie. » Il l’appela, sur son lit de mort, « sa mère, sa sœur, son maître ».

Comme tout « potentes » de l’époque, il fut contraint à la politique. Voué à la vie philosophique, c’est-à-dire à la contemplation, il n’était sans doute pas emballé par cette charge, mais l’élite gréco-romaine était encore animée par l’éthique stoïcienne, et c’était un devoir auquel on ne se dérobait pas encore. Aussi se retrouva-t-il, au mois d’août 399, à la cour d’Arcadios, une parfaite nullité, fils du sinistre Théodose. Le député de la Cyrénaïque était en fait là pour défendre les intérêts d’une province en grande difficulté économique. Il produisit du même coup un Discours sur la royauté qui reprenait le thème de la royauté idéale, opposée à la tyrannie parce que guidée par la philosophie, pattern redevable à la tradition gréco-latine destinée à asseoir idéologiquement la basileia, c’est-à-dire la royauté, avec tout ce que cela suppose de tempérance, de piété, de bonté, d’imitation de l’excellence divine (la providence royale étant faite à l’image de la pronoia divine, et le basileos étant assimilable à la divinité, homoiôsis theô). Synésios invitait l’Empereur à revenir à la tradition romaine de simplicité, de rudesse, etc. – contre l’amollissement d’une cour corrompue par trop de luxe, qu’il constatait de ses yeux. Et il met pour ce faire en regard le souvenir des anciens empereurs, à la tête des armés, et insiste sur la nécessité de la guerre, matrice de vertus. Comme quoi un néoplatonicien peut avoir les pieds sur terre !

Mais ce qu’il fit de plus intéressant encore, et qui nous concerne pour notre propre chef, ce fut d’engager Arcadios à expulser du Sénat les Barbares germains qui s’y étaient infiltrés et qui avaient la haute main sur tout. Il contredisait ainsi Thémistios – dont Arcadios avait été l’élève – philosophe néoplatonicien « de cour », conseiller de plusieurs empereurs, qui avait invité ses maîtres successifs à « passer aux barbares ». Durant les vingt années qui séparent les deux hommes, le problème barbare avait  beaucoup évolué. Les intelligences lucides y voyaient une menace mortelle pour l’Empire. Il fallait un sursaut, une prise de conscience. Aussi Synésios conseilla-t-il de recruter dans les « campagnes » de l’Empire plutôt que chez les Barbares qui infestaient l’armée et minaient sa cohésion. Il demandait des combattants « nationaux ».

Ce n’est pas tout. Il se maria. C’était un homme qui adorait la chasse et la réflexion. Il était richissime, avait de hautes relations, était sérieux, savant. Il n’en fallait pas plus, en ces temps de détresse, pour être élu évêque. Il accepta sous conditions. Dans la Lettre 105 à son frère (en fait il s’adressait à Théophile), il remercie les habitants de Ptolémaïs qui lui ont fait confiance. Mais il est marié, et refuse une séparation officielle ainsi qu’une vie maritale clandestine. Il veut même avoir « beaucoup de beaux enfants ». Sur le plan philosophique, il n’est pas disposé à abandonner ses convictions auxquelles il adhère par voie de démonstration scientifique : « Il y a plus d’un point où la philosophie s’oppose aux idées communément reçues », c’est-à-dire chrétiennes. Il faut le laisser tranquille par rapport au dogme. Par exemple : « Je n’irai pas dire […] que le monde, en toutes ses parties, est voué à la ruine [cela contre le dogme de la fin l’Apocalypse]. Quant à la résurrection, qu’admet l’opinion courante, c’est là, à mon sens, un mystère ineffable où je ne m’accorde pas, tant s’en faut, avec le sentiment vulgaire. » Et il fixe les bornes entre lesquelles peut s’exercer la liberté de conscience : en public, il est philomuthôn (je prêche toutes les « histoires » qu’on voudra), dans le privé, je suis philosophôn (j’exerce librement ma raison).

On ne connaît pas la suite.

Il resta fidèle à Hypatia. Il mourut en 413, la précédant de deux ans.

Entre-temps, Théophile était mort, Cyrille, son neveu, imposait sa loi à Alexandrie. En mars 415, il y eut des émeutes. Cyrille et Oreste s’opposaient, le pouvoir religieux voulait dominer le pouvoir politique. Oreste sanctionna Hiérax, maître d’école chrétien, sectateur fanatique et agent de Cyrille. Une provocation (l’incendie dans une église) fut le prétexte d’un pogrom contre les juifs, que le pouvoir séculier protégeait. Un commando de cinq cents moines rencontra le préfet, qui fut rossé et sauvé in extremis par des Alexandrins. Cyrille accusa le préfet d’être sous l’influence d’Hypatia, considérée comme la source du conflit.

Un commentateur contemporain, du nom de Socrate raconte ce qui suivit : « Des hommes à l’esprit échauffé ourdirent un complot. Sous la conduite d’un lecteur répondant au nom de Pierre, les voilà qui surprennent la femme alors qu’elle rentrait chez elle, s’en revenant on ne sait d’où. Ils l’extraient de sa litière, l’entraînent à l’église du Kaisaréion, la déshabillent et la tuent à coups de tessons. Ils dépecèrent le corps, en rassemblèrent les morceaux sur la place du Cinaron, et les mirent à brûler. »

Lucien Jerphagnon ajoute : « Ainsi s’achève l’histoire d’Hypatia la philosophe, dont le savoir égalait le charme et la beauté. »

Claude Bourrinet


Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=1376

vendredi, 10 décembre 2010

La triade homérienne

La triade homérienne

par Dominique VENNER

Ex: http://engarda.hautetfort.com/

homere.jpgPour les Anciens, Homère était « le commencement, le milieu et la fin ». Une vision du monde et même une philosophie se déduisent implicitement de ses poèmes. Héraclite en a résumé le socle cosmique par une formulation bien à lui : « L’univers, le même pour tous les êtres, n’a été créé par aucun dieu ni par aucun homme ; mais il a toujours été, est et sera feu éternellement vivant… »

1. La nature comme socle

Chez Homère, la perception d’un cosmos incréé et ordonné s’accompagne d’une vision enchantée portée par les anciens mythes. Les mythes ne sont pas une croyance, mais la manifestation du divin dans le monde. Les forêts, les roches, les bêtes sauvages ont une âme que protège Artémis (Diane pour les Romains). La nature tout entière se confond avec le sacré, et les hommes n’en sont pas isolés. Mais elle n’est pas destinée à satisfaire leurs caprices. En elle, dans son immanence, ici et maintenant, ils trouvent en revanche des réponses à leurs angoisses :

« Comme naissent les feuilles, ainsi font les hommes. Les feuilles, tour à tour, c’est le vent qui les épand sur le sol et la forêt verdoyante qui les fait naître quand se lèvent les jours du printemps. Ainsi des hommes : une génération naît à l’instant où une autre s’efface » (Iliade, VI, 146). Tourne la roue des saisons et de la vie, chacun transmettant quelque chose de lui-même à ceux qui vont suivre, assuré ainsi d’être une parcelle d’éternité. Certitude affermie par la conscience du souvenir à laisser dans la mémoire du futur, ce que dit Hélène dans l’Iliade : « Zeus nous a fait un dur destin afin que nous soyons plus tard chantés par les hommes à venir » (VI, 357-358). Peut-être, mais la gloire d’un noble nom s’efface comme le reste. Ce qui ne passe pas est intérieur, face à soi-même, dans la vérité de la conscience : avoir vécu noblement, sans bassesse, avoir pu se maintenir en accord avec le modèle que l’on s’est fixé.

2. L’excellence comme but

A l’image des héros, les hommes véritables, nobles et accomplis (kalos agatos), cherchent dans le courage de l’action la mesure de leur excellence (arétê), comme les femmes cherchent dans l’amour ou le don de soi la lumière qui les fait exister. Aux uns et aux autres, importe seulement ce qui est beau et fort. « Etre toujours le meilleur, recommande Pelée à son fils Achille, l’emporter sur tous les autres » (Iliade, VI, 208). Quand Pénélope se tourmente à la pensée que son fils Télémaque pourrait être tué par les “prétendants” (usurpateurs), ce qu’elle redoute c’est qu’il meurt « sans gloire », avant d’avoir accompli ce qui ferait de lui un héros à l’égal de son père (Odyssée, IV, 728). Elle sait que les hommes ne doivent rien attendre des dieux et n’espérer d’autre ressource que d’eux-mêmes, ainsi que le dit Hector en rejetant un présage funeste : « Il n’est qu’un bon présage, c’est de combattre pour sa patrie » (Iliade, XII, 243). Lors du combat final de l’Iliade, comprenant qu’il est condamné par les dieux ou le destin, Hector s’arrache au désespoir par un sursaut d’héroïsme tragique : « Eh bien ! non, je n’entends pas mourir sans lutte ni sans gloire, ni sans quelque haut fait dont le récit parvienne aux hommes à venir » (XXII, 304-305).

3. La beauté comme horizon

L’Iliade commence par la colère d’Achille et se termine par son apaisement face à la douleur de Priam. Les héros d’Homère ne sont pas des modèles de perfection. Ils sont sujets à l’erreur et à la démesure en proportion même de leur vitalité. Pour cette raison, ils tombent sous le coup d’une loi immanente qui est le ressort des mythes grecs et de la tragédie. Toute faute comporte châtiment, celle d’Agamemnon comme celle d’Achille. Mais l’innocent peut lui aussi être soudain frappé par le sort, comme Hector et tant d’autres, car nul n’est à l’abri du tragique destin. Cette vision de la vie est étrangère à l’idée d’une justice transcendantale punissant le mal ou le péché. Chez Homère, ni le plaisir, ni le goût de la force, ni la sexualité ne sont jamais assimilés au mal. Hélène n’est pas coupable de la guerre voulue par les dieux (Iliade, III, 161-175). Seuls les dieux sont coupables des fatalités qui s’abattent sur les hommes. Les vertus chantées par Homère ne sont pas morales mais esthétiques. Il croit à l’unité de l’être humain que qualifient son style et ses actes. Les hommes se définissent donc au regard du beau et du laid, du noble et du vil, non du bien ou du mal. Ou, pour dire les choses autrement, l’effort vers la beauté est la condition du bien. Mais la beauté n’est rien sans loyauté ni vaillance. Ainsi Pâris ne peut être vraiment beau puisqu’il est couard. Ce n’est qu’un bellâtre que méprise son frère Hector et même Hellène qu’il a séduite par magie. En revanche, Nestor, en dépit de son âge, conserve la beauté de son courage. Une vie belle, but ultime du meilleur de la philosophie grecque, dont Homère fut l’expression primordiale, suppose le culte de la nature, le respect de la pudeur (Nausicaa ou Pénélope), la bienveillance du fort pour le faible (sauf dans les combats), le mépris pour la bassesse et la laideur, l’admiration pour le héros malheureux. Si l’observation de la nature apprend aux Grecs à mesurer leurs passions, à borner leurs désirs, l’idée qu’ils se font de la sagesse avant Platon est sans fadeur. Ils savent qu’elle est associée aux accords fondamentaux nés d’oppositions surmontées, masculin et féminin, violence et douceur, instinct et raison. Héraclite s’était mis à l’école d’Homère quand il a dit : « La nature aime les contraires : c’est avec elle qu’elle produit l’harmonie. »

Dominique Venner, « La Nouvelle Revue d’Histoire », n°43, juillet-août 2009. Mis en ligne sur le site de Dominique Venner.

 

jeudi, 02 décembre 2010

Atene dorica. Comunità gerarchica di popolo

Atene dorica. Comunità gerarchica di popolo

athenes-agora-grecque-11.jpgA sentire il poeta aristocratico Teognide (VI-V secolo a.C.), già ai suoi tempi si doveva parlare di crisi della Tradizione: a quel tipo di Junker greco, tutti i valori superiori sembravano esser crollati dinanzi all’affermazione del dèmos. Ci sono intellettuali della Grecia antica che fanno pensare a certi loro omologhi moderni. Difensori dei valori tradizionali, essi  interpretano la società a democrazia totalitaria del loro tempo come una caduta plebea e demagogica. Teognide o Pindaro, ad esempio, per diversi aspetti si assomigliano come gocce d’acqua a Jünger o a Evola: per loro un’aristocrazia democratica, estesa a tutto il popolo, è uno sproposito. Nessuno dei quattro ammise che la valenza politica dell’eguaglianza di stirpe affermatasi in modi diversi a Sparta e ad Atene, così come nel Reich del 1933, non era un principio di eguaglianza assoluta, ma l’allargamento della coscienza signorile all’intera comunità di popolo, per via del comune lignaggio di sangue. Per il reazionario, spesso difendere la casta vuol dire essere ostile al popolo.

 

 

La democrazia greca nulla ha da spartire con gli universalismi della moderna “democrazia” liberale, che di fatto è una tirannia del denaro in mano a oligarchi estranei al popolo, ridotto a massa livellata. La differenza sta tutta nel concetto cardinale che ad Atene la democrazia non è un diritto, ma un privilegio.

 

Per capire come in Grecia non solo Sparta, ma anche Atene fosse il centro di una concezione di democrazia anti-egualitaria ed etnicista, del tutto opposta all’idea moderna di “democrazia” parlamentare basata sui diritti individuali, basta dare uno sguardo agli ordinamenti di Pericle. È vero che l’epoca classica non vide più all’opera i venerandi ceppi nobiliari dell’epoca arcaica, già decaduti, ma è altrettanto vero che presentava ugualmente la volontà di preservare i retaggi bio-storici della Tradizione dorica, allargandoli all’intera comunità popolare, in una vera e propria specie di socialismo nazionale ante-litteram. Grandi politici come Clìstene, Cimone e Pericle, demagoghi a occhi reazionari, in realtà furono protagonisti di una lotta rivoluzionaria, intesa a proteggere con istituzioni sociali ferree l’identità atavica del popolo, di tutto il popolo, messa in pericolo dal procedere dei commerci e dai contatti con le altre popolazioni. Secondo Plutarco, Pericle, di carattere autoritario e carismatico, era un «capoparte popolare», tipico rappresentante della politica ateniese, gestita da Capi forniti di un Seguito personale, alla maniera della democrazia tribale germanica. Quello di Pericle, in particolare, fu un sistema di potere fondato sul sostegno diretto del popolo, senza intermediari istituzionali, e tutto basato sul prestigio del capo.

 

La cittadinanza, nell’Atene del V secolo, non era un pezzo di carta da mettere in mano al primo venuto, come accade oggi nella “democrazia” liberale. Pericle restrinse la legge precedente, che considerava cittadino chi fosse figlio di un genitore ateniese, e riservò il diritto di cittadinanza unicamente al figlio di entrambi i genitori ateniesi. Questa disposizione – risalente al 451 – si accompagnava al tassativo divieto di contrarre matrimoni misti, secondo una legislazione che prevedeva la condanna e la confisca dei beni per un Ateniese che avesse sposato una straniera e la riduzione in schiavitù per qualunque straniero si fosse ammogliato con una Ateniese. I divieti di immigrazione erano chiari: si tollerava soltanto la presenza dei meteci, stranieri-residenti privati dei diritti civili, cui si inibiva la facoltà di possedere terra, di ricoprire cariche pubbliche, di adire ai tribunali.

Per un’idea di quanto fosse egualitaria Atene, basta un piccolo esempio: l’omicidio di un Ateniese per mano di uno straniero comportava la messa a morte del colpevole, mentre l’omicidio di uno straniero per mano di un Ateniese era punito con una multa…insomma, nulla a che vedere con l’ideologia dei diritti individuali…Si ricordi che siamo nell’aureo V secolo, l’epoca di Platone, di Fidia, di Eschilo, di Sofocle: tutte persone così poco “democratiche” in senso moderno, da considerare del tutto ovvia la superiorità della loro civiltà rispetto a quelle “barbare”, e da vantare l’eccellenza non solo di ordinamenti comunitari apertamente discriminatori verso gli stranieri, ma pure dell’aggressivo imperialismo colonizzatore ateniese – attivo dalla Sicilia al Mar Nero – e persino del sistema schiavile, su cui Atene basava la propria economia e di cui, tra gli altri, Aristotele fece un celebre elogio.

 

E proprio da Aristotele sappiamo di un caso tipico, in cui certi stranieri giunti verso il 510 ad Atene per partecipare alla vita politica ne furono senz’altro allontanati perché non in grado di «dimostrare la loro discendenza dai più remoti antenati della società attica»: era questo il metodo del diapséphismos, la revisione delle liste elettorali in base alla «purezza della nascita». Qualcosa che, ad un confronto, fa apparire le leggi di Norimberga del 1935 – che, diversamente da quelle ateniesi, contemplavano numerose eccezioni, a cominciare dalla figura del Mischlinge, il sanguemisto, del tutto sconosciuta ad Atene – delle blande misure di magnanima tolleranza.

 

Platone definì bene il senso della democrazia ateniese: «un’aristocrazia con l’approvazione del popolo». Una democrazia, quindi, gerarchica, diretta e acclamatoria, in cui la isonomìa, cioè l’uguaglianza davanti alla legge, riguardava unicamente i nativi d’Attica, di cui si sollecitava la partecipazione politica e la mobilitazione, chiamandoli a condividere in assemblea pubblica le decisioni prese dal comando politico. Questo è il senso di ciò che è stato definito il “totalitarismo” delle istituzioni ateniesi, tutte incentrate sulla netta distinzione tra membri della polis ed estranei, sulla rude chiusura ad ogni assorbimento di stranieri, sulla centralità della fratrìa quale organismo parentale e insieme sorta di corporazione ereditaria. Un ricordo dell’arcaico ordinamento ateniese, in cui gli eupàtrides (i patrizi di “buona nascita”), gli agrìkoi (i contadini) e i demiùrgoi (gli artigiani) davano vita allo Stato organico etnico e corporativo.

 

Nell’Atene classica vigevano, ripotenziati da Pericle, gli arcaici presupposti dell’Atene dorica, in cui il legame di sangue veniva protetto lungo la linea ereditaria sia familiare che “nazionale”. Alla base di tutta la grecità troviamo il concetto di synghéneia, la fratellanza di sangue, che ad Atene – città e territorio uniti in un’unica koiné – veniva tutelata dalla legge e riproposta attraverso un fitto reticolo di legami sociali: le varie tribù in cui era suddiviso il dèmos si diramavano su base razziale vera e propria, con la fratrìa, e su base territoriale, con i dèmoi, racchiudendo il senso dell’antica filé dorica, la tribù clanica che legava l’individuo come membro di schiatta radicato al suolo. In questo quadro, così lontano dall’idea moderna di “democrazia”, c’era spazio anche per la difesa del klèros, il possedimento familiare inalienabile, nucleo della solidarietà di stirpe e di terra, secondo il ben noto “mito dell’autoctonia” attica. Come dire, un Blut und Boden in piena regola.

 

In realtà, la preponderanza della comunità sull’individuo era tale che, ad Atene, tutto veniva risolto comunitariamente, e la società inglobava il singolo in ogni aspetto della vita associata. Era lo “Stato” ad occuparsi, ad esempio, della gestione dei funerali, del mantenimento degli orfani, della regolamentazione della prostituzione o della vendetta familiare. Solo che lo “Stato” come lo intendiamo noi, ad Atene semplicemente non esisteva. Come ha scritto lo storico Brook Manville, ad Atene lo “Stato” erano tutti i cittadini: «La comunità non temeva l’intervento dello Stato: la comunità era, infatti, lo Stato». In altre parole, ad Atene ciò che contava non era lo Stato burocratico e anonimo, ma, detto con parola che rende bene l’idea, era il Volk.

 

Antonio Castronuovo, studioso della democrazia ateniese, ha riportato le enunciazioni del mito: «Noi siamo Greci puri e mai ci siamo mescolati coi barbari…non abbiamo contaminato il nostro sangue…», definendole una «vera attestazione di purezza etnica», cosicché «l’uomo attico vuole far credere che il ghénos, la stirpe, sia il primo livello di aggregazione comunitaria». E si ricorderanno le famose parole del Menesseno platonico: «Il primo fondamento della loro buona nascita sta nell’origine dei loro antenati, non straniera…».

Nell’Atene di Pericle vediamo insomma una società completamente “anti-democratica” in senso moderno e democratica in senso tradizionale: autarchia economica; gerarchia del rango sociale; privilegio esclusivo dell’appartenenza; solenne culto dei padri e degli eroi; mistica dell’ethnos ereditario; sacralizzazione del suolo patrio; libertà di popolo e non libertà dell’individuo; religione della guerra, dell’onore e del coraggio; culto della bellezza e della sanità psico-fisica; partecipazione totalitaria dei cittadini alla vita pubblica nelle liturgie assembleari; abbattimento del diaframma tra sfera pubblica e privata…e così via. Tutti valori rivendicati da Pericle in persona, in una celebre orazione dell’anno 431.

Quando, ancora oggi, sentiamo ripetere la secolare sciocchezza che Atene sarebbe statala culla della democrazia occidentale”, a stento si può reprimere una risata omerica. Ricordiamo solo le brevi parole di Ambrogio Donini, il famoso studioso di religioni: «La cosiddetta “democrazia greca” è un’invenzione della storiografia idealistico-borghese». Ad Atene, come a Sparta, non si aveva idea di cosa fossero il cosmopolitismo, i diritti individuali, l’eguaglianza universale, il pacifismo, il libertarismo, l’etnopluralismo e tutte le altre devastanti utopie della liberaldemocrazia. Ad Atene, come a Sparta, civiltà significava lotta eterna per difendere la propria identità contro tutte le aggressioni, quelle di fuori come quelle di dentro.

Luca Leonello Rimbotti

lundi, 29 novembre 2010

Greek & Barbarian

Greek & Barbarian

F. Roger DEVLIN

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories
Edited by Robert B. Strassler
New York: Pantheon, 2007

Independent scholar Robert Strassler has produced far and away the best English edition aimed at the general reader of the work which remains the fountainhead of the Western historical tradition. Let us hope there is still a fit audience out there for it—men, that is, capable of learning what Herodotus has to teach. Generations of schoolboys at British public schools, German Gymnasia, and American rural academies once read his Histories to learn who they were—in other words, what it meant to be men of the West.

On a first approach, Herodotus’s great work appears a confusing welter of names, colorful stories, digressions, and miscellaneous ethnographic information. I have taught the work to undergraduates and remember students valiantly struggling to discuss “that one King of Wherever, who was fighting that tribe, whatever they were called . . .” In reality, the narrative is carefully—indeed intricately—structured, but in a manner that only becomes clear after repeated readings. What Strassler has done is provide a wealth of maps, indices, cross references, notes, illustrations, and appendices which reduce the preliminary mental effort required merely to grasp this overall structure. The reader can thus proceed more quickly to genuine historical understanding.

It is remarkable that no one in the small, overspecialized world of academic classical studies has ever bothered to attempt such a project. Strassler himself fetchingly admits: “I am not a scholar of ancient Greek and indeed can barely parse a simple sentence in that language” (xlvi). He commissioned a new translation for this edition by Andrea Purvis of Duke University. It is not “dazzling,” as the publisher’s blurb claims, but perhaps something better: unpretentiously accurate, and less mannered than its nearest competitor, David Grene’s 1987 version.

Herodotus grew up in Halicarnassus, an important trading center on the edge of the Greek world, where Greek and Barbarian came into frequent contact. He traveled widely, visiting Egypt as well as many Greek cities; he interviewed public figures and veterans of the events he recounts and gave public readings of his work, which he called the “Inquiries” (historiē in Greek). His great theme is the contrast between Greek and Barbarian, and more particularly the struggle of Greek freedom with Asiatic despotism. The narrative is designed from the beginning to culminate in a description of the successful Greek struggle to repel the Persian invasions of 490 and 480 BC.

Herodotus, like most ancient writers, was concerned with freedom primarily in a political sense. He says nothing about freedom of commerce or religion or conscience or of individual action. All of these may be fine things, but they are ideals which belong to a later age.

During the Cold War, many were inclined to cite the greater efficiency of the market economy as the fundamental distinguishing trait of the West, proudly pointing to our groaning supermarket shelves and favorably contrasting them with Soviet bread lines. Persons used to this way of viewing matters will be especially liable to a feeling of cognitive dissonance when reading Herodotus, who constantly stresses the wealth of oriental despotisms; whereas “in Hellas,” according to one Greek quoted in the Histories, “poverty is always and forever a native resident” (Book 7: chapter 102).

An especially famous and illustrative story, not less significant for being probably unhistorical, concerns Solon the Athenian lawgiver and Croesus of Lydia (immortalized in the expression “rich as Croesus”). After proudly displaying his wealth to his Athenian visitor, Croesus hopefully asks whether Solon in all his travels has “yet seen anyone who surpasses all others in happiness and prosperity?” Solon disappoints him by naming a number of Greeks who lived in relatively moderate circumstances. Croesus indignantly asks “are you disparaging my happiness as though it were nothing? Do you think me worth less than even a common man?” Solon explains that no judgment can be made while Croesus is still alive, for reversals of fortune are too common. (1:30-32) Croesus eventually attempts to conquer the Persians, but is defeated by them and deprived of his kingdom.

The Asiatics as portrayed by Herodotus might be described, for lack of a better word, as accumulators. This applies no less to political power than to wealth. “We have conquered and made slaves of the Sacae, Indians, Ethiopians, Assyrians, and many other great nations” says one Persian grandee matter of factly, “not because they had committed injustices against Persia, but only to increase our own power through them” (7:8). In other words, they are believers in what a contemporary neoconservative journalist might call “national greatness.” They build larger monuments than the Greeks and undertake vast projects such as diverting rivers. It never seems to occur to them that anything might become too big or too organized. When they attempt the conquest of Greece, Herodotus shows them becoming encumbered by their vast baggage trains, unable to moor their multitude of ships properly in tiny Greek coves—generally crushed beneath their own weight like a beached whale as much as they are defeated by the Hellenic armies.

A related Asiatic trait is a failure to acknowledge human limitations. When Xerxes’ invasion is delayed by stormy weather at the Hellespont, he orders the beachhead scourged and branded. His slaves are instructed to say: “Bitter water, your Master is imposing this penalty upon you for wronging him. King Xerxes will cross you whether you like it or not” (7:35). Similarly, there is no real place in the Asiatic’s thought for death, because it is the ultimate limitation on human planning and power. Xerxes weeps while reviewing his army as it occurs to him that all his men will be dead in a hundred years, but decides he must simply put the matter out of his mind.

The Solonian view of happiness as a life well lived from beginning to end, by contrast, begins with the fundamental fact of human finitude. It is this characteristically Greek view which Aristotle eventually formalized and extended in his discussion of happiness (eudaimonia) in the Nicomachian Ethics, and which has continued to influence the best minds of Christendom to this day. The modern “consumerist” mentality, by contrast, might be understood as a relapse into Asiatic barbarism.

The Persians make efforts to buy off Greek leaders. Herodotus describes the wealth of a Persian Satrap named Hydarnes, and then recounts his advice to some Spartan envoys passing through his province on the way to the Persian capitol:

“Lacedaemonians, why are you trying to avoid becoming the King’s friends? You can see that the King knows how to honor good men when you look at me and the state of my affairs. This could be the same for you if only you would surrender yourselves to the King, since he would surely think you to be good men and allow each of you Greek territory to rule over.” To this they replied, “Hydarnes, you offer us this advice only because you do not have a fair and proper perspective. For you counsel us based on your experience of only one way of life, but you have had no experience of the other: you know well how to be a slave but have not yet experienced freedom, nor have you felt whether it is sweet or not. But if you could try freedom, you would advise us to fight for it, and not only with spears, but with axes!” (7:135)

When the envoys arrive in Susa,

At first the King’s bodyguards ordered them and actually tried to force them to prostrate themselves before the King; but they refused to do so, saying that they would never do that, even if the bodyguards should try to push them down to the ground headfirst, since it was not their custom [nomos] to prostrate themselves before any human being. (7:136)

King Xerxes, by contrast, is a great believer in “leadership:” if he were alive today, one might picture him topping the bestseller lists with books on his “Seven Principles of Effective Leadership.” Before invading Greece, he asks:

How could 1,000 or even 10,000 or 50,000 men, all of them alike being free and lacking one man to rule over them, stand up to an army as great as mine? Now if they were under the rule of one man, as is our way, they would fear that man and be better able, in spite of their natural inclinations, to go out and confront larger forces, despite their being outnumbered, because they would then be compelled by the lash. But they would never dare to do such a thing if they were allowed their freedom! (7:103)

At the Battle of Salamis, he has a throne erected for himself on a prominent hill, convinced that his men will fight best knowing they are under his watchful eye.

Herodotus leaves us in no doubt where he stands on this issue; he relates in his own voice that

the Athenians increased in strength, which demonstrates that an equal voice in government has beneficial impact not merely in one way, but in every way: the Athenians, while ruled by tyrants, were no better in war than any of the peoples living around them, but once they were rid of tyrants, they became by far the best of all. Thus it is clear that they were deliberately slack while repressed, since they were working for a master, but that after they were freed, they became ardently devoted to working hard so as to win achievements for themselves as individuals. (5:78)

This comparative lack of emphasis on leadership does not mean the ancients were egalitarian levelers. All successful enterprises must be organized hierarchically, because this is what allows men to coordinate their efforts. The Greeks, in fact, made a proverb of a line from Homer’s Iliad: “Lordship for many is no good thing; let there be one ruler.” Moreover, they greatly honored men who performed leadership functions successfully.

Public offices were, however, always distinguished from the particular men holding them. They did not regard their magistrates as sacred, and none ever claimed to be descended from Zeus. Aristotle defined political freedom as “ruling and being ruled in turn.” In battle, Greek captains fought in a corner of the phalanx beside their men; they could be difficult for an enemy to distinguish.

What allowed Greeks to combine effective organization with political freedom? Herodotus suggests it was a kind of “rule of law.” As a Greek advisor explains to Xerxes:

Though they are free, they are not free in all respects, for they are actually ruled by a lord and master: law [nomos] is their master, and it is the law that they inwardly fear—much more so than your men fear you. They do whatever it commands, which is always the same: it forbids them to flee from battle, and no matter how many men they are fighting, it orders them to remain in their rank and either prevail or perish. (7:104)

In order to appreciate what is being said here, it is important to understand what is meant by law, or nomos. If it were possible to make intelligible to Herodotus such modern legal phenomena as executive orders, Supreme Court decrees, or annually updated administrative regulations, it is more than doubtful whether he would have considered them examples of nomos. These are simply instruments of power, not much different from what existed in the Persian Empire or any despotism. A “rule of law” in this sense makes no particular contribution to freedom. In fact, much of the West’s current predicament results from our traditional respect for law being converted into a weapon against us, rendering us subject to a regime of arbitrary commands disguised as “law” and concocted by an irresponsible power elite hostile to our interests.

It is essential to nomos that it be superpersonal. Often the word can be translated “custom,” which helps one understand that it cannot be decreed by any man, whether King or Hellenic magistrate. Freedom under nomos is not lack of a master, as Herodotus makes clear, but the capacity for self-mastery. In battle, it extends even to the point of demanding total self-sacrifice.

This helps to explain why wealth is dangerous to freedom; the man who becomes used to gratifying his desires comes to be ruled by desire and loses his capacity for self-mastery and sacrifice. When an earlier King of Persia is threatened by rebellion, Herodotus shows him being advised as follows:

Prohibit them from possessing weapons of war, order them to wear tunics under their cloaks and soft boots, instruct them to play the lyre and the harp, and tell them to educate their sons to be shopkeepers. If you do this, sire, you will soon see that they will become women instead of men and thus will pose no danger or threat to you of any future rebellion. (1:155)

The limitations of the Asiatic leadership principle become evident when an Asiatic army loses its leader. It is liable to cease being an army—to become a rabble, a mob of individuals incapable of organization or initiative. A famous episode from later Greek history makes clear how the Greek way was different: In 401 BC, about a generation after Herodotus’ death, an army of ten thousand Greek mercenaries marched into the heart of the Persian Empire in support of a rival candidate for the Imperial title. Their leader was killed in battle and they were stranded hundreds of miles deep in hostile territory. A Persian representative came to accept their surrender and collect their weapons, and was flummoxed to learn the Greeks had no intention of handing any weapons over. Instead, they simply met in assembly and elected a new leader for themselves—exactly as they were accustomed to do in the political assembles of their home cities. They proceeded to fight their way back to Greece with most of them surviving, and the entire might of the Persian Empire was insufficient to stop them. It is safe to say that no Persian army could have equaled the feat.

This spirit of independence and self-reliance did not last forever. The Greek cities wore out their strength through decades of fighting with one another. In 338, they finally fell to Philip, King of Macedon. By 291, Athenians were celebrating the triumphal return of a Macedonian general to their city in hymns describing him as a “living god.” He used the Parthenon to house his harem. Economic historians tell us that the overall Greek standard of living was higher in this later age, however.

Today we see a traitorous leadership consciously abandons our heritage of freedom to a barbarism worse than Persian, buying us off with the bread and circuses of television, shopping malls, and tax subsidies for collaborators, punishing the few who offer even verbal resistance. The reader who still has a mind to do something about this situation might find some lessons in the pages of Herodotus. He would be well advised to take a little time from our current plight to reacquaint himself with what Western man has been.

TOQ Online, April 19, 2009

lundi, 11 octobre 2010

Destruction de la mémoire européenne: pour les Turcs, Allianoï n'est qu'une "invention" d'archéologues

Destruction de la mémoire européenne : pour les Turcs, Allianoï n’est qu’ une « invention » d’archéologues

La vallée où se trouvent les ruines de l’antique cité grecque d’Allianoï (ouest de la Turquie) sera dans quelques semaines transformée en lac artificiel, destiné à l’irrigation de 8 000 hectares de terres agricoles. La mise en eau du barrage de Yortanli, dont la construction s’est achevée en 2007, vient en effet d’être programmée pour la fin de l’année. Une décision qui sème la consternation dans la communauté scientifique.

Dans les prochaines semaines disparaîtront à jamais les fondations de l’hôpital de Galien, l’un des pères de la pharmacie, né dans la ville voisine de Pergame au 2e siècle de notre ère. Puis, ce seront les thermes, avec leur bassin encore alimenté par une source d’eau chaude et protégés par des murs hauts de cinq mètres, la salle aux colonnes monolithes, les mosaïques et les allées couvertes qui disparaîtront sous le sable, après avoir été recouverts d’un illusoire enduit de protection rosâtre. Les archéologues, interdits sur le site, assistent impuissants au massacre. « Il n’y a pas, au monde, de bains chauds, de centre de santé aussi bien conservés », se désole le professeur Ahmet Yaras, qui souligne que 80 % du site n’a pas encore été fouillé.

Pour l’archéologue, le sable et le ciment saupoudrés à la hâte par les Turcs sur les vestiges ne suffiront pas à préserver ces derniers sous 30 mètres d’eau. « Et même s’ils étaient protégés, dans 50 ans, la sédimentation due au barrage atteindra 15 ou 16 mètres, ajoute-t-il. Il faudrait être fou pour tenter d’exhumer à nouveau ces vestiges à une telle profondeur. »

« Allianoï ? C’est juste une source d’eau chaude », commente, goguenard, un cultivateur de coton, tomates et maïs du coin, qui voit dans la mise en eau du barrage une excellente chose pour ses affaires. Il ne fait d’ailleurs que reprendre les propos du ministre turc de « l’Environnement » qui affirmait fin août : « Allianoï n’existe pas, c’est une invention. Il y a juste une source chaude, comme on en trouve dans toute la Turquie. » Une déclaration qui a scandalisé la communauté scientifique, conduisant les représentants du Conseil international des monuments et des sites (Icomos), du programme européen Europa Nostra et de l’Union des archéologues européens à adresser une lettre au gouvernement turc l’enjoignant de tout faire pour préserver « l’héritage commun » d’Allianoï.

Les commentaires du ministre turc de la « culture » sont encore plus cyniques : « Après tout, Allianoï est resté sous terre pendant longtemps, il a fallu des fouilles pour l’en sortir. » La négation même de l’archéologie…

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lundi, 14 juin 2010

El hombre integro (spoudaios) como norma del obrar

19296D1_apollon_v.jpgEl hombre íntegro (spoudaios) como norma del obrar

Alberto Buela (*)

 

En estos días que nos hemos enterado por un estudioso amigo, que los ingleses de Oxford, que solo se citan a sí mismo en los estudios aristotélicos, han citado nuestra vieja traducción de 1981 del Protréptico de Aristóteles, única obra en castellano citada por ellos desde la época del ñaupa.

Y además, luego de haber visto como el gallego Megino Rodríguez se hizo el burro en su lamentable traducción del 2005, no haciendo ni siquiera mención a la existencia de nuestro trabajo, es que vamos a  encarar lo que para nosotros es la médula de la ética del hijo de Efestiada de Calcide.

Y lo vamos a hacer porque a esta altura de la soirée [1] pretendemos ofrecer, al lego en forma simple y clara, la idea fuerza que funda la ética aristotélica y que recorre toda la obra del esposo de Pythia y de Herpilis.  

La intención expresa que nos guía es dejar de lado toda actitud erudita, llevándonos del consejo del Don Miguel Reale, ese gran pensador brasileño cuando afirmaba: cultura es aquello que queda cuando el andamiaje de la erudición se viene abajo.

 

El tutelado de Próxenes se ocupó durante toda su vida del tema ético, desde sus primeros escritos como el Protréptico hasta sus últimos como la Magna Moralia [2]. O sea, desde sus treinta y un años siendo aún discípulo de Platón hasta los sesenta y dos cercanos a su muerte.

 

Antes que nada, cabe destacar la exigencia aristotélica en ética; de llevar a la práctica aquello que se estudia y así lo afirma en forma tajante y definitiva: “Lo que hay que hacer después de haberlo aprendido, lo aprendemos haciéndolo… practicando la justicia nos hacemos justos y practicando la temperancia temperantes” (EN. 1103 a 31). “Puesto que el presente estudio no es teórico como los otros, pues investigamos- en ética- no para saber qué es la virtud sino para ser buenos” (EN. 1103 b 28). El realismo aristotélico es el signo de su filosofía, es por ello que el genial Rafael pinta a Aristóteles señalando con su índice la tierra mientras camina junto a Platón.

 

Y de qué tipo y clase es ese hombre bueno que nos propone el maestro de Alejandro?  Es el spoudaios (spoudaioV), el phronimos(fronimoV). Es la idea fuerza, es el centro de toda le ética aristotélica, de modo que si caracterizamos acabadamente estos conceptos vamos a comprender su mensaje ético.

Ya en uno de sus primeros escritos, el Protréptico,  afirma:“Además qué regla (kanon) o qué determinación precisa (oroV  akribesteroV) de lo que es bueno podemos tener sino el criterio del hombre sapiente (fronimoV). Frag. 39. “todos estamos de acuerdo que el hombre más íntegro dirija (spoudaiotaton arcein). Frag. 38.

Al respecto afirma en la Ética Nicomaquea: “El spoudaios enjuicia correctamente todas las cuestiones prácticas y en todas ellas se le devela lo verdadero…quizá el spoudaios difiere de los demás por ver lo verdadero en cada cuestión como si fuera el canon y la medida en ellas”  (EN. 1113 a 29-32). Como se dijo la areté (excelencia) y el spoudaios parecen ser la medida de todas las cosas. Éste está de acuerdo consigo mismo y tiende con toda su alma a fines que no divergen entre sí” (EN. 1166 a 12-19). Y más adelante, casi al final de la ética va ser mucho más explícito: “En los hombres los placeres varían mucho pues las mismas cosas agradan a unos y molestan a otros… Esto ocurre con las cosas dulces, que no parecen lo mismo al que tiene fiebre que al que está sano y lo mismo ocurre con todo lo demás. Pero en tales casos, se considera que lo verdadero es lo que le parece al spoudaios, y si esto es cierto, y la medida de cada cosa son la areté (excelencia) y el spoudaios como tal, son placeres los que a él le parecen y agradables aquellas cosas en que se complace” (EN. 1176 a 17-19).

 

 

Vemos por estas y otras muchas citas[3] que podríamos agregar que los términos spoudáios y phrónimos van a tener, desde sus primeros escritos hasta los últimos, un peso significativo y determinante en toda la ética del padre de Nicómano. Ellos son el centro y el fundamento de toda su ética.

El primer significado del término spoudáios menta el esfuerzo serio y sostenido aplicado a una cosa digna y en una segunda acepción se vincula a las nociones de areté (excelencia o perfección) y agathós (bien).

Esta valoración del spoudaios, por el padrino de Nicanor, como última  regla y norma en las cuestiones prácticas y morales es asombrosa. Erróneamente, como le ocurrió a Dirlmeier, el último traductor al alemán, se puede pensar que se asemeja al adagio del sofista Protágoras: “el hombre es la medida de todas las cosas”, pero en realidad el dueño de Tacón, Filón y Olímpico se distancia porque el spoudaios no es el hombre común del sofista sino el hombre digno. Y con esta afirmación se aleja también de Platón y sus normas universales para el obrar.

Sin quererlo nos ayuda, el maestro de Teofrastro, a enfrentar la filosofía moral moderna y la certeza que busca ésta en los juicios ético-morales. Ante el rigorismo ético del pensamiento ilustrado, de la ética autónoma, del formalismo kantiano, y la ética veterotestamentaria, Aristóteles nos propone el criterio de lo verosímil como guía y norma del hacer y del obrar. “Pues no se puede buscar del mismo modo el rigor en todas las cuestiones, sino en cada una según la materia que subyazca a ellas” (EN. 1098 a 27).

 

 

Viene ahora la cuestión de cómo traducir estos dos términos cruciales para la comprensión de la filosofía práctica del hijo de Nicómaco.

 

Así para spoudaios [4]J. Tricot traduce por “l´homme de bien o vertueux”. Pallí Bonet y E.Sinnott  por “hombre bueno”. J. Montoya y T. de Koninck por “hombre virtuoso”.  Emile Bréhier  David Ross y Nicola  Abbagnano por “sofós”, esto es por sabio, sage o saggio. En cambio ya el español Antonio Tovar en 1953 lo traduce por “diligente” y muchos años después el alemán Harder lo traduce por “hombre noble y serio”. Y el argentino Pablo Maurette por “hombre circunspecto”, “ya que el adjetivo castellano expresa a la vez la idea de sabiduría pero también anuncia seriedad, paz interior y perseverancia. P.Aubenque la traduce por “diligente y serio”.

 

En nuestro criterio, traducir spoudaios por bueno tiene una connotación exclusivamente moral que el término griego supera. En cuanto a la traducción por virtuoso, el término no existe en griego.

Traducir por sabio es una visión intelectualista. Más cerca del original están las versiones de hombre noble, serio o circunspecto pero dejan de lado el aspecto práctico del spoudáios. En cuanto a la traducción por diligente, a la inversa que la anterior, se limita solo al aspecto práctico del spoudáios, es por eso que Aubenque (l´éponge) se percata y agrega el término serio.  

 

Nosotros preferimos traducirlo por “hombre íntegro y diligente” pues cada vez que se plantea el tema del criterio en la elección ética o en la vida práctica es el spoudáios quien aparece. Y es como hombre digno que agota en sí la función propia del hombre (juzga adecuadamente)  y como diligente actúa siempre de acuerdo con la areté (la excelencia o perfección) de cada cosa, acción o situación.

Aquello que asombra de esta idea del spoudaios es que éste no es ni se alza como una regla trascendente, como los diez mandamientos, sino que el spoudaios mismo es quien se convierte en la medida de la acción perfecta tanto en el hacer como en el obrar.

 

En el spoudaios su deseo se refiere siempre al bien y como cada cual es bueno para sí mismo es, en definitiva para nosotros para quienes queremos el bien, ya que la preferencia de sí mismo se encuentra en el fondo de todos los deseos.

El spoudaios es el que realiza al grado máximo las potencialidades de la naturaleza humana. Lo que caracteriza al spoudaios es contemplar la verdad en cada acción o tarea y el es la referencia y la medida de lo noble y agradable.

El spoudaios hace lo que debe hacer de manera oportuna. Es el hombre que actúa siempre con la areté. Este concepto de areté no se limita simplemente al plano moral como sucede cuando se la traduce por “virtud” sino que debe de ser entendida como excelencia o perfección de las cosas y las acciones y así podemos hablar de la areté del ojo que es percibir bien, la del caballo que es correr, la del ascensor que es subir y bajar. Es decir que la areté expresa y tiene tanto un contenido moral y ético como funcional, y es por ello que debemos traducir y entender el término areté como excelencia, perfección o acabamiento de algo.

Y esto es lo que logra el spoudaios con su obrar y con su hacer, transformase, él mismo, en canon y la medida que se presenta como norma no trascendente de la sociedad,[5] y es por esta última razón que sólo a partir de él podemos conseguir la implantación de un verdadero y genuino humanismo.

 

En cuanto al concepto de phrónesis hace ya muchos años en nuestra traducción al castellano del Protréptico (1981) hemos sostenido: “La aparición por primera vez del término phrónesis, capital para la interpretación jaegerdiana del Protréptico, nos obliga a justificar nuestra traducción del vocablo. Hemos optado por traducir phronimos por sapiente y phrónesis por sapiencia por dos motivos. Primero porque nuestra menospreciada lengua castellana (no se aceptaban comunicaciones en castellano en los congresos internacionales de filosofía en la época) es la única de las lenguas modernas que, sin forzarla, lo permite. Y segundo, porque dado que la noción de phrónesis implica la identidad entre el conocimiento teorético y la conducta práctica, el traducirla por “sabiduría” a secas, tal como se ha hecho habitualmente, es mutilar parte del concepto. Ello implica in nuce una interpretación platónica del Protréptico, y traducirla por “prudencia” la limita a un aspecto moral que el concepto supera, mientras que “sapiencia o saber sapiencial”, implica no sólo un conocimiento teórico sino también su proyección práctica“ [6].

Ya observó hace más de medio siglo ese agudo traductor de Aristóteles al castellano que fue el mejicano Antonio Gómez Robledo: “Hoy la prudencia tiene que ver con una cautela medrosa y no con el heroísmo moral, el esfuerzo alto y sostenido de la virtud”.

 

Sobre este tema es interesante notar que los scholars ingleses, especialistas desde siempre en los estudios aristotélicos, se han jactado de sus traducciones por lo ajustado de las mismas a la brevedad de la expresión griega. Sin embargo en esta ocasión tanto el inglés como el francés han tenido que ceder a la precisión del castellano. Así para phrónesis ellos necesitan de dos términos, sea practical wisdom o saggesse practique, en tanto que al castellano le alcanza con uno: sapiencia.[7] Ya decían nuestros viejos criollos: Hay que dejar de ser léido para ser sapiente. Así la tarea del sapiente consiste en saber dirigir correctamente la vida. Su saber, a la vez,  teórico y práctico le permite distinguir lo que es bueno de lo que es malo y encontrar los medios adecuados para nuestros fines verdaderos: “los sapientes buscan lo que es bueno para ellos y creen que es esto lo que debe hacerse” (EN. 1142 a 1).

 

Spoudaios y phronimos, íntegro y sapiente, son dos caras de una misma moneda, son dos términos que pintan conceptos similares, solo se distinguen por los matices, uno destaca la integridad, la seriedad que viene del verbo spoudázein y otro el matiz más intelectual que viene del verbo phronéin.

Así el hombre íntegro y sapiente será aquel que sabe actuar en la vida cotidiana de forma tal que sus acciones, por lo incierta que es la vida en sí misma, se transforman en norma y medida de lo que debe hacerse para el buen vivir.

 

 

(*) arkegueta, aprendiz constante

Universidad Tecnológica Nacional (UTN)

alberto.buela@gmail.com                                                                                 



[1] Es que llevamos 40 años leyendo sistemáticamente al Discípulo.

[2] Los escritos que tratan específicamente de la ética son: Protréptico, Ética Eudemia, Ética Nicomaquea, Magna Moralia (algunos (Aubenque) dicen que no sería de Aristóteles y otros (Ackrill) que sí), y uno pequeño De virtutibus et vicis donde no hay en toda la opera omnia  de Aristóteles ni en ninguno de los sesudos comentaristas del Estagirita una síntesis más acabada de su teoría de las virtudes como la que nos brinda este pequeño tratado. Está bien, no salió de la pluma de Aristóteles, pero quien quiera que haya escrito este opúsculo conocía al Filósofo como los mejores.

[3] Cf. EN 1179 b 20; 1155 a 12-19; EE 1218 b 34; Rhet 1367 b 21, etc.

[4] Cf. EN, 1109a 24, 1113a 25, 1114b 19, 1130b 25, 1144a 17 y 1154a 6

[5] Salvando la distancia teológica que media, el spoudaios nos recuerda el Jesús existencial que se alza como norma, aquel del: ego sum via, veritas et vita  o “el que no está conmigo está contra mi”.

[6] Aristóteles: Protréptico, Bs.As., Ed. Cultura et labor, 1983, p. 44

[7] Existe una anécdota de José Luís Borges quien ante la jactancia inglesa de la brevedad de su expresión tomó un cuento inglés y lo escribió en castellano mucho más breve. De ello se dio cuenta André Malreaux cuando caracterizó el mérito de Borges afirmando: “su genio está en la economía y belleza de su expresión”.